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STATE OF IDAdO
COUNTY OF K O O T E H A l j ss

FILED

Kootenai County Department of Administrative Services
Patrick M. Braden, Civil Attorney, ISB #6020
451 N. Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur dJAlene,ID 83816-9000
Phone: (208) 446-1620
Fax: (208) 446-1621
Attorney for Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
CHATEAU DE LOIRE.

Case No.

KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,

CV-08-163

OBJECTION TO REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT AND MOTION TO
STRIKE

Appellant,

KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R.
CURRIE, RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W.
TODD TONDEE,
Respondents.

i

COME NOW the Respondents, KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R. CURRIE, RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W. TODD
TONDEE, by and through their attorney of record, Patrick M. Braden of the Kootenai
County Department of Administrative Services, and hereby object to the Appellant's
OBJECTION TO REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 1
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Reply to Respondents' brief, filed on or about April 3, 2008, and move this honorable
Court, pursuant to 1,R.C.P. 84(0), to strike said reply, or alternatively, to decline to
consider the arguments contained therein. The basis for this motion is that the PostMediation Agreement reached between the parties on January 19, 2007 superseded,
extinguished, andlor rendered moot any arguments based on claims raised in the
appeal of Kootenai County's August 24, 2006 decision in the first "Chateau de Loire"
application (PUD-054-05).
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(0), Respondents have provided authority and argument
in support of this motion in a separate memorandum filed contemporaneously herewith.
Respondents hereby request oral argument on this motion.
Dated this

/ylL

day of April, 2008.
Kootenai County Department
of Administrative Services

Patrick M. Braden
Attorney for Respondents
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

&

I hereby certify that on the
day of April, 2008, 1 caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing via facsimile to the following person:
Kristen R. Thompson
THOMPSON LAW FIRM
55 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 150
Meridian, ID 83642
Fax: (208) 888-7296

Geraldine Kirk-Hughes
KIRK-HUGHES & ASSOCIATES
2551 S. Fort Apache Road, Suite 103
Las Vegas, NV 891 17
Fax: (702) 233-8661

Kacey L. Wall
GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM
105 N. Fourth Street, Suite 307
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83814
Fax: (208) 667-8503

Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box " A
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83816
Fax: (208) 765-51 17

Patrick M. Braden
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STATE, O i IDAHO
COUNTY Or" KUOTENAI
FILE?

Kootenai County Department of Administrative Sewices
Patrick M. Braden, ISB #6020
451 N. Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone: (208) 446-1620
Fax: (208) 446-1621
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Attorney for Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT,
LLC FOR PLANNED UNIT
DEVELOPMENT CHATEAU DE LOIRE.
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Appellant,
VS.

Case NO.

CV-08-163

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
OBJECTION TO REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT AND MOTION TO
STRIKE

KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R.
CURRIE, RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W.
TODD TONDEE,
Respondents.

COME NOW the Respondents, KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R. CURRIE, RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W. TODD
TONDEE, by and through their attorney of record, Patrick M. Braden of the Kootenai
County Department of Administrative Services, and provide the following memorandum
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 1
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in support of Respondents' Objection to Reply Brief of Appellant and Motion to Strike,
filed contemporaneously herewith.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAl BACKGROUND
Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC (hereinafter referred to as "KHD") filed
an application with Kootenai County (hereinafter referred to as "the County") on April 12,
2005 requesting approval of a proposed planned unit development (PUD) and a
proposed subdivision within the PUD, to develop a gated community named "Chateau
de Loire" on 578 acres of property located within the Restricted Residential and Rural
zones. The site is located on either side of State Highway 97, west of the entrance to
Beauty Bay State Park, approximately 5 miles from Interstate 90, on the southwest
shore of Lake Coeur dlAlene to the south of Moscow Bay.

This application was

assigned Case No. PUD-054-05. This PUD application will be hereinafter referred to as
"the first Chateau de Loire application."
The Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (hereinafter referred to as "the
Board") denied the first Chateau de Loire application in an Order of Decisioh dated
August 24, 2006. KHD timely appealed that decision to the District Court on September
1, 2006 in Kootenai County Civil Case No. CV-06-6587. KHD filed its opening brief on
December 8, 2006, and the County filed its response brief on January 19, 2007.
While that appeal was pending, KHD and the Board reached a mediated
settlement agreement on January 19, 2007, in which the Board agreed to consider a
new application for approval of a proposed PUD and subdivision for the Chateau de
Loire development on an expedited basis (hereinafter referred to as "the Post-Mediation
Agreement"). This agreement also set forth certain conditions which were to be met in
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 2
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order for the new application to be considered by the Board. The agreement, however,
did not state that the application would be automatically approved upon satisfaction of
those conditions, nor did it otherwise guarantee approval of the application.
KHD then filed an application on March 14, 2007, requesting approval of a
proposed PUD and a proposed subdivision within the PUD for Chateau de Loire. This
application proposed no more than 500 units on the 578-acre property.

The PUD

application was assigned Case No. PUD-057-07, and the subdivision application was
assigned Case No. S-878P-07. The combined PUD and subdivision application will be
hereinafter referred to as "the second Chateau de Loire application."
A public hearing was held on the second Chateau de Loire application before
Kootenai County Hearing Examiner Lisa Key on August 29, 2007. Key recommended
denial of this application in a hearing examiner report issued on September 11, 2007
The Board held a public hearing on the second Chateau de Loire application on
November 19, 2007, and conducted a site visit on December 4, 2007.

At their

deliberations on December 6, 2007, the Board received clarification from staff regarding
the site visit, then closed the public hearing and deliberated on this application. During
deliberations, a number of major concerns with the project as proposed were identified.
The Board then voted unanimously to accept Key's recommendation and to deny the
second Chateau de Loire application. An Order of Decision memorializing this denial
was approved for signing on December 13,2007.
KHD timely filed a Notice of Appeal of this decision on January 9, 2008 in
Kootenai County Civil Case No. CV-08-163. The Court entered an order consolidating
that appeal with the appeal in Case No. CV-06-6587, pursuant to stipulation of the
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO
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parties, on January 29, 2008. On February 22, 2008, the Court heard oral argument on

KHD's Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement. The Court denied this motion in a
ruling from the bench at that hearing, and memorialized this ruling in a written order
entered on March 4, 2008. KHD then filed Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief filed
in Case No. CV-06-6587 on or about April 3, 2008.
ARGUMENT

1.

The Post-Mediation Agreement reached between the parties on January 19,
2007 superseded and extinguished any arguments based on claims raised
in the appeal of the first Chateau de Loire application.
The Court should not consider the arguments raised by KHD in Appellant's Reply

to Respondent's Brief because they are based solely on the Board's denial of the

first

Chateau de Loire application. As the ldaho Supreme Court stated in 1959 in Wilson v.
Bogert:
An agreement of compromise and settlement is a merger and bar of all
pre-existing claims which the parties intended to settle thereby. Such prior
claims are thereby superseded and extinguished. The compromise
agreement becomes the sole source and measure of the rights of the
parties involved in the previously existing controversy. The existence of a
valid agreement of compromise and settlement is a complete defense to
an action based upon the original claim.
In an action brought to enforce an agreement of compromise and
settlement, made in good faith, the court will not inquire into the merits or
validity of the original claim.
Wilson v. Bogert, 81 ldaho 535, 542, 347 P.2d 341, 345 (1959) (citations omitted).
More recently, the ldaho Supreme Court has had occasion to apply this rule to a
settlement agreement reached via mediation. Goodman v. Lothrop, 143 ldaho 622,
625, 151 P.3d 818, 821 (2007). The Goodman Court also reaffirmed that such an

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO
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agreement "supersedes and extinguishes all pre-existing claims the parties intended to
settle." Id.
Were, the Post-Mediation Agreement acted as a compromise and settlement of
all claims asserted in the appeal of the County's denial of the first Chateau de Loire
application. Therefore, under Bogerf and Goodman, as well as other well-settled ldaho

case law, all claims which were, or could have been, made on the basis of the County's
denial of the first Chateau de Loire application are superseded and extinguished. The
Court has already found that the parties have performed their respective obligations
under the Post-Mediation Agreement, and on that basis denied KHD's Motion to
Enforce Mediation Agreement.

Accordingly, the Court should decline to hear or

consider any arguments based on the denial of the first Chateau de Loire application,
and should strike Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief.
11.

Any arguments based on claims raised in the appeal of the first Chateau de
Loire application are moot.
An issue is moot "if it does not present a real and substantial controversy that is

capable of being concluded through judicial decree of specific relief." Koch v. Canyon

County, - kklho

,

, 177 P.3d 372, 377 (2008). Here, the appeal of the denial

of the first Chateau de Loire application is moot for two reasons. First, as discussed
above, any claims based on this decision are superseded and extinguished under the
terms of the Post-Mediation Agreement. Secondly, KHD received the relief the Court
would have provided if its petition for judicial review of this decision were successful.
In Idaho, a reviewing court must remand a matter to an agency or governing
body "for further proceedings as necessary" if it does not affirm the agency or governing
body's decision. ldaho Code § 67-5279. Thus, if the Court had ruled in KHD's favor on
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT AND MOTION TO STRIKE - 5
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the County's denial of the first Chateau de Loire application, that application would have
been remanded to the Board for further proceedings.' The Post-Mediation Agreement
afforded KHD the opportunity to file a new application in lieu of a remand for
reconsideration of the original denial. KHD did in fact file a new application, which
included an application for preliminary subdivision approval as well as an application for
PUD approval. Therefore, the Post-Mediation Agreement provided KHD the relief it
would have received if its challenge of the denial of the first Chateau de Loire
application were successful, thus rendering KHD's appeal of this decision moot.
CONCLUSlON
The Post-Mediation Agreement superseded and extinguished all claims which
were, or could have been, made on the basis of the County's denial of the first Chateau
de Loire application. In addition, KHD's appeal of this decision is moot. Therefore,
Respondent Kootenai County objects to KHD's continued pursuit of relief from this
decision, as evidenced by the filing of Appellant's Reply to Respondent's Brief.
Accordingly, the County respectfully requests the Court to strike this brief, or
alternatively, to decline to consider the arguments contained therein.
DATED this /*h

day of April, 2008.
Kootenai County Department
of Administrative Services

P&R. &L

Patrick M. Braden
Attorney for Respondents

' Remand is unnecessary only where "there is no indication in the record that further findings of fact could
be made from the paucity of evidence that would affect the outcome" of the case. Bonner General Hosp.
v. Bonner County, 133 Idaho 7 , 11, 981 P.2d 242, 246 (1999). Here, this exception would not apply,
given the myriad of evidence in the record of the first Chateau de Loire application.
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF OBJECTION TO
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this /b#& day of April, 2008, 1 caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing via facsimile, addressed to the following:
Kristen R. Thompson
THOMPSON LAW FIRM
55 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 150
Meridian, ID 83642

Geraldine Kirk-Hughes
KIRK-HUGHES & ASSOCIATES
2551 S, Fort Apache Road, Suite 103
Las Vegas, NV 89117

Fax: (208) 888-7296

Fax: (702) 233-8661

Kacey L. Wall
GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM
105 N, Fourth Street, Suite 307
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83814

Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
P.0. Box "A"
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83816

Fax: (208) 667-8503

Fax: (208) 765-51 17

/&&.L

Patrick M, Braden
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STATE O F IDAEICi
COUNTY ~i ~ O Q T E H A)I

FILE?:

''

Kristen R. Thompson
THOMPSON L,AW FIRM
55 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 150
Meridian, Idaho 83642
Telephone Number: (208) 888-7278
Facsimile Number: (208) 888-7296
ISB #4033
Attorneys for Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
KNOWN AS CHATEAU DE LOIRE

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-163

1

KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

vs.
Appellant,
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; S . J. "GUS"
JOHNSON; ELMER R. CURRIE; KATIE
BRODIE,

APPELLANTfS MOTION
REQUIZSTING RECONSIDERATION
OF OFLDER A?2D, IN THE
ALTERNATIW, CERTIFICATION
OF THE COURT'S DECISION

)
)

Respondents.

1

COMES NOW the Appellant, KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC, (KHD)
by and through its attorney of record, Kristen R. Thompson of the
THOMPSON

LAW

reconsider

its

FIRM,
Order

and

requests

Denying

that

this

Appellant's

Honorable

Motion

to

Court
Enforce

Mediation Agreement or, in the alternative, certify the Court's
Order Denying Appellant's

Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement

for review by the Idaho Court of Appeals.

I. INTRODUCTION
On February 22, 2008, this Court heard oral argument on
Appellant's Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement as entered into
between

Kirk-Hughes

Development, LLC,

(KHD) and

the

Kootenai

County Board of County Commissioners (the County), Case CV-08-163
(In re: S-878P-07 and PUD 057-07, which was consolidated with Case
CV-06-6587).

Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development moved this Court

to enter an Order requiring Kootenai County to perform under the
terms and conditions of the Post-Mediation Agreement entered into
by the parties on January 19, 2007.
This Honorable Court denied the Appellant1s motion using a
standard

which

Therefore,

the

Appellant

Appellant
requests

believes
the

reasons for denying Appellant's

Court

Motion

to

be

erroneous.

to

reconsider

to Enforce

Mediation Agreement as KHD contends the Court's

the

its
Post-

Decision was

based on the Administrative Standards contained in Idaho Code,
Section 67-5279, rather than on the law of contracts.
11. ARGUMENT
Standard Found Under Administrative Procedure Act Used Instead
of Contract Law:

Appellant believes that the Court applied a non-contractual
standard

in

its

review

contractual agreement.

of

the

Post-Mediation

Agreement,

a

For the purpose of considering KHD'S

Motion to Enforce the Post-Mediation Agreement, the Court did
acknowledge that KHD completed its obligations set forth in the
2

-;
4

I.

Agreement.
lns.16-18)

(Transcript of
However,

the

Proceedings
Court

did

[TPJ, 2/22/08,
not

consider,

pg.8,
as

a

contractual standard, whether or not the County had performed
its

obligation of

granting

the

permit

under

the

terms

and

Motion

to

conditions of the Agreement/Contract.
In arriving

at

its

determination

that

KHDfS

Enforce must be denied, the Court stated several times that the
Post-Mediation Agreement was "reached pursuant to Rule 16 (and)
mediation agreements

are

certainly

contract and contract law applies. "
4; see also, pg.27, lns.6-8)

enforceable

lns.16-17)

It even

The

any

other

(TP, 2/22/08, pg. 26, Ins.lstated that

Agreement stands, it certainly is enforceable
2/22/08, pg.29,

as

Court

"as

. .

.

rr

erroneously made

the
(TP,
its

determination to deny KHD'S Motion to Enforce Agreement under
the Administrative Procedures Act as shown by the following:

. what we have in front of the Court
really is a very limited question this morning.
I do have consolidated Cases CV-08-163 and CV-066587. Both of those cases are Petitions for Judicial
Review under the Administrative Procedures Act that
this Court has in front of it that the Court has for
consideration.
And, obviously, the Commissionerfs decision to
not approve the proposed PUD is certainly subject to
administrative
review
under
the
Administrative
. . (TP, 2/22/08, pg.24, lns.10Procedures Act .
21
Facts Misapprehended:

Part of the confusion that the Court may have encountered
is because Appellant

filed a Motion

rather

than

a

Petition

asking the Court to enforce the Mediation Agreement. Pursuant to
IRCP 15 and using its authority of discretion, Appellant asks
the Court consider its Motion as a Petition thereby bestowing on
the Court original jurisdiction and bringing it out from under
the Administrative Procedures Act.
Because the Court was using the Administrative Procedures
Act standard rather than contract law, Appellant believes there
are at least three (3) facts misapprehended by the Court which
led it to its determination to deny KHD'S

Motion to Enforce

Agreement.
Words
meaning

has

--

"obtainff and

"consider"

do

not

carrying

the

same

In its various arguments to this Court, the County

continuously

tried

to

convince

the

Court

that

all

the

Mediation Agreement did was to set forth conditions which KHD had
to meet in order for its new applications to be considered by the
Board.

This is not what the Post-Mediation Agreement states.

Paragraph 2 of the Agreement it states, "

.

KHD

the

agreed to and

hereby

do

identify

.

In

the Board and

actions

that

the

applicant KHD can take to obtain a permit/approval of the PUD."
(Exhibit 1, Emphasis added.)

This does not state that these

actions must be taken so that the County will consider KHDfS
Application.

If it met the terms of the Agreement, KHD understood

its new PUD Application and its Subdivision Application would be
approved so that the Appellant could proceed to the next phase in
the permit process.

As this Honorable Court can see, KHD was to obtain approval
by meeting the terms of the Agreement.

Meeting the terms of the

Agreement was not a necessary step in having the County consider
its Applications.

It already, by

law, had to

consider

the

Applications.
I .C. 67-6519 (4) (c) and

the

terms

Agreement are not one in the same

--

of

the

Post-Mediation

The reasoning and logic

of the foregoing Section flows right into this Section.
throughout

its various

tried to convince

the

arguments,

the

Court that

I.C.

County

has

Again,

constantly

67-6519 (4)(c) is

controlling law of the Post-Mediation Agreement.

the

It is not.

The mediation between KHD and the County evolved from KHDfS
first Appeal, which was stayed pending the outcome of KHD1S new
Applications.

Because the County had decided there were no

actions KHD could take to obtain a permit, it did not set* forth
any conditions pursuant to 67-6519(4) (c) at the conclusion of
its Decision and Order issued August 24, 2006.

Therefore, the

negotiated terms which were made part

Post-Mediation

of the

Agreement were the first actions the County had determined KHD
could

meet

to

obtain

a

permit/approval.

However,

these

negotiated terms were not a part of the Decision from which KHD
appealed and, therefore, were not a part of the Appeal.
This is the difference between using I.C. 67-6519 (4)(c) as
a basis for an argument regarding the Appeal and a basis as an
argument against enforcement of the Mediation Agreement.

The

conditions

set

forth

in

negotiated

conditions

of

binding

each

to

the

the

a

terms

Post-Mediation

contract
of

the

conditions had been made a part

signed

Agreement
by

contract.

the
If

of the County's

were

Parties
any

such

Decision of

August 24, 2006, they could not be deemed part of a contract as
the Decision was not a signed document entered into between the
County and KHD.

If the County did not want to be bound by a

contract with regard to these negotiated conditions, it should
have simply amended its August, 2006, Decision and added the
terms to the Decision pursuant to 67-6519.

However, it did not

take this route and became a party to a contract to which this
Court should make it adhere.
Since the terms of the Post-Mediation Agreement were not
Appeal, this Honorable Court should have

part of the Stayed '
1

based its determination whether or not to grant or deny KHDfS
Motion to Enforce Agreement on contractual law and not on the
standard of the Administrative Procedures Act.
strong

basis

under

which

to

grant

Reconsideration of the Courtfs March

This is a very

KHD'S

Motion

4, 2008, Order

for

denying

Appellant's Motion to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement.
A Decision to grant Appellant's
Mediation

Agreement

automatic

approval

would
of

not

be

Appellant's

Motion
a

PUD

to Enforce Post-

"rubber

--

stampu

The

or

an

Court

is

concerned that approving KHD'S Application simply because it met
all the terms of the Post-Mediation Agreement would be a "rubber

stamp", or an automatic approval of the PUD. This is not the
case. Once the mediated agreement/contract was in place, and the
conditions as
between

defined

the p a r t i e s

by

the

parties

were

met,

outside of the administrative

standard requires the Court1s enforcement.

contract

a

procedures

Specifically, the

parties to the mediation agreement contracted for certain terms
and

conditions

to

be

PUD/Subdivision Permit.

met

prior

to

the

issuing

of

the

This contract did not and could not

rubber stamp the stayed application t h a t d i d n o t c o n t a i n t h e s e
terms and c o n d i t i o n s . Once the contracted terms and conditions

were met, they were memorialized in the new application, which,
as a result of the parties1 negotiations and the contract must
be approved.

No other terms and conditions were requested by

the County and the mediation contract finalized what was need
for approval of the permit.

By contract, the permit therefore,

must be issued.
The Court prefaced its Decision by stating:
It's a very limited issue, and that is simply the
question as to whether or not the Agreement calls for
basically an automatic approval of the PUD. And while
the Agreement certainly did set forth considerations
and conditions that the County Commission Board was
concerned with that needed to be met - and for purpose
of this Agreement, assuming they have been met -- it
did not call for an absolute confirmation of and
approval of the PUD permit.
And so I think as the Agreement stands, it
certainly is enforceable; however, that Agreement does
not call for an automatic approval of the PUD, and,
therefore, the motion will be denied at this time.
(TP, 2/22/08, pg. 29, lns. 6-20)

The Court erroneously uses the Administrative

Procedures

Act standard in arriving at its Decision in this matter instead
of relying on contract law.
Appellant
Agreement

was

acknowledges
not

an

the

absolute

fact

that the

guarantee

that

Subdivision Applications would be approved.

Post-Mediation
its

PUD

and

If that were the

case, KHD would not have had to perform by meeting

all the

conditions and then by submitting another PUD Application and a
Subdivision

Application,

which

it

did.

There

was

nothing

automatic in getting approval of its Applications so it could
proceed to the next level. KHD had to fulfill the terms and
conditions of the contract - which the Court acknowledged it
The County, u n d e r a c o n t r a c t

did.

standard,

must now do the

same.
Even to get to the point of submitting its Applications to
the County, KHD and its experts spent many hundreds of hours and
thousands

of

dollars

to

prepare

the

Applications,

which,

ironically, the Building and Planning Department Staff has said
are

the best

received.

and most

complete Applications

they

have

ever

After KHD filed its new Applications, it and its

experts again spent hundreds of hours and thousand of dollars
working with the agencies addressing their concerns to make sure
the Applications were in accordance with the applicable Ordinances
and Codes such as the Zoning Ordinance

(393) and particularly

Chapter 15 of Title 9, the Subdivision Ordinance (394), I.C. 67-

6535 and the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan including the

KWD believes that this work is why

Planfs Future Land Use Map.

the Staff very carefully analyzed its Applications
(2) Planners) and

found

the

Applications

in

(KHD had two

compliance

and

actually recornended approval.
This is hardly the behavior displayed by an Applicant who
believed its Applications would be automatically approved simply
because of the Mediation Agreement.

KHD expected to have the

Agreement honored after it met all its obligations under
contract.

the

These included waiting months for a decision by the

County because the application process - (now clearly defined and
those items necessary for KHD to accomplish to get its permit
completed under t h e c o n t r a c t ) had to be followed.

These included

having all the public notices issued and the public hearings held
as well as the hearings before the Hearing Examiner.

Not one step

of these procedures was missed.
The Court erroneously believed it would be "circumvent (ing)
that

process

Agreement."

here

by

simply

rubber

stamping

(TP, 2/22/08, pg.28, lns. 17-19)

this

mediated

That would hardly

have been the situation as Appellant has pointed out, supra.
The Court in its Order issued March 4, 2008, failed to
address the contractual standard required for consideration to
be provided by the County for the actions met by KHD under the
Post-Mediation Agreement.
standard.

Instead, it applied an administrative

Further, the Court, while indicating that the Post-

Mediations Agreement

did not guarantee

or

assure the County

would approve the Applications as submitted by KHD failed to
find any alternative consideration that

was provided

by

the

County after the Appellant performed.
C e r t i f i c a t i o n t o the Idaho A p p e a l s C o u r t :

Should
Appellant's

this

Honorable

Court

uphold

its

Order

Denying

Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement entered into

in good faith by Kirk-Hughes Development on January 19 2007, KHD
hereby requests that this Court, pursuant to IRCP 54(b), certify
for appellate review its Decision as final in the Order Denying
Appellant's

Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement so that KHD

can appeal to the next level, as there is no just reason for
delay of the entry of a final judgment in this matter.
111. CONCLUSION

In this Motion, Kirk-Hughes Development hereby incorporates
its previous briefing into this Request for Reconsideration and
respectfully asks this Honorable Court to review its findings in
light of the Court's position that it is a contractual standard
not

an

administrative law

should have been

reviewed.

standard

under

which

Had a contractual

this matter
standard been

applied to this matter, Appellant believes that it would have
prevailed and that the County would be required to comply with
the terms and conditions of the Mediation Agreement.
It is Appellant's
granted and its Motion

belief that if reconsideration is not
to Enforce Agreement

continues to be

denied

it

will

have

a

fundamental

chilling

affect

on

all

mediation actions and negotiated agreements and cause parties to
avoid entering into mediation.
DATED this

81 5?5day of April,

2008.

THOMPSON LAW FIRM
Attorney for Kir

evelopment LLC

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of April 2008, I caused
to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by
the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Patrick M. Braden
Kootenai County
Dept. of Legal Services
PO Box 9000
451 I?. Government Way
Coeur dfAlene, ID 83816
Fax: 208-446-1621

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
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Kristen R. Thompson
THOMPSON LAW FIRM
55 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 150
Meridian, Idaho 83642
Telephone Number: (208) 888-7278
Facsimile Number: (208) 888-7296
ISB #4033
Attorneys for Kirk-Hughes Development, !~LC

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
KNOWN AS CHATEAU DE LOIRE

)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-08-163
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Appellant,
vs .
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; S .J. "GUS"
JOHNSON; ELMER R. CURRIE; KATIE
BRODIE,
Respondents.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

APPELLANTfS MOTION
FOR APPEAL OF
COMMISSIONERSf DECISION
ON PUD APPLICATION"
054-05

)
)

COMES NOW the Appellant, KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC, (KHD)
by and through its attorney of record, Kristen R. Thompson of the
THOMPSON LAW FIRM, and motions the Court to rule on the First
Appeal of Kirk-Hughes Development on its PUD Application 054-05.
The parties previously agreed to stay this appeal pending the
outcome of KHDfS renewed PUD and Subdivision Applications.

Appellant,

consistent

with

this

agreement

and

with

the

concurrence of the Court, hereby moves the Court for review of
this PUD Application.

Appellant has scheduled this Motion for

hearing on May 21, 2008, at 3:00 p.m. and hereby gives notice.
T

DATED this

1.7 =day

of April, 2008.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
day of April 2008, I caused
to be ferved a true and correct copy of the foregoing document, by
the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the
following:
Patrick N. Braden
Kootenai County
Dept. of Legal Services
PO Box 9000
451 N. Government Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816
Fax: 208-446-1621

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
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Geraldine Kirk-Hugltes
KIfPK-EIUGmS B ASSOCIATES
2551 S. Ft. Apache Road, W103
Las Vegas, Nevada 89 117
Telephone No.: (702) 233-8683
Facsimile No.: (702) 233-866 1
Pro Hsrc Vice
NSB #3444

Kacey ]I.%fall
GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM
105 XI. Fourth Street, Suite 307
Coeur d ~ l e n eIdaho
,
838 14
Telephone No.: (208) 667-953 1
Facsimile No. : (208) 567-8503
L o ~ Counsel
d
for GeraIdine Kirk-Huglies
ISB: #7116

?@

Krislen R. Thompson
THOMPSON LAW FIRM
55 SW Fifih Avenue, Suite 150
Meridian, Idaho 83642
Telephone No.: (208) 888-7278
Facsimile No .: (208) 688-7296
ISB #4033
Attorneys for Kirk-Hughes Development, LLG

IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTMCT OF

STATE OF ZDAHO, XN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAi

NO. 824
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n\r THE M A n E R

OF THE APPLICATION
OF
-mGFIES DEVELOPMENT, LLC
FOR PLANNED W T DEVELOPMENT
AND PROPOSED SUBDZVISION WTTEIM
PLJD K N O W AS CHATEAU DE LOIRE
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Case No. CV-08-163

ij!LTn;;li

z,;?,;

{1

FEF~TL

UK-HUOHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,

K O O E N A I COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; ELMER
R. G U W E ; RICI3Am A. PIAZZA; AND
W. TODD TONDEE:

UPELLANT'S
OPPOSl1TION
TO COUNTY'S OBmCTION TO
REPLY BRIEF & TO COUNTY'S
MOTION TO STMm BRIEF

Respondents.

COMES NOW the Appellant, KIRK-IIUGES DEVELOPMEXT, LLC, by and through
its attorneys, Kacey L. Wall of the GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM and Kristen R Thompson of
the THOMPSON LAW FIRM, md s u h i i ~ 1s1s Opposition lo County's Objection to RepIy Brief

and to COLUI~Y'S
Motion to Strike Brief.

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

I.

Statement of Relevant Facts and Procedural Backgrrrund

Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC (IU-ID) has read the Kootenai County Board of County
Comissioners' (I3OCC) srate1nelit of fwrs and procedural background set forth in its

Memorandum

111

S~ipporlof Objection lo Reply Brief of Appellant end Motion to Strike and

generally agrees with Anomey Braden's assessmear ofthe case, The BOCC made two (2) very
impartnn't changes in fhe language usecl in Illat Memorand~mwllich do not accltrately depicl the

situation that is before this Court.

On page 2 and ending on page 3 in the lasl paragraph at tlne BOCC'S Memorandun,
states that the "appeal was pending".

11

Well, that i s hasically true but KI-T;D and the BOCC had

: ,-

4

1

'.J

1
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DBJ

actually stipulated to a slay of Ihe Appeal in Pmg~aph1 of the Post-Mediation Agreement.
(Exhibit 1) 'I'lus is not mentioned at all in the BOCC'S presentation of ihe facts and procedures.

In this same paragrdph, tlie BOCC states hat "Kf-n> and the Board tcached a mediated
seulement . . . in whch the Board agreed.to consider a new (PUD)application

. .." (Emphasis

added.) Stating h s once apparently was not strong ellough for the BOCG to convincc the: Corn

that h s was the language of the Post-Medie~onAgreement for the very next sentence states,"s'
agrccmerxt also set (sic) forb ceriajl~con&rions which were to be met in order for the new

application to be considered by the Board." (Emphasis added.) Again, this is not exactly what the

Post-Mediation Agreelne~itstates. In Paragraph 2 of the Apeanent it states, " .

.

. the Board and

WID agreed to and hereby do identity the actions that the applicad KHI) can take

to

obtain a

psnnithpproval of the PUD." (Emphasis added.) This does nor state hilt tfiese actions must be

@en so that the BOCC will consider ICED'S Application.

What appear ro be minor changes are really at the cenm of tfvs Motion and Opposirion,
particularly the fut that the first Appeal was stayed.
11.

Argumeart

The legal aulfiority cited by the BOCC it1 its Memorandum docs not apply to the instant
matter. First, if the County is &ng

die stance tlmt KfID'S Appeal a d its issues were

superseded by the Post-Mediation Agreement why did tile County file its AnswerResponse to

KFID'S Opening Brief on the same day the Parties executed the Post-Mediation Agreement, i.e,,

January 19.20077
Second and most important, the first Appeal of the BOCC'S denial of W D ' S PUD

Application was stayed, not dismissed.

It did not go away. Even the Post-Mediation

Agreement states that "=the parties shall stipulate to a stay of that appeal." (Exhibit 1, para. 1)

Nowhere in the Agreement does the word 'Yismiss" appear. 11was only temporarily suspended

!
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to await the outcome of KEISI'S rulewed PUD a i ~ dSubdivision Applications. If the renewed
Application md the Subdivision Application had been approved, rl~enrhc first Apped would

have been dismissed. This interpretation is supported no1 only by ihe lanpage of the Motion
for Stay of Appeal, the Stipulattion ta Stay Appeal and the Court Order Granting Motion .to Stay
Appeal wlterein ail thee (3) used the same language, to wit: ".

..

the appeal shall be stayed

until September I , 2007, at~dpending Kirk-H~lghesDevelopment, Id.L.C. filing n new PUD
Application with Koore~~ai
County . . ." but also by zhe defitioi~of Slay ~fproceedingsfound

in Black's Law Dictionary, as follows:

The temporary suspension of the regular orcler o f proceedings in a cause,
by direction or order of the court, itstrally to await the action of one of the parties
in regard to some ornii~edstep or some act wltick the coun has required him to
pcrf~rmas incidental to tlie suit; as where e nonresident plaintiff has been ruled to
give security for costs.
pg. 1267, Fifth Edition, 1979.
Since the Applic~tioiiswere denied, KHD had to proceed wit11 its first Appeal,

parlicularly since the stay had been automttticnlly dissolved on December 3, 2007.

KHD'S going forward wit11 the first Appeal was eve11 more critical wllen this Honorable
Court denied M3D'S Motioa to Enforce die Post-Mediation Agreement.

Based on the foregoing, thc Court c m ascertain that there was 13ot and couid not
be a merger of the Post-Mediati011 Agreement wilh W'D'S Appeal. Each is a separate
entity and tlie Appeal lias a life of its own and most be allowecl to go forward on its
merits.
Thirdly, although KI-TlD does not disagree witli the holdings in Wilson v. Boyen,

81 Id&o 535, 347 P.2d 341 (1 959) and Goodnlnn v. Lor"nsoo, 143 Idaho 622, 15 1 p.3d
5 18 (2007). they simply do not apply to ihe matter a.t hand. In Wilson, a Dismissal of the

agreement was entered. no1 a stay as in the instant cnse. In Goodman, tile Court

determined that the Mo~ionto Enforce Senle~nentAgrce~nentf~tnctionedas n motion to

L-]
..
j "

NO.824

dismiss the action for failure to state a claim upon wlich relief could be granted. Again,
there was no stay; natliing was temporarily suspended until an action by one of the
parties had been completed as in the instat11 case. As such, the holdings in these t'wo
Gases an: not applicable lo the sitmion currently existing between

K?D and the BOCG,

Based on his analysis, there are no grounds upon which ths Honorable Corn can

apply the holdings

ill

Wilson and Goodman lo the ease at hmd. As such, the BOCC'S

Motion must be denied.

Finally, the clainls raised in the first Appeal are not moot because the matter was
not remanded to tlie BOCC to reconsider

KHD'S originel PUD Application. New

Applications were considered by the BOCC md were denied. This denial Rm been
appeal~dfor consideration on its o m merits. K1-D must be given the oppomnity to

argue that .its first PUD Application was denied in violation of Section 67-5279 of the

ldaho Code, which is set forth below.
Scope of review - Type of relief
(1) The court shall not substit~rt.~
i t s judgment for that of the agency as
to the weight of the evidence on questi.onsof fact.
. . .
(3) When ihe agency was req~iitedby the provisions of this chapter or
by oher provisions of law to issue an order, the! court shall affirm the agency
action ~udess the court Fids diat the agency's findings, inferences,

conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violatioil of constitutional or slan\torqr provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory nu~horityof tile agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d)not supported by substantial evidence on tlic recard as a wllole;
(e) arbitray, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
. . .
(4) Notwithstmduzg !.he provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of tlis section,
agency action shall be ELSfimeJ unless substantial righrs of the appellant have

been prejudiced.

Id.
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111, Conclusion

Based on rhe faregoing KT-ID prays that this EIonorable Court will deny rha;te

BOCC'S Motion to Sttilce AppeIlmt's Reply Brief.

DATED this

zdY
of April, 2008.

KIRKaMUGHES & ASSOCIATES

GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM

2551 S. Ft. ~pacheRoad, #
03
I

105 N. Fourth ~tre-st,Suite 307
Coeur.d'Altsns, Idaho 838'14
Telephone No.: (208) 667-9531
Fswlmiie No.: (206)667-8503
Local Counsel for Geraldine Krrk-Hughes
ISB: #7116

Las Vegss, Nevada 89117
Telephone No.: (782) 233-8683
Famimile No.:(702) 233-8661
Pro Hac Vioe
NSB #34M

NO.824

DF16

NO. E24

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

a4

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thc
day of April, 2008,l caused to be served a
me and correct copy of the foregoing by .Ihe metkdod indicated below, and addressed to the
fallowing:
Koorend County
Dept. of Legal Senrices
Pat Braden
45 1 Covement Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur dxlene, Idaho 53 8 16-9000

f 1 U.S. Mail

[ 1 Hmd Delivorcd
W Facsimile to: (208) 446- 1 62 1

[I Overnight Mail

Kirk-Htlghes Development, LLC
For Planned Unit Developinent
Chateau de Loire
c/o Geraldine k k - H t ~ g h e s
A.KIW-WCHES 2k ASSOCIATES
2552 S. Ft. Apache Road, #I03
Las Vegas, Nevada 891 17

W)L'.S. Mail
[ 3 Hand Delivered
, -)Facsimile to: (208) 446-1621
f ] Overnight Mail

Knskn It.Thompson
B.THOMPSON LAW FIRM
55 SW Fifih Avenue, Suite 150
Merjdian, Idaho 83642

[ ] U.SrMail
[ ] I-Imd Delivered
BFacsimiIe to: (208) 888-7296
1: ] Overtlight Mail

Scott W. Reed
Atloniey a1 Law
40 1 Front Avenue, Suite 205

P.O. Box A
Gaeur dlAlene, Idaho 63 81 6

[ ) U.S.Mail
[ 7 Hand Delivered 1195Fncsim.ile to: (208) 756-5 I 17
] Overnight Mail
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
CHATEAU DE LOIRE.
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Appellant,
VS.
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R. CURRIE,
RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W. TODD
TONDEE,

Case NO.

CV-08-163

ORDER DENYING APPELLANT'S
MOTION TO ENFORCE
MEDIATION AGREEMENT

(In re: S-878P-07 and
PUD-057-07)

Respondents.

On February 22, 2008, this Court heard oral argument on Appellant's Motion to
Enforce Mediation Agreement filed on April 24,2007 in Case No. CV-06-6587, which was
consolidated with this case by order of this Court dated January 29,2008. At that hearing,
Appellant was represented by Kristen Thompson of the Thompson Law Firm, Kacey W a l l

NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND FILING OF AGENCY RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT - 1
H \Planning\Chateau de Loire #2\Petition for Judicial Review - CV-08-163\0rder Denying Motion to Enforce Mediation
Agreement doc

r

-1

4.

i
.

of the Glen Walker Law Firm, and by Geraldine Kirk-Hughes of Kirk-Hughes and
Associates (appearing pro hac vice). Respondent was represented by Patrick M. Braden
of the Kootenai County Department of Administrative Services. Ms. Thompson presented
oral argument on behalf of Appellant, while Mr. Braden presented oral argument on behalf
of Respondent.

I have heard and considered the oral argument presented by counsel, the written
arguments submitted by counsel, the exhibits submitted by Appellant, and the Affidavit of
Elmer R. Currie filed in opposition of this motion. Based on a consideration of these
arguments and affidavits, and on the decision that was set forth on the record during the
hearing on these motions, I hereby rule and order as follows:
For the reasons stated on the record at the February 22, 2008 hearing on this
motion, the Court finds that the Post-Mediation Agreement executed by Kirk-Hughes
Development (KHD) and Kootenai County (the County) on January 19,2007 is enforceable
as a contract, and that it is clear and unambiguous. See, e.g., Bondy v. Levy, 121 ldaho
993, 996-97, 829 P.2d 1342, 1345-46 (1992); Wilson v. Bogert, 81 ldaho 535, 542, 347
P.2d 341, 345 (1959). The Court also assumes, for purposes of deciding this motion only,
that KHD did comply with all of its obligations as set forth in the Post-Mediation Agreement.
The Court further finds, however, that the Post-Mediation Agreement does not
contain any guarantees or assurances that the County would approve the application t o be
submitted by KHD upon a finding that KHD had complied with the conditions setforth in the
agreement. Additionally, the Court declines to construe ldaho Code § 67-6519(4)(c) to
require the County would approve an application upon a finding that KHD had complied
with the conditions set forth in the agreement. Accordingly, the Court concludes t h a t it

NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND FILING OF AGENCY RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT - 2
H:\Planning\Chateau de Loire #Z\Petition for Judicial Review - CV-08-?63\0rder Denying Motion to Enforce Mediation
Agreement.doc

would not be appropriate to enter an order enforcing the terms of the Post-Mediation
Agreement as requested by KHD.
NOW THEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the Motion to Enforce Mediation
Agreement
is hereby DENIED.
DATED this

21' 2 y

, 2008.

of
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1

,

I hereby certify that on this
day of
,2008,lcausedto
be sewed a true and correct copy of the foregoing via facsimile &dressed to the following:

2

Kristen R. Thompson
THOMPSON LAW FIRM
55 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 150
Meridian, ID 83642
Fax: (208) 888-7296

Geraldine Kirk-Hughes
KIRK-HUGHES & ASSOCIATES
2551 S. Fort Apache Road, Suite 103
Las Vegas, NV 891 17
Fax: (702) 233-8661

Kacey L. Wall
GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM
105 N. Fourth Street, Suite 307
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83814
Fax: (208) 667-8503

Patrick M. Braden
KOOTENAI COUNTY
451 N. Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur dlAlene, ID
Fax: (208) 446-1 62 1

1

/

/
J
i

/

DANIEL J. ENGLISH /
Clerk of the ~ i s t r i c t ~ ~ o dj q t

NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND FILING OF AGENCY RECORD AND TRANSCRIPT
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Kootenai County Department of Administrative Sewices
Patrick M. Braden, ISB itf6020
451 N, Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur dlAlene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone: (208) 446-1620
Fax: (208) 446-1621
Attorney for Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
CHATEAU DE LOIRE.
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Appellant,

Case No.

CV-08-163

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

VS.
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R.
CURRIE, RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W.
TODD TONDEE,
Respondents.

COME NOW the Respondents, KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R. CURRIE, RICHARDA. PIAZZA, and W. TODD TONDEE,
by and through their attorney of record, Patrick M. Braden of the Kootenai County
Department of Administrative Services, and hereby provide the following response to
Appellant's Opening Brief, filed with the District Court on April 15, 2008.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - 1

H:\Planning\Chateau de Loire #Z\Petition for Judicial Review - CV-08-163\Brief of Respondents.doc

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC ("KHD") filed an application on March 14,
2007, requesting approval of a proposed planned unit development (PUD) and a proposed
subdivision within the PUD, to develop a gated community named "Chateau de Loire,"
which would consist of no more than 500 units on 578 acres of property located within the
Restricted Residential and Rural zones. The site is located on either side of State Highway
97, west of the entrance to Beauty Bay State Park, approximately 5 miles from Interstate
90, south of the shoreline of Moscow Bay on Lake Coeur dJAlene. The PUD application
was assigned Case No. PUD-057-07, and the subdivision application was assigned Case
No. S-878P-07. The combined PUD and subdivision application will be hereinafter referred
to as "the Chateau de Loire application" or "the Chateau project."
In conjunction with the residential component of the development, consisting of
single family dwellings, condominiums, and villas, the proposed development would
include a number of amenities, including a championship eighteen (18) hole golf course
and associated amenities, a spa with a variety of services and offerings, an
athletic/recreationaI center, camp style activities for children, fishing ponds, walking, hiking
and biking trails, a helipad for emergency services, a community shuttle service, an
amphitheatre, a community dock, a fire station for the East Side Fire District (ESFD), and
various retail enterprises. The project would occur in three phases, with completion to
occur within ten (10) years. A full description of the proposal is included in the revised
narrative submitted by KHD in support of this application. (Agency Record at 21 84-2233.)
Approximately 393 acres of the site are zoned Rural, and approximately 184 acres
are zoned Restricted Residential. (A.R. at 162, 3481 .) The minimum lot size in the Rural
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zone is five (5) acres. K.C.C. $j 9-13-3. The minirnum lot size in the Restricted Residential
zone is 8,250 square feet. K.C.C. $j 9-8-3. Chapter 15 of the Kootenai County Zoning
Ordinance, Title 9, Kootenai County Code, as enacted by Kootenai County No. 401 (the
"Zoning Ordinance"), governs PUDs. This chapter states that if a PUD is located within
more than one zoning district, the allowable density for the land in each zone shall be
calculated separately and then added together to yield the allowable density for the
development. See K.C.C. § 9-1 5-6. The overall density of development must conform to
the requirements of the zoning district(s), but the size of individual lots within the PUD may
vary. Id.
KHD had previously filed an application for approval of a proposed PUD for the
Chateau de Loire development on April 12, 2005 (Case No. PUD-054-05). The Kootenai
County Board of Commissioners (the Board) denied this application in an Order of Decision
dated August 24, 2006. The Applicant filed a petition for judicial review of that decision to
the District Court on September 1, 2006.
While that appeal was pending, the Applicant and the Board reached a PostMediation Agreement on January 19, 2007, in which the Board agreed to consider a new
application for approval of a proposed PUD and subdivision for the Chateau de Loire
development on an expedited basis. (A.R. at 2052-53.) This agreement also set forth
certain conditions which were to be met in order for the new application to be considered
by the Board. (Id.) The agreement, however, did not state that the application would be
automatically approved upon satisfaction of those conditions, nor did it otherwise
guarantee approval of the application. (Id.)
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The Kootenai County Building and Planning Department (the Department) issued a
Notice of Public Wearing before Hearing Examiner Lisa Key regarding this application,
which was to be held August 29, 2007. This hearing was rescheduled on one occasion
because an agency requested additional time to comment, and was rescheduled on
another occasion because KHD had failed to include the proper deadline for submission of
comments in the notice it sent out to nearby property owners. On July 30, 2007, notice
was posted at the site, and was published in the Coeur d'Alene Press on August 1,2007.
A public hearing was held before Kootenai County Hearing Examiner Lisa Key on August
29, 2007. (A.R. at 1874-89, 3024-30; Transcript of Proceedings Vol. I.)
The Department issued a Notice of Public Hearing before the Board regarding this
application, which was to be held on October 24, 2007. However, for reasons completely
beyond the control of either KHD or Kootenai County, the Coeur d'Alene Press failed to
publish this notice. Therefore, the hearing was rescheduled to November 19, 2007. On
October22,2007, notice was published in the Coeurd'Alene Press, and was posted on the
site on October 23, 2007. The Board held a public hearing on the Chateau de Loire
application on November 19, 2007. (A.R. at 2349-50, 3507-11; Tr. Vol. 2.)
The Board conducted a site visit on December 4, 2007. The site visit included
viewing the site for the proposed wastewater treatment facility, existing roads to the
waterfront, location of village clusters with respect to adjacent properties, and the locations
of other amenities requested in the PUD. (A.R. at 351 1; Tr. at 359-403.)
At their deliberations on December 6, 2007, the Board received clarification from
staff regarding the site visit, then closed the public hearing and conducted deliberated on
this application. During deliberations, a number of major concerns with the project as
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proposed were identified. These included the location of this proposal, which did not
appear to the Board to be a good fit for an otherwise rural area. (A.R. at 3884-85, 391819; Tr. at 405-22 .)
The location of the wastewater treatment plant, its ability to function properly, and
the effect of the development on runoff were also major concerns. (Tr. at 41 3-1 7.) In that
regard, the Board noted that the proposed system would not function correctly without
adequate flows, which would be particularly problematic early on in the development, and
in the winter months when most of the homeowners in 'this development would be
elsewhere. (Id.) Additionally, if the system were to fail, the effluent could flow through
adjacent properties and into Lake Coeur dlAlene. (Id.)
Other major concerns identified by the Board included the proposed relocation of
wetlands, the increase of traffic which would result from the development on State Highway
97, which is a narrow, winding, often dangerous highway, especially in the winter or during
times of heavy construction traffic. (Tr. at 413, 415.) They also were concerned with
ESFD1sstated inability to man the new station contained in the Chateau proposal, and time
issues regarding emergency medical service (EMS) responses, particularly given the
probable age range of prospective residents. (Tr. at 417-19.)
The Board then voted unanimously to accept the recommendation of the hearing
examiner and to deny the application. (A.R. at 3918-19; Tr. at 41 9.) An Order of Decision
memorializing this denial was approved for signing on December 13,2007. (A.R. at 38903917, 3920; Tr. at 421-22.)
KHD timely filed a Notice of Appeal of this decision on January 9, 2008. Upon
stipulation of KHD and the County, this Petition for Judicial Review was consolidated with
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the petition for judicial review of Case No. PUD-054-05 (District Court Case No. CV-066587) on January 29,2008. The Court entered an order denying KHD's Motion to Enforce
Mediation Agreement, originally filed in Case No. CV-06-6587, on March 4 , 2008. KHD
moved for reconsideration of that decision on April 22, 2008. This motion is set for hearing
before this Court on May 22, 2008. On April 22, 2008, Kt-iD also moved for a decision on
the petition for judicial review of Case No. PUD-054-05. The County filed an objection to,
and moved to strike, the reply brief filed in that matter, on April 16,2008. These are set for
hearing before this Court on May 21, 2008.

On March 21, 2008, Neighbors for

Responsible Growth filed a Motion to Intervene in this Petition for Judicial Review. The
Court entered an order granting this motion on May 8, 2008.

It. ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

2.

Whether the decision of the Board in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07 was:
a.

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

b.

made upon unlawful procedure;

c.

not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or

d.

arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Whether the decision of the Board in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07
constituted a taking of property without just compensation.

3.

Whether substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced by the decision of
the Board in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07.

Ill. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of planning and zoning decisions made by a board of county
commissioners under the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA), Idaho Code § 67-6501 et
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seq., is to be made the same manner as that of any administrative determination or order
in accordance with the ldaho Administrative Procedures Act, ldaho Code fj 67-5201 et seq
(IAPA).

See ldaho Code § 67-6519.

Thus, in such cases, the board of county

commissioners is the "agency" for purposes of judicial review under the IAPA. The scope
of judicial review of administrative decisions is as follows:
(1)

The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the
weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

...
(3)

When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or by other
provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm the agency action
unless the court finds that the agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or
decisions are:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)

in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
made upon unlawful procedure;
not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or in part,
and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(4)

Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections (2) and (3) of this section,
agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the appellant
have been prejudiced.

ldaho Code § 67-5279
LLUPA requires counties to submit written decisions in all planning and zoning
matters, and include findings of fact and conclusions of law in such decisions. ldaho Code
§ 67-6535(b). Judicial review of such orders is limited to the record. Balser v. Kootenai
County, 110 ldaho 37, 39, 714 P.2d 6, 8 (1986). The board's findings of fact are to be
upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Sanders
Orchard v. Gem County, 137 ldaho 695, 698, 52 P.3d 840, 843 (2002).
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IV. ARGUMENT

I.

The Board's findings of fact, analysis, and conelusions of law in Case Nos.
PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07 were supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole.
KHD made voluminous submittals in support of its application. In fact, the agency

record in this case, altogether, consists of twenty-one (21) volumes, the majority of which is
comprised of those submittals. With one rather glaring exception discussed below, these
submittals complied with the requirements for proposed planned unit developments (PUDs)
set forth in Chapter 15 of the Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance, Title 9, Kootenai County
Code ("Zoning Ordinance"), and with the requirements for proposed major subdivisions set
fodh in section 10-2-1 of the Kootenai County Subdivision Ordinance, Title 10, Kootenai
County Code ("Subdivision Ordinance"). Compliance with these requirements, however,
does not in and of itself entitle an applicant to approval of a PUD or a subdivision.
The findings required to be made in order for a hearing examiner to recommend
approval of a PUD application, and for the Board to approve a PUD application, are as
follows:
1. The proposal is compatible with the goals, policies and future land use map of
the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan.
2. The proposal is consistent with the intent and purpose of this title [the Zoning
Ordinance]. The amenities, design, and benefits of the PUD justify any
requested deviation from the normal requirements of this title. Development of
the PUD is in the best interest of the public.
3. The application and design meet the requirements of this chapter, other
applicable sections of this title, other County ordinances, and the requirements
of other agencies.
4. The proposed structures and uses within the PUD are compatible with one
another.
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5. The proposed development is compatible with surrounding homes, businesses
and neighborhoods, and with the natural characteristics of the area. Areas not
suited for development are designated as open space. Road construction and
disturbance of the terrain, vegetation and drainageways will be minimized and
will not result in soil erosion. Any site constraints, hazards or negative
environmental, social or economic impacts will be adequately mitigated.
6. Services and facilities necessary to serve the development are feasible,
available and adequate. Any adverse effects on service delivery by political
subdivisions, will be adequately mitigated.

7. Proposed roads, sidewalks, trails and parking facilities within the development
establish or adequately contribute to a transportation system for vehicles,
bicycles and pedestrians that is safe, convenient, efficient and that minimizes
traffic congestion.
8. The proposal is not anticipated to result in significant degradation of surface or
ground water quality as determined by DEQ.

9. The PUD will be held in one ownership, or there is an effective means of control
and oversight of the development in perpetuity. Provisions for maintaining land,
infrastructure and shared improvements are adequate.
10. If the application is for final plan approval, any applicable conditions of
conceptual plan approval have been met.
11. Public notice and the processing of the application met the requirements set
forth in this title, County adopted hearing procedures, and Idaho Code §676512.
K.C.C. § 9-15-9(C) (italics in original). Similarly, the findings required to be made in order
for a hearing examinerto recommend approval of a major subdivision application, and for
the Board to approve a major subdivision application, are as follows:
(1) The Applicant provided adequate information to determine compliance with
requirements.
(2) The plan and supplemental pages meet the requirements of Table 2-1.
(3) The subdivision proposal meets (or is capable of meeting) the requirements of
this Title [the Subdivision Ordinance].
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(4) The plan, project and proposed lots are capable of meeting all other applicable
County ordinances without variances (e.g. the Zoning, Site Disturbance, Road
Naming, Area of City Impact and Flood Ordinances).

(5) The plan, project and proposed lots are capable of meeting the requirements of
other agencies.
(6) The proposal will contribute to orderly development of the area. Proposed uses,
design and density are compatible with existing homes, businesses,
neighborhoods, and with the natural characteristics of the area. The subdivision
will create lots of reasonable utility and livability, which are capable of being built
upon without imposing an unreasonable burden on future owners. Areas not
suited for development are designated as open space.

(7) Where appropriate, the proposed subdivision will have adequate open space for
recreation, wildlife, agriculture or timber production. Road construction and
disturbance of the terrain, vegetation and drainageways will be minimized and
will not result in soil erosion. The design will adequately address site constraints
or hazards and will adequately mitigate any negative environmental, social or
economic impacts.

(8) Services and facilities such as schools, electricity, water, sewer, stormwater
management, garbage disposal, EMS, police and fire protection are feasible,
available and adequate. The proposal includes on and off site improvements,
and if necessary payments, to mitigate the impacts of the subdivision so that it
does not compromise the quality, or increase the cost, of public services.
Mitigation actions or fees must be commensurate with the impacts of the
subdivision, and fees must be authorized by law.
(9) Proposed roads, sidewalks and trails establish or adequately contribute to a
transportation system for vehicles, bicycles and pedestrians that is safe, efficient
and that minimizes traffic congestion.

(10) The proposal is not anticipated to result in significant degradation of surface or
ground water quality as determined by DEQ.
(11) Public notice and the processing of this application met the requirements set
forth in this Title, County adopted hearing procedures and Idaho Code.
K.C.C. § 10-2-1(C)(l)(k)-(t).
In each case, the Board decided that it was unable to make all of the required
findings for a number of reasons. The main areas of concern the Board identified were
water service, wastewater treatment, disturbance of existing wetlands, runoff (particularly
.
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downhill toward Moscow Bay), the condition of State Highway 97 and the impact the
Chateau project would have on this highway, both from construction traffic over the ten (10)
year buildout period and from Chateau residents and other facility users, the impact of the
project on emergency services, particularly emergency medical services (EMS), and lack of
compatibility with the surrounding neighborhood and the natural surroundings within the
area. (Tr. at411-19.)
To determine the proposed PUD1s compatibility with the Kootenai County
Comprehensive Plan, as required in section 9-15-9(C) of the Zoning Ordinance, the
Board's Order of Decision contained a analysis which addressed each of the goals of the
Comprehensive Plan. (A.R. at 3911-15.) This analysis is consistent with the ldaho
Supreme Court's recognition that while a land use application does not need to strictly
comply with a county's comprehensive plan, the comprehensive plan cannot be ignored in
making a decision to approve or deny the application. Evans v. Teton County, 139 ldaho
71, 76, 73 P.3d 84, 89 (2003) (application for zone change and PUD); Friends o f Farm to
Market v. Valley County, 137 ldaho 192, 200, 46 P.3d 9, 17 (2002) (application for
conditional use permit).
Based on the concerns listed above, the Board specifically found that the Chateau
project was not compatible with the Comprehensive Plan's future land use map and with
the following goals:
GOAL 4: Preserve, protect, and enhance the water quality and quantity of
lakes, streams, rivers and wetlands in Kootenai County.
GOAL 7: Prevent or limit development activity in hazardous areas.
GOAL 9: Develop land use regulations that protect property rights, maintain
quality of life, provide adequate land for development, buffer non-compatible
land uses land uses, and protect the environment.
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GOAL 14: Provide for the efficient, safe, and cost-effective movement of
people and goods.
GOAL 17: Ensure efficient and effective police, fire, and emergency sewices.
GOAL 23: Develop quality County parks, greenbelts, and recreation facilities
to meet the diverse needs of a growing population.
GOAL 24: Secure waterfront and near-shore areas for beneficial public uses
and enhance public enjoyment of a growing population.
(A.R. at 391 1-16.) The Board's analysis and conclusions of law was based in large part on
the findings made in the comprehensive plan analysis, and addressed comprehensive plan
goals as well as the necessary findings for approval of PUD and subdivision applications.
(A.R. at 3915-16.)
KHD contends that the Board should have only considered the evidence it
presented, particularly those plans, studies and other documents prepared by engineers
and other design professionals regarding the proposed Chateau project. (See, e.g.,
Appellant's Opening Brief at 11-12, 24-28.)

However, issues were raised by public

agencies and during public testimony which the Board determined could not be ignored,
and were not adequately answered by Chateau's development team. These issues will be
discussed in greater detail below.
Water Service. KHD provided copies of permits from the Idaho Department of
Water Resources (IDWR) that proved that KHD had obtained the right to draw up to three
cubic feet per second (3 cfs) of water from Lake Coeur dlAlene, and that KHD had
obtained the right to draw water from five (5) wells drilled on the property. (A.R. at 220810, 3729-35.) There was also evidence submitted from both the public and from the Coeur
dlAlene Tribe, however, that indicated that when the flow of the Spokane River dropped
below 600 cfs, KHD, as a junior water right holder, would not be able to draw any water
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from the lake, and that these conditions had occurred on several occasions during the
summer within the past few years. (A.R. at 3725-28, 3332-34.) Also of concern was the
fact that KHD proposed to reclaim water from the Steamchet (Squaw) Creek drainage for
golf course irrigation, though no permit to do so had been issued by IDWR. (A.R. at 2456.)
Although KHD did propose to build water storage facilities, the Board was not satisfied that
KHD had made adequate plans for water service during these conditions, particularly given
the amount of water needed just to irrigate the proposed golf course. (Tr. at 344-45, 41 6.)
Wastewater Treatment. Two issues arose with respect to Chateau's proposed
wastewater treatment facility, located in the northeastern portion of the property near the
boundary with neighboring landowners. First, public testimony and the site visit indicated
that a failure of a facility in this proposed location could very well lead to the flow of effluent
onto neighboring properties, as well as within the project boundaries. (See general1yA.R.
at 3594-3794; Tr. at 365-66, 413-16.) Second, the proposed treatment system, while
acceptable to the Idaho Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ), needed a certain
amount of effluent to function properly, and there was a concern raised that there'may not
be enough effluent for the system to function properly during the early stages of the project
prior to buildout. (A.R. at 2490-91; Tr. at 414-16.)

It was pointed out that this had

happened at Gozzer Ranch, a similarly large-scale development down State Highway 97
near Arrow Point, which employs the same system as that proposed here. (Tr. at 415.)
Again, the Board indicated that it was not completely satisfied with the response provided
by KHD's development team. (Tr. at 345-56, 414-1 6.)
Wetlands. The Chateau proposal, by all accounts, proposed to disturb or modify a
significant amount of the wetlands currently existing on the property. (See, e.g., A.R. at
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2195, 3795.) While KHD has agreed to disturb, modify and replace wetlands only as
permitted by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Board was well within its
authority, independent of USACE, DEQ, and other agencies with jurisdiction, to demand
that these activities be conducted so as to minimize negative environmental impacts
caused by the project. (See A.R. at 2052.)
One area where the Board specifically found that KHD failed to adequately mitigate
potential damage to wetlands was the failure to properly delineate hydrologic protection
areas (HPAs), as required of all PUD applications under subsection 9-15-7(C)(2) of the
Zoning Ordinance. These delineated HPAs must meet certain requirements, which are set
forth as follows:
When a PUD abuts a lake, river, stream, wetland, or drainage way, a
Hydrologic Protection Area must be reserved and shown on the plan. The
purpose of this area is to protect downstream property owners and water
resources from increased or decreased flows, to prevent sedimentation, to
promote good water quality, and to protect fish and wildlife habitat. The area
shall be labeled "Stream (lake or wetland, as applicable) Protection Area",
and within this area native vegetation and large organic debris shall be
protected or replanted to leave the area in the most natural condition
possible. Any necessary maintenance must be in conformance with the
Kootenai County Site Disturbance Ordinance and with applicable best
management practices. Proposed road and utility crossings must be shown
on the plan, must be kept to a minimum, and must take the shortest possible
route across the area. Other than approved crossings, roads and utilities
shall not be constructed within this area. Fences, walkways which do not
exceed four (4) feet in width, stairway landings which do not exceed six (6)
feet in length or width, and trams may be constructed in hydrologic protection
areas, providing there is minimal disturbance of the ground and vegetation.
The Board may require that this area be shown as an easement, including a
conservation easement, or that ownership of the area be transferred to a
homeowners association, highway district or other maintenance entity.
Hydrologic Protection Areas shall be as follows:
Lakes
Spokane and
Coeur d'Alene Rivers

45 feet from the ordinary high water mark
45 feet from the ordinary high water mark
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Class I Streams
Class II Streams
Drainageways
Wetlands

75 feet from the ordinary high water mark
30 feet from the ordinary high water mark
5 feet
Determined by the Board, based on the
wetland analysis.

K.C.C. 5 9-15-7(C)(2) (emphasis added). Chapter 15, Table 15-1 of the Zoning Ordinance
expressly requires that "wetlands and associated protection areas" complying with the
above requirements be provided for as a condition of conceptual PUD approval.
Here, a careful reading of the maps delineating HPAs within the proposed PUD
reveals that a large number of roads, lots, buildings, and, presumably, utilities are located
within delineated HPAs. (A.R. at 1629-33.) This is in clear violation of the above
standards. In addition, there are no provisions regarding transfer of ownership of these
areas, nor could there be given the proposed development overlaying these HPAs. (Id.) In
addition, not all of the delineated HPAs meet the width standards, and there is no HPA
within forty-five feet (45') of the ordinary high water mark of Lake Coeur dlAlene. (Id.)
Even if KHD were to found to have complied with this requirement, however, the
record shows that the Board had a number of concerns with the proposed treatment of
existing wetlands within the Chateau project. (Tr. at 41 1,415.) First of all, the Board found
the sheer amount of existing wetlands to be disturbed to be problematic, even with the
mitigation measures proposed. (Id.) Second, there was public testimony that man-made
wetlands do not perform as well as natural wetlands. (A.R. at 3765-94; Tr. at 308-12.)
Third, there were concerns expressed as to whether the amount of impervious and less
pervious surfaces to be constructed within the project would alter the performance of both
the man-made and remaining existing wetlands, contributing to greater runoff and erosion.
(See id.)
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Runoff and Erosion. The concerns expressed in this regard tie in to the issues
regarding treatment of wetlands, and also have to do with the geology of the area. For
example, six (6) of the ten ( I 0) soil types on the site identifies as present on the site in the
preliminary geotechnical report submitted by KHD were identified in the Comprehensive
Plan as susceptible to slippage and to have inherently low support strength. (A.R. at 2104,
3902.) The Comprehensive Plan also identified the site as underlain by the Columbia
River Basalt Group and the Latah Foundation Association, an unstable combination of
soils. (A.R. at 2105, 3707-09.)
The geotechnical report also stated that there are some signs of long term, largescale slope movement at the northern end of the property adjacent to Lake Coeur dlAlene.
(A.R. at 2109-10.)

Public testimony, photographs and site visit observations also

confirmed that erosion was occurring on the north end of the site as it slopes down toward
Lake Coeur d'Alene, and that existing roads often washed out in times of high precipitation
or runoff. (A.R. at 2 110, 3243-44, 3704-12; Tr. at 292-94, 306-08.) Thus, the proposed
addition of impervious surfaces and less pervious ones such as golf course turf grass
raised concerns that such development would significantly increase runoff toward Lake
Coeur dlAlene, accelerating the erosion process to the detriment of neighboring properties
as well as to the water quality of Lake Coeur dlAlene. (A.R. at 3765-94; Tr. at 308-12,411,
416-17.)
The amount of structures proposed to be built on slopes was also problematic
because of the soil composition of the site and actual andlor potential erosion. (A.R. at
21 08; Tr. at 335-37, 41 1-14.) In addition, the materials submitted by respected attorney
William Boyd, including opinions of experienced mining engineers, raised questions
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regarding the suitability of the proposed rock crushing site. (A.R. at 3299-3325, 3652.)
The Board found that the responses of KHD's development team did not satisfactorily
assuage these concerns. (Tr. at 335-37,411-17.)
. The concerns raised by the opponents who live on the east side of

Lake Coeur dlAlene, public agencies and the Board with respect to this issue centered on
the dilapidated condition of State Highway 97. The condition of this highway in the vicinity
of the proposed Chateau project, and particularly with respect to Beauty Bay Hill, is well
documented in public testimony, agency comments, and the Board's observations during
its visit to the site. (See, e.g., A.R. at 2459-61, 2509-1 2, 3594-3643, 3660-67, 3686-90; Tr.
Vol. 2, passim.)
The Transpo Group, a Kirkland, Washington-based transportation consultant,
performed a traffic study on behalf of KHD in support of the Chateau application. (A.R. at
585-651 .) The Idaho Transportation Department (ITD), which is charged with maintenance
of Highway 97, questioned the methodology of this report. (A.R. at 2460-61 .) In response,
the Transpo Group performed a revised study based on ITD's preferred methodology.
(A.R. at 2234-49.) This study showed that Chateau would have a much more significant
impact on the capacity of Highway 97 than did the original study, even though Highway 97
would not reach capacity by virtue of Chateau alone. (Id.)
While ITD concurred with the methodology and conclusions contained in the revised
study, the East Side Highway District (ESHD), along with certain neighbors opposed to the
Chateau development, questioned some of the assumptions made in both studies. (A.R.
at 2481 -82, 2509-12; see also, e.g., A.R. at 3594-3643, 3660-67, 3686-90.) For example,
the shoulder width was listed as medium width in both Transpo Group studies, while in fact
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the highway has very narrow shoulders and, in places, no shoulders. (A.R. at 605, 2249,

2512, 3135-44, 3156, 3640, 3673-73, 3344-47.) The terrain was assumed to be rolling,
which in fact it is best described as mountainous. (A.R. at 3160.)
It was also pointed out that neither study addressed the impact of construction
traffic, which, based on current construction traffic, can be very significant even when run
at non-peak hours as agreed to by KHD. (A.R. at 2052, 2512.) In addition, the ESHD
letter pointed out that neither study considered typical winter driving conditions, and did not
identify Beauty Bay Hill as the limiting segment of the highway's capacity. (A.R. at 251 2.)
There was also no indication that anyone from the Transpo Group actually came out and
drove Beauty Bay Hill or physically measured the width of the lanes or shoulders. (See

A.R. at 2234-49.) Finally, a concern was raised that the subdivision roads, as laid out,
could contribute to congestion along the stretch of Highway 97 even with the underpass or
overpass required by ITD and agreed to by KHD. (A.R. at 2450,251 1.)
Emergency Services. The main concerns regarding the provision of emergency
services came from the East Side Fire District (ESFD), which provides both firefighting and
EMS services in the vicinity of the Chateau project. (A.R. at 2442-45, 2457-59, 2498-99,

2504-06, 2514, 2516-17; Tr. at 222-26.) In an effort to mitigate these concerns, ESFD
required KHD to convey land for a fire station for ESFD, pay for the construction of the
station, and build a helipad suitable for air ambulance service, conditions which were
agreeable to KHD. (A.R. at 2198,2457-28.) While these mitigation measures undoubtedly
would contribute significantly to the mitigation of the development's impact on fire and EMS
services, they do not address the issue concerning ESFD's ability to adequately staff its allvolunteer department to address the impact of the development on these services. (See
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Tr. at 222-26,417-19.) They also do not change the fact that ambulance and paramedic
services are provided by the Coeur dlAlene Fire Department, a twenty (20) or more minute
drive from the Chateau project site.

(A.R. at 2508; Tr. at 222.)

Kootenai County

Emergency Medical Services System (KCEMSS) Chief Officer Lynn Borders submitted a
comment that raised serious questions about KCEMSS' ability to service rural areas of
Kootenai County with continued approval of large-scale developments such as Chateau,
calling this issue "a very serious matter." (A.R. at 2507-08.)
Compatibility. Besides the issues discussed above, the Board was unable to find
that the approval of a rather sizeable community - larger, in fact, than some incorporated
cities within Kootenai County, but without many services typically provided by cities straddling Highway 97 in one of the more rural areas of Kootenai County would be
compatible with the surrounding neighborhood or with the area's natural surroundings. (Tr.
at 41 1, 414.) Lots in that vicinity are typically quite large, with the exception of some lots
along the shoreline of Coeur dJAlene Lake, and the area is, for the most part, heavily
timbered. (A.R. at 3638, 3710-12, 3902.) Thus, the density proposed in the Chateau
project was found to be problematic even though it is allowed under County PUD
regulations and the underlying zoning, and it was also found not to be compatible with the
Comprehensive Plan's Future Land Use Map, which designates the vast majority of the
area as "timber," with a surface water overlay. (A.R. at 3914-15.)
The minimum lot size in the Rural zone, in which the majority of the Chateau project
site is located, is normally five (5) acres. K.C.C. § 9-13-3. A PUD would allow greater
density in that area because part of the property is zoned Restricted Residential, which
allows a much greater density. See K.C.C. 9-8-3, 9-15-6. Thus, the density within the
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portion of the property within the Rural zone would be much greater than normally allowed
in that zone, though it is also true that the density within the portion of the property within
the Restricted Residential zone would be much less than normally allowed in that zone.
Here, the Board found, for this and other reasons, that this proposed shift in density would
not be compatible with the surrounding neighborhood. (A.R. at 3915-16; Tr. at 41 1.)
The above analysis shows that the Board's decision in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and
S-878P-07 was amply supported by substantial evidence in the record. Therefore, this
decision should be affirmed.
11.

The Board's decision in Case Nos. PUD-057-07and S-878P-07was not
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of the Board's discretion.
KHD argues at great length that the decision of the Board in Case Nos. PUD-057-07

and S-878P-07 was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of the Board's discretion.
(Petitioner's Opening Brief at 10-40.) In determining this issue, it is important to note that
the Court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the
evidence presented, but must instead defer to the Board's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous.

Sanders Orchard, 137 Idaho at 697-98, 52 P.3d at 842-43.

Additionally, there is a strong presumption of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning
boards, which includes the application and interpretation of their own zoning ordinances.
Id. at 698, 52 P.3d at 843.
KHD's argument that the County's decision was arbitrary and capricious is twofold.
First, KHD argues that it was arbitrary and capricious because

this

Board, in its

comprehensive plan analysis, found that this application failed to meet goals which a prlor
Board found were met in the

first Chateau application, even though that application was

also denied. The first application, however, was merely for a PUD, while this application
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was for both PUD and preliminary subdivision approval. Also, it is entirely possible that
one Board, acting in its quasi-judic~alcapacity, could find that a comprehensive plan goal
was met, while another could find that it was not. Neither decision would be considered
arbitrary and capricious so long as it is supported by substantial, though conflicting,
evidence in the record. Evans, 139 Idaho at 75, 73 P.3d at 88.
KHD's second argument is that an application for a similar development, Gozzer
Ranch, was approved, while the Chateau application was denied. The attempt to prove
arbitrariness by repeating the mantra "they got approved but we didn't" is not appropriate
because the projects involved different parcels, different plans, and different proposals,
and was heard before a different Board. (See, e.g., A.R. at 3247, 3253.) It is also
important to note that when the prior Board considered Gozzer, there were no other such
developments on that side of Lake Coeur dlAlene. By contrast, this application was
considered in light of the fact that Gozzer had previously been approved, and other
developments of similar scope were being considered.
In essence, Gozzer was the "canary in the coal mine" - in other words, its approval
and the aftereffects thereof caused the people living on that side of the lake, local
environmental activists, and public agencies to see the true impact of such developments
in rural Kootenai County, and on that area in particular.

At the time Gozzer was

considered, this was an unknown factor; now, it is definitely a known one. (See, e.g., A.R.
at 3132, 3135, 314, 3144, 3713-17.) Thus, it was a natural byproduct of this process,
acting in conjunction with the ensuing turnover in two members of the Board, that proposed
developments such as Chateau would undergo greater scrutiny than did Gozzer, within the
scope of review allowed under the County's land-use ordinances.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - 21
H:\Planning\Chateau de Loire #Z\Petition for Judicial Review - CV-08-163\Brief of Respondents.doc

In this case, these factors led to the organization of opposition to the Chateau
project which did not simply repeat emotional "NIMBY" arguments, but instead was
supported with tangible evidence of the potential negative effects of the project on the
surrounding area, both from local observations and information, as well as evidence of
environmental degradation occurring in other areas as a result of similar projects. (See
A.R. at 3594-3794.) Even many of the public agencies which ultimately gave their approval
to this project expressed major concerns regarding the type of development proposed in
this case, including DEQ, ITD, ESHD, ESFD, and KCEMSS. (A.R. at 2448-50, 2459,
2472-73, 2491, 2495-98, 2507-12, 3592-93.)
The Board, in its quasi-judicial capacity, had the duty to weigh this evidence against
that provided by KHD's development team, and did so in this case. Ultimately, the Board
found that KHD's development team failed to adequately address the concerns raised by
the opposition to the project and the public agencies charged with approving specific
aspects of the proposed development. (See Tr. at 41 1-19.) Therefore, the Board's
decision in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07 can hardly be characterized as arbitrary
and capricious. Accordingly, this decision should be affirmed.

Ill.

The Board's decision in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07 did not
constitute a taking of property without just compensation.
KHD has alleged that the County's denial of its PUD and subdivision applications

constituted a taking of private property by the County without just compensation. Both the
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

5

13 of the Idaho

Constitution protect private property from being taken by a governmental entity for public
use without just compensation. The United States Supreme Court has stated that a taking
requiring just compensation under the Fifth Amendment occurs "when the owner of real
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
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property has been called upon to sacrifice a 1economically beneficial uses in the name of
the common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle." Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (emphasis in original). In so
holding, however, the Supreme Court emphasized that this rule applied only "in the
extraordinary circumstance when no productive or economically beneficial use of land is
permitted." Id. at 10 (emphasis in original).
The ldaho Supreme Court has followed Ltrcas and its progeny in interpreting Article
I, § I 3 ofthe ldaho Constitution. In Moon v. North ldaho FarmersAssln, 140 ldaho 536,96
P.3d 637 (2004), it stated that when there has been no claim of "a permanent deprivation
of all economically beneficial uses of their land . .. under the ldaho Constitution, which does
not allow less than a total deprivation of use or denial of access, and under Lucas, there is
no taking in violation of the state or the federal constitution." Moon, 140 ldaho 536,542,96
P.3d 637, 643 (2004) (citation omitted).
Here, KHD has failed to show that the denial of its application amounts to a
permanent deprivation of

all economically

beneficial uses of that property. Prior to its

purchase by KHD, the property has been continuously used for agricultural purposes.
(See, e.g., A.R. at 17, 32-33.) In addition, KHD, with or without approval of the proposed
PUD and subdivision, would be able to avail itself of any use permitted in each respective
zone, as set forth in Chapter 13 of the Zoning Ordinance with respect to the property
located in the Rural zone, and as set forth in Chapter 8 of the Zoning Ordinance with
respect to the property located in the Restricted Residential zone.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that "[lland-use regulations are
ubiquitous and most of them impact property values in some tangential way - often in
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completely unanticipated ways. Treating them all as per se takings would transform
government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford.

Tahoe-Sierra

P e s e m t i o n Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 324 (2002).
If the County were required to treat every subdivision request that is denied as a
"regulatory taking," it would prove to be utterly cost-prohibitive to enforce land-use
regulations mandated under state law, see ldaho Code § 67-6501 et seq., and would
ultimately render such regulations meaningless. Therefore, the Court should not find that
the denial of KHD's application constitutes a "regulatory taking" requiring just compensation
under the Fifth Amendment and Article I, § 13 of the ldaho Constitution.

IV.

The Board's decision in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07 was not made
upon unlawful procedure.

KHD has alleged, in general terms, that the County's denial of its PUD and
subdivision applications constituted a violation of its right to due process under the United
States and ldaho constitutions. No specific instances of procedural irregularities have
been identified in Appellant's Opening Brief, however. Courts acting in an appellate
capacity have no obligation to search the record for error, however. Miller v. Callear, 140
ldaho 213, 218, 91 P.3d 1117, 1122 (2004). Therefore, the Court should find that the
Board's decision in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07 was not made upon unlawful
procedure.

V.

No substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced by the decision of
the Board in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07.

Finally, in order to prevail in this petition of judicial review, KHD must show that the
denial of its proposed PUD and subdivision prejudiced substantial rights. However, as
discussed above, KHD has failed to specifically allege any irregularities in procedure such
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as would warrant a remand. Cf. County Residents Against Pollution from Septic Sludge
("CRAPSS") v. Bonner County, 138 ldaho 585, 586-89, 67 P.3d 64, 65-68 (2003)
(summary dismissal of an appeal for failure to state lawful grounds upon which the appeal
could be based prejudiced plaintiffs' substantial rights because it "deprived the Plaintiffs of
their right, under the ordinance, to a public hearing at which additional information could be
presented"). KHD has also failed to show that the Board's denial was not based on
substantial evidence in the record, or that it was arbitrary and capricious. Cf. Sanders
Orchard, 137 ldaho at 702, 52 P.3d at 847 (finding that substantial rights were prejudiced
because a finding of fact, and a conclusion of law based upon that finding, were not based
on evidence submitted to the Gem County Commissioners or upon findings made by the
Gem County Planning and Zoning Commission).
The denial of this particular application does not deprive KHD of any lawful use of its
property existing prior to the filing of its application; it merely reinforces the pre-existing
limitations on the use of each of the subject parcels. Moreover, KHD is still able to put this
property to any use permitted under applicable state laws and regulations, and county
ordinances - including a subsequent PUD andlor subdivision application which meets the
applicable requirements of county land-use ordinances and adequately meets the concerns
addressed by the Board.
For the reasons stated above, no substantial rights have been prejudiced as a result
of the decision in this case. Accordingly, the decision of the Board should be affirmed.
VI.

KHD is not entitled to an award of attorney fees because the Board did not act
without a reasonable basis in fact or law.
ldaho Code § 12-117 governs the awarding of attorney fees in civil actions to which

a public entity is a party. It reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
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(1) Unless otherwise provided by statute, in any administrative or civil judicial
proceeding involving as adverse parties a state agency, a city, a county or
other taxing district and a person, the court shall award the prevailing party
reasonable attorney's fees, witness fees and reasonable expenses, if the
court finds that the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law.

(2) If the prevailing party is awarded a partial judgment and the court finds
the party against whom partial judgment is rendered acted without a
reasonable basis in fact or law, the court shall allow the prevailing party's
attorney's fees, witness fees and expenses in an amount which reflects the
person's partial recovery.
ldaho Code 5 12-117(1)-(2). An award of attorney fees under this statute is unwarranted if
the public entity '"cted in a way that fairly and reasonably addressed the issue," even if a
reviewing court later finds that such action involved an erroneous interpretation of a statute
or ordinance. Payette RiverProperty OwnersAssPnv. Valley County, 132 ldaho 551, 558,

As discussed, the Board properly applied county zoning and subdivision ordinances
in denying KHD's application. Therefore, the County should be deemed the prevailing
party in this matter, precluding KHD from entitlement to attorney fees. However, if the
Court were to find that the Board erroneously applied these ordinances in considering
KHD's application, it is clear from the record that the Board, at the very least, made a
reasonable, good faith effort to make a decision on this application in accordance with the
mandates of LLUPA and the applicable zoning and subdivision ordinances. Therefore,
even if the Court were to decide that the Board's decision was based on an erroneous
interpretation of the applicable law, an award of attorney fees under ldaho Code § 12-117
would be inappropriate because the decision had a reasonable basis in fact and law.

-

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - 26
H:\Planning\Chateau de Loire #2\Petition for Judicial Review - CV-08-163\~riefof Respondents.doc

CONCLUSION

The Board's decision in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07 was amply
supported by substantial, though conflicting, evidence in the record, including testimony
and documentary evidence not specifically cited in this brief. This decision was not
arbitrary and capricious because it is a different application from both Gozzer Ranch and
the first Chateau de Loire application, and two of the members of the Board (a majority)
were not on the Board when either of those applications were heard. In addition, it was not
arbitrary and capricious because it was well grounded in the concerns raised during the
agency comment and public hearing process.
The Board's decision also does not constitute a taking of the property without just
compensation, and KHD has not identified any specific procedural irregularities. KHD has
not been deprived of any substantial rights as a result of the denial of this application
because it is still able to put this property to any use permitted under applicable state laws
and regulations, and county ordinances, including any subsequently approved PUD andlor
subdivision application.
Because the Board acted well within its discretion under LLUPA and County land
use ordinances, its decision has ample factual and legal foundation.

Therefore, no

attorney fees should be awarded to any party in this case.
DATED this

I '2'

day of May, 2008.
Kootenai County Department
of Administrative Services

L

Patrick M. Braden
Attorney for Respondents
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Scott W. Reed, lSB#818
Attorney at Law
P. 0 . Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816
Phone (208) 664-2 16 1
FAX (208) '765-5117
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT'OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IN THE MATTER OF THE
APPLICATION OF KIRK-HUGHES
DEVELOPMENT, LLC FOR
PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
CHATEAU DE LOIRE,
Appellant,

v.
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
ELMER R. CURRIE, RICHARD A.
PIAZZA, and W. TODD TONDEE,
Respondents,
and
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit
unincorporated association;
NORBERT and BEVERLY
TWILLMANN, husband and wife;
SUSAN MELKA; BILL and SYLVIA
LAMPARD, husband and wife;
DAVID and BARBARA
WARDSWORTH, husband and
wife; and HEATHER BOWLBY,

BRIEF OF INTERVENORS

Case No. CV-08-163

)
)

BRIEF OF INTERVENORS1
RESPONDENTS

This Court has granted the motion of Neighbors for Responsible
Growth, et al (Neighbors) for intervention as respondents against
appellants Kirk-Hughes Development (KHD). Counsel for Kootenai County
has made available for review the 21 volumes of the Agency Record (ROO
and the three volume Transcript Record v r ) . Photocopies were made of
the transcript. Because of the limited time period and also the absence of
undersigned counsel from his office, Neighbors will not provide a Statement
of the Case nor a Statement of Facts, but instead will rely on what is
submitted on behalf of respondents Kootenai County onthese two
headings.
Residents and environmental groups opposing developments in rural
areas have been frustrated and often thwarted with the great latitude given
by the Idaho appellate courts in affirming local government approval of
developments disregarding overwhelming popular opposition.
This Court relied upon those appellate decisions in allowing the
Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners (BOCC) to reject the
hearing officer's recommendation and to affirm spot zoning in violation of
the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan in Presenle Our Rural
Communities, et a l v. Kootenai County, CV-07-414, appealed S.Ct. No.
35084.
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In this case, the reverse should apply equally. The BOCC denied and
gave reasons with far more support in the record and thought than in
Fighting Creek decision.
The ldaho appellate courts have treated comprehensive plans as
what "ought to be" in the future. In its most recent decision on March 27,
2008 in Giltner Dairy v. Jerome Countg 08. ISCR 303, the ldaho Supreme
Court held that an amendment to a comprehensive plan that opened the
door to a dense development next to the Dairy was just that: an open door
with no assured zone change.

The complaining Dairy was held not to

be "affected person" with standing to challenge the amendment.
Appellant's Opening Brief is based on numerous allegations of failure
to follow the comprehensive plan. The allegations are erroneous and not
factual, but even if true, the response should be dismissal of the appeal.
Given the Giftner Dairy v. Jerome Counfydecision and the quoted
excerpts from ldaho appellate decisions set forth hereafter, the appeal of
Kirk-Hughes Development is totally without legal support or factual support
in the record justifying an award of attorney's fees to respondents Kootenai
County under ldaho Code s12-117.
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POINTS OF AUTHORITIES

The Local Land Use Planning Act was promulgated to ensure the
orderly and effective development of land to the benefit of ldaho
citizens. See I.C. 967-6502. The Act indicates that a
comprehensive plan and a zoning ordinance are distinct
concepts serving different purposes. A comprehensive plan
reflects the "desirable goals and objectives, or desirable future
situations" for the land within a jurisdiction. I.C. 567-6508. This
Court has held that a comprehensive plan does not operate as
legally controlling zoning law, but rather serves to guide and
advise the governmental agencies responsible for making
zoning decisions. South Fork Coalition v. Board o f County
Commfrs o f 1-ewiston, 107 ldaho 844, 850, 693 P.2d 1046, 1052
( I984); cf. Sprenger, Grubb & Assocs. lnc., v. City o f Hailey, 127
ldaho 575,585,903 P.2d 741,750 (1995); Ferguson v. Board o f
County Comm'rs, 110 ldaho 784, 787, 718 P.2d 1223, 125 (1986).
The Board may, therefore, refer to the comprehensive plan as a
general guide i n instances involving zoning decisions such as
revising or adopting a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, by
contrast, reflects the permitted uses allowed for various parcels
within the jurisdiction. See I.C. $67-6511.

Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 ldaho 353, 357-258, 2 P.3d 738,
(2000).

The Court defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous and the agency's factual determinations are
binding on the reviewing court, even when there is conflicting
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are
supported by evidence in the record. South Fork Coalition v.
Board of Comm'rs o f Bonneville County, 117 ldaho 857,860,792
P.2d 882, 885 (1990). Additionally, there is a strong presumption
BRIEF OF INTERVENORS
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of favoring the validity of the actions of zoning boards, which
includes the application and interpretation of their owrr zoning
ordinances. Howard v. Canyon County Bd. of Contm'rs, 128
ldaho 479,480,915 P.2d 709 711 (1996).

Payetfe River Property Owners Association v. Board of County
Commissioners of Valley County; 132 ldaho 55 1, 554, 976 P.2d 477, ( I 999).

Our holding is supported by a large body of case law which
states that comprehensive plans do not themselves operate as
legally controlling zoning law, but rather serve to guide and
advise the various governing bodies responsible for making
zoning decisions. See Theoblad v. Board of County
Commissioners, Summit County, 644 P.2d 942, 949 (Colo. 1982);
Barrie v. Kitsap County, 613 P.2d 1148, 1152 (Wash. 1980);
Holmgren v. City o f Lincoln, 199 Neb. 178, 256 N.W.2d 686, 690
(1977); 82 Am.Jur.2d, Zoning and Planning, §69; 3 Anderson,
American Law o f Zoning 609.
Our holding that "in accordance with" does not require that
.
governing bodies, as a matter of law, zone their land as it
appears on their land use maps does not mean that such bodies
can ignore their comprehensive plans when adopting or
amending zoning ordinances. Section 67-6511 requires
governing bodies to zone in accordance with their
comprehensive plan. We hold that "in accordance with" is a
question of fact. What a governing body charged to zone "in
accordance with" under §67-6511 must do is make a factual
inquiry into whether the requested zoning ordinance or
amendment reflects the goals of, and takes into account those
factors in, the comprehensive plan in light of the present factual
circumstances surrounding the request.

Bone v. City of Lewiston, 107 ldaho 844, 850, 693 P.2d 1046, BRIEF OF INTERVENORS
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IV.
This Court defers t o the Board of Commissioner's findings of
fact unless the findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Evans, 137
ldaho at 431, 50 P.3d at 446; Friends o f Farm to Market, 137
ldaho at 196, 46 P.3d at 13. The Board of Commissioners' factual
findings are not clearly erroneous s o long as they are supported
by substantial, competent, although conflicting, evidence.
Friends o f Farm to Market, 137 ldaho at 196,46 P.3d at 13.

Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 75, 73 P.3d 84,

(2003).

Notwithstanding these provisions, however a court reviewing an
administrative decision pursuant t o the IAPA may reverse or
remand for further proceedings only if substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced. I.C. 567-5279 (4); Jefferson
County v. Easfern ldaho Regional Medical Center; 127 ldaho 495,
497, 903 P.2d 84, 86 (1996). There is a strong presumption
favoring the validity of the action of a zoning board. South Fork,
Coalition v. Board o f Commissioners o f Sonneville County, 117
ldaho 857, 860, 792 P.2d 882, 884 (1990). The party attacking a
zoning decision bears the burden of proving that the zoning
ordinance was applied improperly. Sprenger, 127 ldaho at 586,
903 P.2d at 751. The reviewing court must apply a presumption
of validity afforded t o the zoning board when considering the
adoption, interpretation and application o f zoning ordinances by
the board. South Fork Coalition, 117 ldaho at 860, 792 P.2d at
885. Hence, review of a zoning board decision under I.C. 4675279 is a two-tiered process. The party attacking the zoning
board's action 'must illustrate that the zoning board erred in a
manner specified i n I.C. 567-5279(3), and that a substantial right
of that party has been prejudiced.
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Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 577-578, 917 P.2d 409, - (App. 1996).
ARGUMENT
In one of the very few reported cases of an appeal by a developer
rather than the opponents, Balser v. Kootenai County Board of

Commissioners, 110 ldaho 844, 693 P.2d 1046 (1984),

the ldaho

Supreme Court upheld the denial by the BOCC even though the Balser
application was completely in conformity with the county comprehensive
plan.
On the face of it, Neighbors does not believe that in Idaho, absent a
major procedural defect, any denial of an application fora land use change
can ever be reversed on appeal by a district or appellate court to grant the
change requested. Bone v. Gity of Lewiston, suprq reversed on
procedural defects.
Neighbors' brief could stop here but instead will continue to respond
to each of Kirk-Hughes Development's arguments as highlighted with
insertion of a "not" or "not so.".
KHD's Project is Not Consistent with the Future Land Use Map
Designation. Brief, p. 13.

The Findings of Fact, Applicable Legal Standards, Conclusions of
Law and Order of Decision, December 20, 2007 (Decision) recite in s4.12
BRIEF OF INTERVENORS

as follows:

4.12 Future Land Use Map
The Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use Map
identifies the subject property as Timber and within the Surface
Water Overlay Designation. The Timber designation is to
preserve and to protect existing productive timber areas. Timber
areas are defined as areas where primary use it timber reduction
and dwellings as incidental. The Surface Water Overlay requires
that special consideration be taken in residential areas. The
northwestern most portion of this site is designated Rural. The
purpose of this designation is to provide a "country like" setting
for residences with agricultural, timber, or open space
environments, and to prevent the financial burden of providing
infrastructure where it would be least beneficial.
The proposed development is not consistent with the future
land use designation for the subject property contained in the
Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan Future Land Use Map.
In both the hearing before Lisa Key and in the final hearing before
BOCC, the residents along the east side of Coeur d'Alene Lake again and
again testified that Chateau was the opposite of "country lik& Tr., Voi. I , p.

KlfD's Applications are not Compatible with the Kootenai
County Comprehensive Plan. Brief, p. 14.
First, KHD's argument is fundamentally flawed when it endeavors to
show compliance with each goal (which it in fact cannot do) as assuring
automatic approval. It is within the authority of the BOCC to disregard any
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of the goals or alternatively to place less emphasis upon one or another

Balser v. Kootenai County Board of Commissioners, supra. Giltner Dairy
v. Jerome County, supra.
KHD HAS NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF GOAL 4

-

Goal 4 Preserve, protect and enhance the water quality and
quantity of lakes, streams, rivers and wetlands in Kootenai
County.
On the property are 26 acres of federally designated wetlands of
which about 20% were to be impacted by development. As to water quality,
all three commissioners were concerned about the wastewater plant
proposed by Kirk-Hughes Development both as to its location and its
discharge into the lake. Tr., Vol. 3, p. 41 3, L. 13 - 17; p. 414, L. 17 -25; p.
415, 17 - 23; p.416, L. 8 - 12; p. 417, L. 1 -13.
In the public hearing before BOCC, there was testimony of downhill
resident, Romer Brown, about the potential pollution into the creek through
his property into the lake. Tr., Vol2, p. 307, L. 1 -25. Susan Melka
identified 140 acres that would be converted from absorbent to impervious
surfaces by houses and roads. Tr., Vol. :! p. 293, L. 14 - 25; p. 294, L. 1 24.
The 20% of impacted wetlands were to be compensated by created
wetlands of a larger acreage. It is established fact backed by EPA reports
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that created wetlands do not initially adequately duplicate the functions of
natural wetlands. There was testimony before the BOCC so stating. Tr.,
Vol, 2, p. 309, L. 9 -25. Commissioner Piazza asked that question of KirkHughes Development expert Tom Duebendorfer at the close of hearing
and received a less than satisfactory answer:
BY COMMISSIONER
PIAZZA:

BY TOM
DUEBENDORFER:

Wetlands in their natural seem t o perform better
than when man tries t o supplement (inaudible).
You are telling me that man can actually make a
better wetland?
This is a very -- uh, you are asking me to make a
qualitative judgment on what is a better wetland.
I mentioned only an increase in hydrologic
duration. Because you you can have a bucket
of an area that's full of water and it will have
qualities that wetlands perform if it has two feet
deep or it is four feet deep. How long is it two
feet deep or how long is it four feet deep -- you
can have qualities of wetlands that are six
inches of water for three weeks i n the growing
season -- early in the growing season -- six
inches of water and it's gone the rest of the
season -- and those can happen very high
quality wetland functions. You can have seer
swamps that have mature seers but the water
only flows basically flows basically under and
thorough the roots and you look there and you
go that's really cool and that's a wetland. It's
got some skunk patches in there so you can
have a lot of different types of -- (inaudible)
characteristics -types of trees, types of soils amounts of water - how the water flows. Every
one of those things makes a different type of

-
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function in the wetland. So the wetlands in the
center of the property perform biofilteration -they probably perform some amphibian or
(inaudible) production because of the shallow
flowing like this so there is some biologic use of
those wetlands but they are no means the same
as a longer duration pond or a seer swamp or a
seep coming out of the side of the hill. What I
am saying is a wetland a wetland could be
constructed in that low lying area that will be a
higher quality than those which presently are.
It's difficult to replicate a hillside seep or a seer
swamp.

--

Runoff from the golf course was identified as a major threat by Karen
Hays who provided a supporting study by the University of Colorado. Tr.,
Vol. 2, p. 314, L. 9 - 25; p. 315, L. 1 - 25; p. 315, L. I9. Exhibit B - 1021.
The commissioners faced with conflicting evidencechose to trust
established nature rather than engineering plans untested in difficult terrain.

KHD HAS NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF GOAL
Goal 7 -- Prevent o r limit development activity in hazardous
areas. Brief, p. 17.
In the Board Analysis, BOCC recognized, as had Hearing Officer Lisa
Key that the terrain for development was very difficult:

5.06 The design does not adequately address site constraints or
hazards. Specifically, a significant portion of the
construction on the site is proposed in areas with slopes of
between 15 and 35%. Approximately 20% of jurisdictional
wetlands on the site will be impacted and will require
BRIEF OF INTERVENORS
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replacement wetlands. (Decision).
The information was based on staff analysis backed by testimony.
Kootenai County has adopted a site disturbance ordinance, but as the
commissioners noted in their board analysis a significant portion being
constructed on slopes of 15% to 35% presents a challenge to enforcement
of that ordinance. Decision $5.04.

KHD HAS NOT MET THE REQUIREMEN'TS

OF GOAL 9

-

Goal 9 Develop land use regulations that protect property
rights, maintain qualify o f life, provide adequate land for
development, buffer non-compatible land uses and protect the
environment. Brief, p. 22.
The BOCC Comprehensive Analysis on Goal 9 in 55.03 concludes
that ". . . approval of a PUD requires an express finding that the
development is compatible with surrounding homes, businesses and
neighborhoods . . ."
Appellant makes this statement:
There is nothing in the Record that would suggest that the
Appellant's development would not be compatible with the
surrounding area. p. 23.
The common theme in 63 written public comments in opposition and
in the 100 plus pages of public testimony at both hearings would be that the
proposed Chateau development was not compatible with the surrounding
area. Citations would fill another full page.
-' L:

BRIEF OF INTERVENORS

12

h
'

'.*

KHD HAS NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF GOAL 14

-

Goal 14 Provide for the eficient, safe and cost-effective
movement o f people and goods. Brief, p. 24.

The most visible, most easily understood and principal grounds for
rejection by the earlier BOCC in 2006was traffic on Highway 97.
Appellants' Opening Brief suggests that all BOCC had to do was to
follow the letter from the East Side Highway District of August 14, 2007. pp.
20 - 22. Typically in these larger developments and also in smaller
subdivisions, the highway district makes an engineering analysis, poses a
few additional requirements and then conditionally approves. The first
three pages of the letter from District SupervisorJohn Pancratz follows this
format, albeit with considerable more detail.
However, the fourth page by the person who knows the road system
best can only be described as a whole series of red markers and a
concluding "Don't Go There!"
The traffic study covers the construction traffic that will be
necessary for this development very briefly. The number of
workers and the number of heavy construction trucks is not
included. A statement is made that construction trucking will be
eliminated during peak traffic times. It is not just the peak hour
traffic that is impacted by this development. The number of
trucks using SH97, especially on the Beauty Bay Hill, does
impact the safety of local traffic and does consume vehicle trips,
which results in the loss of life of the existing road structure.
The traffic study authors seem to believe that if traffic from the
BRIEF OF INTERVENORS

development does not exceed LOS (Level of Services) C in 2022,
no impact on the road capacity has occurred. The report states
that the directional capacity of SH 97 i s 750 vehicles i n each
direction. This i s calculated from the Highway Capacity Manual
with reductions for existing road and terrain features. The report
states the expected volume with this development, existing
traffic, growth of existing traffic, and traffic from approved
developments will be 641 vehicles i n the peak direction. Given
that all assumptions made are accurate, what would happen if
the following considerations were added to this information?

*
*
*
*

Consider the Beauty Bay Hill as the limiting road segment
Do not use 3 to 5.99 feet shoulders as reported in the
traffic study
Consider what happens t o traffic flow in the winter
Consider the capacity of the 1-90 off ramp or the merge lane
onto 1-90

-

Who is responsible for replacing the capacity that this
development has consumed from the SH 97 corridor? The
narrative stated this development will participate in safety
upgrades and studies for SH97 through aWperlot" extraction fee
requested by the KMPO. No mention of replacing the lost
capacity on SH 97 is made in the traffic study or the project
narrative. As the capacity is used, the LOS drops to undesirable
levels and drivers take unsafe risks. These risks impact the
local traffic from Highway District roads as well as the State
Highway traffic. East Side Highway proposes t o join ITD in
review and comment on the capacity of SH97. East Side
Highway District may also be the only agency that can accept
fees in lieu of construction for safety or capacity work on
adjacent or access roads that lead to his development.
Agency Record (ROA) 2512.
It is clear that the BOCC did in fact "use this letter as a guideline."
(Brief, p. 21) in issuing its denial.
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In its Decision under Comprehensive Plan Analysis $4.07, the BOCC
identified as credible evidence the Pancratz letter, emergency service
providers and all the testifiers who drove upon Highway 97 every day.
Appellants dismiss all this credible evidence and tie on to their kite of
criticism disparagement of the commissioners' personal driving experience.
Brief, pp. 25 - 26.
The record is solidly in support of all that the BOCC decided related
to the impact of a potential Chateau on Highway 97, but a special response
needs to be made to the dismissive ". . .Board's reliance on amateurs and
unqualified so-called traffic studies of SH-97 . . ." Brief, p. 25.
The cumulative experience and observations of the residents driving
both ways between Harrison and Interstate 90 almost everyday for five to
twenty-five years cannot be discounted.
Opponents of Chateau gave up their testifying time to Pat Kelly.". . . a
degreed engineer with 38 years of engineering experience. . ." Tr., Vol. 2,
p. 230, L. 21 - 25. In 15 pages of reported testimony on November 19,
2007, Engineer Kelly dissected theTRANSP0 Report paid for by KHD.
Engineer Kelly's conclusions summarized were that the Beauty Bay climb
had the highest accident density on Highway 97 between 1 -90 and Harrison
which would be exacerbated by 3,900 vehicles coming from Chateau. Id.,
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p. 237, L. 10 - 19. Highway 97 could not be improved by the East Side
Highway District, the Idaho Transportation Department and KHD given the
physical facts: ". . .42 blind curves, steep dropoffs and vertical rock walls. .

." Id., p. 237, L. 19 -25; p. 238, L. 1- 3.
Bill Lampard, a nearby resident, constant user of Highway 97 and with
a degree in engineering, gave to the BOCC detailed first hand counts of
traffic and use on Highway 97 showing today's over-use of that highway and
total absence of future capacity. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 275, L. 21 - 25; p. 276, L. 1 25; p. 277, L. 1- 18.

KHD HAS NOT MET THE REQUIREMENTS OF GOAL 17

--

Goal 17 Ensure efficienf and effecfive police, fire and
emergency services, Brief, p. 28.

In his testimony before Hearing OfficerLisa Key and before the
Board of Commissioners, Gary Young implied that agreement had been
reached with the East Side Highway District. Appellant's opening Brief
similarly equated KHD's offer to the District with acceptance to make
agreement.

Not so!

KHD pledged to build a $500,000 fire station when half of the lots
were sold, If not pie in the sky by and by, this is certainly a way up on the
mountain, long-time away from the here and not a "now" component
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In his testimony before Hearing OfficerLisa Key and before the
Board of Commissioners, Gary Young implied that agreement had been
reached with the East Side Highway District. Appellant's opening Brief
similarly equated KHD1soffer to the District with acceptance to make
agreement.

Not so!

KHD pledged to build a $500,000 fire station when half of the lots
were sold, If not pie in the sky by and by, this is ceitainly a way up on the
mountain, long-time away from the here and not a "now" component
required for a PUD. Given the known record of KHD, the highest likelihood
is that if half of the lots were ever sold, it would be by a different entity
claiming not to be bound by such a pledge. Neither the county nor the fire
district would, ten years or more from now, have either the legal grounds
nor the will to enforce such a commitment.
Of more importance is what the BOCC and the hearing officer were
told by those who know best, the volunteering members: The volunteer fire
department and the volunteer ambulance service need money, manpower
and equipment far more than the buildings.
Jai Nelson testified to her personal experience as a resident and
adjacent owner to Black Rock on the west side of Coeur dlAlene Lake.
People who pay up to or beyond a million dollars for a second or third home
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to occupy intermittently according to season and other choices, do not
become volunteers in the fire district or ambulance drivers. They are not
even sunshine soldiers. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 282, L. 2 - 25; p. 283, L. 1 - 16.
The first hand knowledge and experience concerning both the East
Side Fire District and emergency servicing (EMT) came from Rachel
Wickham. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 222, L. 2 - 25; p. 223, L. 1- 25; p. 224 L. I- 25; p.
225, L. 1 - 25; p. 226, L. 1 - 24. It is of special interest that Ms.Wichham
spoke far beyond the allotted time in answering questions from all three of
the commissioners. No other witness had so much attracted their
inquiries.
At the present time the East Side Highway District seeks to protect
"about 1,500 homes and 500 other structures."~.,p. 222, L. 13 - 44. The
District had formed a quick response medical unit which had seen an
increase in calls which she attributed to development. Id., p. 223, L. 3 - 11;
p. 224, L. 19- 25; p. 225, L. 1 - 3.
The District had a total of 29 volunteers including both firefighters and
EMT1s. Ms. Wichham told the commissioners that the District was totally
dependent on residents who are able to provide year round service. Id., p.
226, L. 8 - 12. Those who would choose to buy one of the French style
chateaus are no more likely to appearas volunteers for the East Side
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Highway District than their counterparts in the Loire Valley in France.
Rachel Wichman listed the areas of disagreement between KHD and
the District:
1.

The District sought immediate conveyance of o m acre of land

for a building and related facilities; KHD would defer conveyance until half
of the lots had been sold. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 223, L. 12 - 20.
2.

The District sought an immediate $500,000 performance bond

for construction of the fire station and facilitator. KHD refused. Id. p. 223,
L. 18 - 22; p. 224, L. 5 - 7.
3.

What Chateau had categorized as a trail to the lake, the District

deemed to be a road that ". . .needs to meet all emergency vehicle
standards."

Id.,p. 223, L. 23 - 25.

The BOCC determined properly that it was unrealistic and unfair to
expect that the additional 500 residences (60 condos) would be adequately
served by 29 volunteers supposed to be made satisfied by the promise of a
new fire station 250 lot sales away.
Arbifrary and Capricious Behavior by BOCC Shown in
Comparison Befween KHD's and Eozzer's Orders of Decision.
NOT SO! Brief, p. 30.

Firstly, every planning decision is fact specific. The granting of one
application can never provide a precedent to require the granting of a
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similar application.
Secondly, as Doug Allman told Hearing Officer Key:
We were all asleep when Gozzer was built but we woke up with
all the trucks and blasting and that sort of thing and got rather
active to take a look at what else was coming down the pike
(Highway 97). Tr., Vol. I , p. 84, L. 4 - 7 .

Subsequently before the BOCC, resident Heather Bowlby made a
lengthy comparison between Chateau and Gozzer using reports on both to
point out the significant differences. Tr., Vol. 2, p. 297, L. 10 - 25; p. 258,

Finally, KHD grasps at a straw that was never in reach:
KHD's Subsfanfial Righfs & Due Process of Law have been
Violated by Wrongful Taking by fhe Koofenai Counfy Board of
County Commissioners: NOT SO! Brief, p. 4 1.

The taking law developed by the United States Supreme Court and
echoed in the lower federal courts and in many state supreme court
decision is most recently derived from Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1993).
A statute or regulation which deprives a landowner of utilization of all
of his, hers or its land can constitute a taking. What KHD was seeking here
was a change in use of its existing land. The action of BOCC in denying
the application for this PUD left KHD with the same status and condition
and uses available for its land as existed before it applied.
BRIEF OF INTERVENORS
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Undersigned counsel is unaware of any reported case where an
appellate court has held that denial by a governmental unit of the
application for a change of use constituted a taking.

KHD cites ldaho Code $67-6535 (c) as providing a remedy. The last
sentence in subsection (c) is a direction to provide notice of the "applicant's
right to request a regulatory taking analysis pursuant to Section 67-8003,
ldaho Code."
The addition was contained in 2003 Session Laws, Chapter 142.
Chapter 141,2003 Session Laws was an amendment to Section 67-8003,
the Regulatory Takings Act originally enacted in 1994 to require the city or
county to provide an analysis of whether the challenged action constituted a
taking. Attorney Jerry Mason,who represents statewide cities and
counties, informed undersigned counsel a year or so ago that in all the
years since ldaho Code §67-8001 et. seq. was adopted there had not been
a single request made to the Attorney General for such an analysis.

KHD must be presumed to know the law. Regardless of whether any
notice was given under ldaho Code §67-6535 (c) about ldaho Code 5678003, KHD could request the Attorney General to require an analysis
which it has not done.
The code only requires that the city or county provide a taking
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analysis upon request from the Attorney General. Until the owner of the
real property makes the request of the Attorney General, the Regulatory
Takings Act is a dead letter.

In the presentation by Gary Young in both hearings, much was made
of cooperation and services of Audubon International, a patent pitch to give
environmental comfort. Undersigned counsel served off and on for 18
years on the Board of Directors of National Audubon Society. Audubon
International has absolutely no connection with the National Audubon
Society.
Appellant's Opening Brief touches on the environmental theme:
However, when Aud ubon International holds its semi-annual
educational seminars, the entire community will be invited to
attend. Brief, p. 26.

Jeanne Hom set the record straight before Lisa Key whom she
informed that ". . .Audubon International's main financial supporter is the
United States Golf Association and Kirk-Hughes is paying them thousands
of dollars to retain their services." Tr., Vol. 1 p. 124, L. 20 - 25.
Before the hearing officer Lisa Key, Gary Young portrayed the
Chateau team as ". . .sensitive to the concerns of the neighbors to the
Coeur dlAlene community." Tr., Vol. 1, p. 12, L. 11 - 14. Young singled
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out team member ". . .Sharon Rogers a personal friend and confident of
Id. 1, p. 13, L. 1 - 8.
Geraldine Kirk. . ." Rogers' testimony, which followed, simultaneously displayed complete
ignorance of the response of the Coeur d'Alene community to Richard
Butler's neo-Nazis and shocked and offended all those present:
BY SHARON ROGERS: I'm not prepared for this but on a personal
note, I've been with Geraldine Kirk-Hughes and her company for
around 14 years. Been through a lot with them watch them grow from
a small office to what they have now and here they are. Ina state
which is known to be a little resentful towards, it is an Arian (Aryan)
state, and it has been (INAUDIBLE).
AUDIENCE: Ohhhh, (INAUDIBLE)
BY SHARON ROGERS: All I'm saying dear heart it that, you've got to
admit you have it here, you know CNAUDIBLE).
BY LISA KEY: Excuse me, excuse me. Please directyour coments to
me and not to the public.
BY SHARON ROGERS: Ah, its just like I don't know. I cantell ya a lot
of beautiful things about this company and so much. And I am sorry if
I've insulted anybody. I'm just quoting history and all I am saying is I
think it's a good time to do maybe a little pay back here. Give these
people a break, that's all.
Id., p. 51, L. 21 - 25; p. 52, L. 1 - 12.
CONCLUSION
The agency record and the transcript of the hearings before the
hearing officer and the BOCC provide overwhelming support for the
decision from which appeal is made. In light of all that came before
BRIEF OF INTERVENORS

Kootenai County, no other determination but denial would be sustainable.
The Court must affirm the denial of the KHD application and give
serious consideration to awarding attorney's fees as against KHD to
Kootenai County under Idaho Code $12-1 17.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a copy of the above and foregoing has been sent by first
class mail, postage prepaid, this 13th day of May , 2008 to:
KRISTEN R. THOMPSON
THOMPSON LAW FlRM
55 SW FIFTH AVENUE, SUITE 150
MERIDIAN, IDAHO 83642
FAX (208) 888-7278
KACEY L. WALL
GELEN WALKER LAW FlRM
105 N. FOURTH STREET - SUITE 307
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83814
FAX (208) 667-9531
GERALDINE KIRK-HUGHES, ESQ.
KIRK HUGHES & ASSOCIATES
2551 S. FORT APACHE ROAD #I 03
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 891 17
FAX (702) 233-8661
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PATRICK M. BRADEN
KOOTENAI COUNTY DEPT. OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES
451 NORTH GOVERNMENT WAY
P. 0. BOX 9000
COEUR D'ALENE, IDAHO 83816-9000
FAX
8 ) 4 1621
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Kootenai County Department of Legal Services
Patrick M. Braden, 1SB tf6020
451 N. Government Way
P.O.Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone: (208) 446-1620
Fax: (208) 446-1621
Attorney for Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
CHATEAU DE LOIRE.
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Appellant,
VS .

KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R. CURRIE,
RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W. TODD
TONDEE,

Case NO.

CV-08-163

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO APPELLANT'S MOTION
REQUESTING
RECONSIDERATION AND, IN
THE ALTERNATIVE,
CERTIFICATION OF THE
COURT'S DECISION

Respondents.

COME NOW the Respondents, KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R. CURRIE, RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W. TODD
TONDEE, by and through their attorney of record, Patrick M. Braden of the Kootenai
County Department of Legal Services, and provide the following memorandum in
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opposition to Appellant" Motion Requesting Reconsideration and, in the Alternative,
Certification of the Court's Decision, filed in this matter on April 22, 2008

ARGUMENT

1.

A Motion for Reconsideration under I.R.C.P. ll(a)(2)(B) is not the proper
procedural mechanism for reconsideration of a decision made by a court
acting in an appellate capacity.
Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development LLC (KHD) has requested reconsideration

of the Court's Order Denying Appellant's Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement,
entered on March 4, 2008. Although no rule is cited under-which this motion has been
brought, as required under I.R.C.P. 7(b)(l), it was presumably brought pursuant to
I.R.C.P. I I (a)(2)(B). This rule reads as follows:
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court
may be made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later
than fourteen (14) days after the entry of the final judgment. A motion for
reconsideration of any order of the triar court made after entry of final
judgment may be filed within fourteen (14) days from the entry of such
order; provided, there shall be no motion for reconsideration of an order of
the trial court entered on any motion filed under Rules 50(a), 52(b), 55(c),
59(a), 59(e), 59.1, 60(a), or 60(b).
I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) (emphasis added)
Here, the Court is sitting in its appellate capacity, not as a trial court. Therefore,
a Motion for Reconsideration would not be the proper mechanism to revisit issues
previously decided by the Court. Accordingly, KHD's Motion for Reconsideration should
properly be construed as a Petition for Rehearing filed pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(t).
Rule 42 of the ldaho Appellate Rules is applicable to this Petition for Judicial
Review pursuant to I.R.C.P. 84(r), which states in pertinent part, that "[alny procedure
for judicial review not specified or covered by these rules shall be in accordance with
the appropriate rule of the ldaho Appellate Rules to the extent that the same is not
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENFORCE MEDIATION AGREEMENT
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contrary to this Rule 84." Thus, assuming that the Court treats the Petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration as a Petition for Rehearing, I.R.C.P. 84(r) and 84(t) incorporate
1.A.R-42.
Pursuant to I.A.R. 42(a), Respondent Kootenai County (the County) is not to
respond to a Petition for Rehearing except upon direction of the Court. Nevertheless, to
the extent that the Court may be inclined to treat KHD's motion as a motion for
reconsideration pursuant to I.R.C.P. 1l(a)(2)(B), the County's response is as set forth
below.
II.

No new evidence has been brought to the Court's attention, and the legal
arguments set forth in KHD's motion have already been properly
considered by this Court.
The ldaho Supreme Court has stated that a motion for reconsideration of an

interlocutory order under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) "usually involves new or additional facts,
and a more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact. Indeed, the chief virtue of
a reconsideration is to obtain a full and complete presentation of all available facts, so
that the truth may be ascertained, and justice done, as nearly as may be." J.I. Case Co.
v. McDonald, 76 ldaho 223, 229, 280 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1955). More recently, the ldaho

Supreme Court affirmed this view in stating the following:
When considering a motion of this type, the trial court should take into
account any new facts presented by the moving party that bear on the
correctness of the interlocutory order. The burden is on the moving party
to bring the trial court's attention to the new facts. We will not require the
trial court to search the record to determine if there is any new information
that might change the specification of facts deemed to be established.
Coeur d'/llene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of North Idaho, 118 ldaho 812, 800 P.2d
1026 (1990); see also Jensen v. State, 139 ldaho 57, 64, 72 P.3d 897, 904 (2003)
(finding that without supporting affidavits which were the subject to a successful motion
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENFORCE MEDIATION AGREEMENT - 3
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to strike, "there was no basis for asking the trial court to reconsider its earlier decision").
On the other hand, the ldaho Court of Appeals has held that interlocutory orders may be
reconsidered on the basis of "facial errors or errors of law" with the necessity of
submission of additional facts. Johnson v. Larnbros, 143 ldaho 468, 471-73, 147 P.3d
100, 103-05 (Ct. App. 2006). In any event, the decision to grant or deny a request for
reconsideration is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Jordan v. Beeks, 135
ldaho 586, 592, 21 P.3d 908, 914 (2001).
KHD's motion does not point to any newly discovered evidence which would
support its motion (which, to the extent such evidence is outside the record, would
require the granting of a motion to augment the record), nor does it allege that the Court
overlooked any evidence currently in the record on this Petition for Judicial Review.
Instead, it merely argued that the Court denied KHD's Motion to Enforce Mediation
Agreement solely under the ldaho Administrative Procedures Act, ldaho Code § 675201 et seq., rather than as a matter of contract.

(Appellant's Motion Requesting

Reconsideration at 2-10.)
The County in fact argued that the Post-Mediation Agreement was enforceable
as a contract, and the Court agreed with this argument. It specifically found that "the
Post-Mediation Agreement executed by Kirk-Hughes Development (KHD) and Kootenai
County (the County) on January 19, 2007 is enforceable as a contract, and that it is
clear and unambiguous." (Order Denying Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement, at
2.) The Court found that while "KHD complied with all of its obligations as set forth in
the Post-Mediation Agreement," that agreement did not contain "any guarantees or
assurances that the County would approve the application to be submitted by KHD
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upon a finding that KWD had complied with the conditions set forth in the agreement."
Thus, the Court declined to enter an order enforcing the terms of that agreement.
The Court properly applied statutory and contractual principles on denying KHD's
Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement. Therefore, there are no facial errors or errors
of law in this decision. In addition, KHD has not provided any factual information which
could cause the Court to reconsider this denial in light of those facts. Accordingly, the
Court should deny KHD's motion for reconsideration, to the extent that it has been
properly brought under I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B)
Ill.

The Court should n o t grant a permissive appeal o f its Order Denying
Motion to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement.
In the event the Court denies KHD's motion for reconsideration, KHD has also

requested certification of such denial to the ldaho Supreme Court for appeal pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 54(b). (Appellant's Motion Requesting Reconsideration at 10.) This rule allows
a court to "direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and upon an express direction for the entry of the judgment." I.R.C.P. 54(b)(l).
The entry of a "54(b) certificate" is within the sound discretion of the court entering the
order. Willis v. Larsen, 110 ldaho 818, 822, 718 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Ct. App.1986)
The ldaho Supreme Court, however, has cautioned that "[pliecemeal appeals are
disfavored," and that "delay itself cannot constitute a hardship" sufficient to justify the
granting of a 54(b) certificate. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Carrier Corp. 112 ldaho 27, 29,
730 P.2d 947, 949 (1986). Where there is no "hardship, injustice, or compelling reason"
to grant a motion for certification of final judgment under I.R.C.P. 54(b), the granting of

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENFORCE MEDIATION AGREEMENT

-5

H.\Planning\Chateau de Loire #2\Petition for Judicial Review - CV-08-163\Memo IOT Motion for Reconsideration.doc

t-

.-,
-

/:

such motion constitutes an abuse of discretion. ld.; Watson v. Weick, 141 Idaho 500,

Here, KHD has not shown that there is any hardship, injustice, or other
compelling reason which would support the issuance of a 54(b) certificate in this matter.
In fact, it may well be argued that the delay caused by an appeal of an interlocutory
order before all issues presented in this appeal can be determined, which could extend
for a year or more, could cause a greater hardship than the much shorter delay caused
by waiting until all issues raised in this matter have been decided by this Court.
Accordingly, the County requests that the Court deny this motion, thereby allowing it to
decide all issues brought in this appeal in a manner most consistent with judicial
economy and the interests of justice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Appellant's Motion Requesting Reconsideration
and, in the Alternative, Certification of the Court's Decision should be DENIED.
DATED this

/xf2day of May, 2008
Kootenai County Department
of Legal Services

Patrick M. Braden
Attorney for Respondents
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Kristen R. Thompson
THOMPSON LAW FIRM
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Geraldine Kirk-Hughes
KIRK-HUGHES & ASSOCIATES
2551 S. Fort Apache Road, Suite 103
Las Vegas, NV 891 17

Fax: (208) 888-7296

Fax: (702) 233-8661

Kacey L. Wall
GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM
105 N. Fourth Street, Suite 307
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box "A"
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Fax: (208) 667-8503

Fax: (208) 765-51 17

Patrick M. Braden

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO ENFORCE MEDIATION AGREEMENT

-7

H \Plannlng\Chateau de Lo~re#2\Petltlon for Judlclal Rev~ew- CV-08-163\Memo IOT Mot~onfor Recons~derat~on
doc

c

+-.

-b

,*

:>

&PB*

Z&*A:
F
wg4
w
+
*;

&i

ORIGI...;I

Kootenai County Department of Administrative Services
Patrick M. Braden, ISB kr6020
451 N, Government Way
P.O. Box 9000
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-9000
Telephone: (208) 446-1620
Fax: (208) 446-1621

p$$3

>&%*!
?,?
%&&$w

STATE OF IDAHO
)ss
COUNTY OF KOOTE*~'
F\LED:

Attomey for Respondents

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT,
LLC FOR PLANNED UNIT
DEVELOPMENT CHATEAU DE LOIRE.
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Appellant,
VS.

Case No.
NOTICE RE: OPPOSITION TO
APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR
APPEAL OF COMMISSIONERS'
DECISION ON PUD APPLICATION
054-05

KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R.
CURRIE, RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W.
TODD TONDEE,
Respondents.

COME NOW the Respondents, KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R. CURRIE, RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W. TODD
TONDEE, by and through their attorney of record, Patrick M. Braden of the Kootenai
County Department of Administrative Services, and hereby give notice to this honorable

.

NOTICE RE: OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR APPEAL
OF COMMISSIONERS' DECISION ON PUD APPLICATION 054-05 - 1
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Court and to all counsel of Respondents' opposition to Appellant's Motion for Appeal of
Commissioners' Decision on PUD Application 054-05 for the reasons stated in
Respondents' Memorandum in Support of Respondents' Objection to Reply Brief of
Appellant and Motion to Strike, previously filed in this matter on April 16, 2008.
DATED this

day of April, 2008.
Kootenai County Department
of Administrative Services

pafl?
.L

Patrick M. Braden
Attorney for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this /
day of April, 2008, 1 caused to be served a
true and correct copy of the foregoing via facsimile, addressed to the following:
Kristen R. Thompson
THOMPSON LAW FIRM
55 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 150
Meridian, ID 83642

Geraldine Kirk-Hughes
KIRK-HUGHES & ASSOCIATES
2551 S. Fort Apache Road, Suite 103
Las Vegas, NV 891 17

Fax: (208) 888-7296

Fax: (702) 233-8661

Kacey L. Wall
GLEN WALKER LAW FIRM
105 N. Fourth Street, Suite 307
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814

Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box "A"
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Fax: (208) 667-8503

Fax: (208) 765-51 17

s
7

Patrick M. Braden

NOTICE RE: OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR APPEAL
OF COMMISSIONERS' DECISION ON PUD APPLICATION 054-05 2
H \Plann~ng\Chateaude Lore #2\Petitlon for Judlc~alRev~ew- CV-08-163\Notlce re Memo IOT Mot~onfor
Appeal of PUD-054-05 doc

-

*

4'
4

a.f

STATE OF 13AHO
COUQ'TY GF KOOTEliAI

Robert M. Freilich
rfreilich@miilerbarondess.corn
MILLER BARONDESS, LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1000
Los h g e l e s , California 90067
Telephone No:(3 10) 552-4400
Facsimile No: (3 10) 552-8400
Pro Hac Vice
CSB #I41786

FILETI:

Kristen R. Thompson
THOMPSON LAW FIR.M
55 $W FiEth Avenue, Suite 150
Meridian, Idaho 83642
Telephone No: (208) 888-7278
Facsimile Ni: (208) 888-7296
ISB #4033
Attorneys for Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIA& DISTRICT OF
STATE O F IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY O F KOOTENAI
IN THE MATTER OF THE
APPLICATION OF KIRK-HUGHES
DEVELOPMENT, LLC, FOR PLANNED
UNIT DEVELOPMENT CHATEAU DE
LOIRE
Appellant,

08-Ik3
Case No: C V - m

KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; S.J.
"GUS" JOHNSON; ELMER R. CURRIE;
KATIE BRODE,
Respondents.
IN T?-IE MATTER OF THE
APPLICATION OF KIRK-HUGHES
DEVELOPMENT, LLC FOR PLANNED
UNIT DEVELOPMENT AND
PROPOSED SUBDIVISION WITHIN
PUD KNOWN AS CHATEAU DE LOIRE
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Appellant,
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; ELMER
R. CURRIE; RICHARD A. PIAZZA; AND
W. TODD TONDEE,
Respondents.

Case No: CV-08-163

APPELLANT KIRK-HUGHES
DEVELOPMENT, LLC'S
CONSOLIDATED SUPPLEMENTAL
& REPLY BRIEF

Hearing Date: June 4,2008
Hearing Time: 1:30 p.m.

) ss

I,

ISSUES ON M P E G
1.

Wether the Kootcnai County Board of County Commissioners"

("'BBOCC") first and second decisions regarding Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development,
LLC's ("KHD") Chateau de Loire P l w e d Unit Development and Preliminary
Subdivision Appli~ationswere made in the BOCC's administrative, quasi-judicial
capacity and not in its legislative capacity as in a rezoning.

.3

Whether the BOCC ened under Idaho law by basing its denial of KHD's

Chateau de Loire Planned Unit Development and Preliminary Subdivision Applications
on its alleged non-conformance with the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan instead of
the applicable zoning ordinance provisions and standards.

3.

Whether the BOCC ened under Idaho law by making its principal finding

when denying W D ' s Chateau de Loire Planned Unit Development and Preliminary
Subdivision Applications that the zoning of the property was incompatible with the
surrounding area.
4.

Whether the BOCC was equitably estopped in its decision on the second

applications &om raising any new Comprehensive Plan goals with respect to KHD's
Chateau de Loire Planned Unit Development and Preliminary Subdivision applications
that were not raised upon the denial of Kf-ID's first application or in the post-mediation
agreement between the parties.

5.

Whether the decisions of the BOCC violate KHD's due process, equal

protection and takings rights as a landowner in Idaho under the U.S. Constitution and the
constitution of the State of Idaho.
6.

Whether the Court should vacate the first and second decisions of the

BOCC, and remand to the BOCC with instructions to approve the PUD and preliminary
subdivision application, as set forth in the Planning Staff Report and Recommendation
dated August 23,2007, and retain jurisdiction over this consolidated matter until such
approval becomes final and building permits are issued.

7.

Whether the Court should reserve the Appellant's right to file plenary

federal and state constitutional claims without prejudice by reason of res judicata or other
preclusive effect.

8.

Whether the BOCC, by acting without a reasonable basis in fact or law,

should be awarded attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho Code (S 12-1 17.
11.

INTRODIJCTION
Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC ("KHD" or "Appellant") brings these

consolidated appeals from the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioner's
("BOCC," "County" or "Respondents") first and second decisions to deny KHD's
Chateau de Loire Planned Unit Development and Preliminary Subdivision Applications.
The BOCC, instead of fulfilling its administrative and quasi-judicial task to adhere
strictly to the standards for PUDs and subdivisions set forth in the zoning code and
subdivision regulations, succumbed to unrelated political pressure from certain segments
of the community, and abdicated its responsibilities in favor of arbitrarily, capriciously
and unreasonably denying KHD's applications and substantially infringing on KHD's
statutory and constitutional rights as a landowner with a specific project application.
In evaluating specific PUD and subdivision developmental applications from
landowners, the BOCC acts in an administrative, quasi-judicial capacity-not

in a

legislative capacity as it does when adopting or amending zoning ordinances or a
comprehensive plan. As such, the BOCC's only task is to determine whether an
applicant's proposal complies with the applicable zoning ordinance. The BOCC does not
have the discretion to take into account concerns with standards not found in the zoning
ordinance, including extraneous matters expressed by vocal members of the community.

After the BOCC rejected Kf"iD9sfirst application despite the approval
recommendation from the Hearing Exminer, KWD appealed to this Court. The two
sides entered into mediation where RHD negotiated in good faith to cure any concerns
that the BOCC hdd to avoid further litigation. The outcome was a post-mediation
apeement between KHD and the BOCC that set forth the roadmap for KXD to obtain
approval upon submitting a second application. W D submitted a second application in
accord with that roadmap. In submi~ingthe second application, Mf)did everything
required by the County in the post-mediation agreement:

* Modified the conceptual PUD plan to incorporate the requirement for an overpass
of Highway 97 and received approval of all reviewing agencies including the
Idaho Department of Transportation (ITD);
Updated the traffic impact studies to show that the effect of the development
would not exceed the capacity of Highway 97 including peak hours of travel,
which was approved by ITD and all reviewing agencies;

* Agreed to build a fire station and also to dedicate the land for the station;
Deleted the service station and retail to remove any non-residential uses alleged to
be incompatible with the area;
Submitted a preliminary subdivision plat which incorporated all of these changes.
KHD worked in good faith, incurring substantial expense, to fully implement the terns of
the agreement, provided all of thc required dedication of land and construction of
infrastructure required by the staff, and addressed all issues raised by the BOCC in its
denial of KHD's first application and the post-mediation agreement between the parties.
The County's Planning Staff Report of August 23,2007 recoinmended approval with
standard conditions. (ROA, Second Appeal, 2065-23 01).

The BOCC was equitably estopped horn going beyond its agreement in reviewing
the second application. Based on an enviroment of vocal and hostile community
opposition to new development in the area, without regard to the standards of the zoning
ordinance, and in disregard for its Planning Staff's recornendation, the BOCC
impermissibly rejected KHD's application, citing as its findings KHD's failure to
confom to five additional new goals in the Comprehensive Plan. These new alleged
non-compliance deficiencies with K m ' s application were not raised by the BOCC at the
time it denied KHD's first application. Nor did the BOCC raise these new goal
"deficiencies" when the parties entered into the post-mediation agreement. The failure to
raise these new issues equitably estops the BOCC from raising these alleged deficiencies
upon review of the second application. Further, the BOCC used the County's
Comprehensive Plan general policies as a weapon to attack KHD's proposal even though
Idaho law is clear that a local zoning board acting in an administrative capacity on a
conditional use permit, PUD or subdivision application cannot use the general terms of a
comprehensive plan in order to deny a developer's proposal that otherwise conforms with
the requircments of the zoning ordinances in place.
In sum, the BOCC rejected KHD's first and second PUD and preliminary
subdivision applications on the pretext that they were not compliant with the general
goals of the Comprehensive Plan, despite the fact that the second application met all of
the requircments set forth in the first decision of the Board and the post-mediation
agreement. KHD respectfully requests that the Court vacate the two decisions of the
BOCC and remand with instructions that the BOCC approve KHD's Second PUD and
subdivision application, upon the terms and conditions set forth in the Hearing
Examiner's Recommendation of Approval to the first application (ROA, First Appeal,

1655) and the Planning S t d P s Recornendation of Approval of August 23,2007 (ROA,
Second Appeal, 2065-2301).

HI.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In 2004 and 2005, Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC ("KKWD") purchased a total of

five hunBred seventy-eight (578) acres of land located on the eastern shore of Lake Coeur
d' Alene with the intent of developing a private resort c o m u n i t y called Chateau de
Loire. The zoning that was in place at the time, and remains in place today, authorizes

KHD to submit its application for a planned unit development ("PPUD") without having to
request that the area be rezoned. (Kootenai County's PUD ordinance provides that "[tlhe
primary uses in a PUD shall be those allowed or conditionally allowed in the applicable
zoning district." K.C.C. Cj 9-15-5.)
Approximately one hundred eighty-four (184) acres of KHD's land are zoned
"Restricted Residential" and another three hundred ninety-four (394) acres of the land are
zoned "Rural."The minimum lot size in the Restricted Residential zone is 8,250 square
feet (or 5 lots per acre). Kootenai County Code Cj 9-8-3. The minimum lot size in the
Rural zone is five (5) acres. K.C.C.

5 9- 13-3. Kootenai County's zoning ordinance

regarding planned unit developments provides:
The overall density, or number of dwelling units in a PUD, shall conform
to the requirements of the zoning district in which the PUD is located,
however lot sizes may be varied. If a PUD is located in more than one
zoning district, the allowable density for the land in each zone shall be
calculated separately and then added together to yield the allowable
density for the development. The distribution of dwellings within the
PUD shall not be affected by zoning district boundaries.
K.C.C.

5 9-15-6. Thus, the total number of lots permitted by Kootenai County's zoning

ordinance on W D ' s land is nine hundred ninety-nine (999). The number of units that

KND's application contemplales is four hundred seventy-five (475)-less

than half the

number that KWD is entitled to under the zoning ordinance.

In May of2005, KHD submiaed its first application, which was designated as
PUD 054-05. KI-fD's plans met all planning and engineer infrastructure requirements for
fire and roads, for water and sewer and for open space. Public hearings were held before
the Comty Hearing Examiner, who recommended approval, and the BOCC. The heavily
attended hearings were marked by hostile objections by groups of organizations and
citizens on matters that did not relate to any of the administrative standards set forth in
the County's zoning ordinance, but rather voiced objections that no new growth be
allowed in the area as being incompatible with their rural lifestyle as if the application
hearing involved a request for a legislative discretionary rezoning. Furthermore, one
member of the BOCC visited the site without notice to the BOCC, KHD or the public and
without authority of the Board and conducted his own "study" as an opponent to the
application. KHD's application was denied on August 24,2006.

KHD appealed this decision with this Court. During the appeal, the parties
engaged in mediation to determine if the matters could be resolved without continued
litigation. On January 19, 2007, the parties entered into a post-mediation agreement
setting forth the BOCC's remaining concerns and offering a roadmap by which KHD
could obtain approval at the conceptual stage.
KHD made the requested changes over the next few months, incurring substantial
expense, and filed an amended PUD application along with filing a Preliminary
Subdivision Application on March 14, 2007. The second application, designated PUD
057-07, was substantially the same as the previous application, other than fulfilling the
requirements and modifications that were agreed to by the parties in the post-mediation

agreement. Both the second PUD application and Preliminary Subdivision Application
were, however, denied by the BOCC on December 20,2007, based on alleged
incompatibility with new msllerial Comprehensive Plan goals not raised in the denial of
KHD's first application.
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.

Standard of Review

The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act sets forth five separate circumstnnces
where the decision of a counv comissioner" board must be overtwed when the
decision prejudices substantial rights of the appellmt as follows: (a) when the decision is
in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) when the decision is in excess of
the statutory authority of the agency; (c) when the decision is made upon unlawful
procedure; (d) when the decision is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as
a whole; or (e) when the decision is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C.

f3

67-5279(3) (Idaho Administrative Procedures Act); Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho
353,357 (2000); Application of Ifayden Penes Water Go., 11I Idaho 33 1 (1 986); Bone v.
City of lewiston, 107 Idaho 844 (1984); Ferguson v. Board of County Commissioners,
110 Idaho 626 (Ct. App. 1982); Love v. Bd. of County Commissioners of Bingharn
County, 108 Idaho 728 (1985). Remarkably, each of these circumstances is present in the
BOCC's first and second decisions, as set forth below.
B.

A Decision Bv A Countv Commission To Approve Or Denv A PUD
Application Is An Administrative, Oussi-Judicial Act That Must Be
Guided Solely By The Standards of The Ordinance In Place

It is undisputed that the BOCC acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when it considers
whether to approve or deny applications for subdivisions and PUDs. "A decision by a
zoning board applying general rules or specific policies to specific individuals, interests

or situations, are quasi-judicial in nature and subject to due process constraints."
Chambers v. Sootenai County Bd. of Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 115,118 (1 994); Cowan v. Bd
of Comm 'rs ofFremonf County, 143 Idaho 501 (2006); Cooper v. Board ofCuunty
Comm'rs of Ada County, 101 Idaho 407,411 (1 980). Nor is the BOCC allowed to
advocate approval or denial of the application. "When acting upon a quasi-judicial
zoning matter the governing board is neither a proponent nor an opponent of the proposal
at issue, but sits instead in the seat of a judge." Marcia 7: Turner, LLC v. City of %in
Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846 (2007). "In this context, the Due Process
Clause would therefore apply to the zoning board in the same way that it applies to
judges." Id
This is not a situation, as Respondents suggest, where the Court should leave the
decision to the legislative judgment of the local agency-such

as a zoning decision where

a legislative action is being made by the BOCC. On the contrary, here the BOCC had
previously made the zoning decision in its legislative capacity and was left with the
quasi-judicial task of approving applications of landowners whose applications are in
conformity with the zoning ordinance. See Floyd v. Klein, 765 N.E. 632,646 (Ind. App.
2002) ("[tlhe plan commission's only task when reviewing [a developer's]
application.. .[is] to determine whether the proposed plat complied with the concrete
standards set out in the subdivisions control ordinance.. ."). The BOCC has no discretion
to deny applications based on considerations other than the zoning ordinance. Id. ("the
Plan Commission's denial of [the developer's] application on the basis of factors outside
the ordinance was erroneous"). The BOCC is not acting as a "mini-legislature."
Albuquerque Commons Partnership v. City of Albuquerque, 2008 WL 203 1414 at 10

These requirements are in place so that uniform results are reached no matter who
applies to the local zoning board for developmental approval. "All persons similarly
situated should be able to obtain plat approval upon meeting uniform standards.
Othemise the official approval of a plat application would depend upon the whim or
caprice of the public body involved." Broward County v. Narco Realty, 359 So.2d 509

C.

The BOCC's Entire Denial, Based On Alleged Non-Confomance
With The Comprehensive Plan, Is Not Permitted Under Idaho Law

In its denial of KHD's applications, the BOCC relied principally upon the
applications' alleged non-compliance with general goals laid out in the county's
Comprehensive Plan. Doing so was legal error. The Comprehensive Plan does not serve
the purpose of acting as a legal standard that quasi-judicial development applications are
analyzed against. The Comprehensive Plan contains a list of general goals, which are too
vague for a developer or a quasi-judicial board to use in order to determine whether a
particular application meets the express written standards of the zoning and subdivision
ordinance. The Hearing Examiner reviewing KHD's first application recognized this,
recommending approval of the application because it met the requirements in the zoning
ordinance; the Comprehensive Plan was not the proper standard since the application was
not requesting a change in zoning. (ROA, First Appeal, 1655.) As detailed below, use of
a comprehensive plan in this manner effectively gives a reviewing board unbridled
legislative discretion when reviewing specific applications-a

situation that the law

clearly does not permit.
It is well-established in Idaho law that "a comprehensive plan does not operate as
legally controlling zoning law, but rather serves to guide and advise the governmental
agencies responsible for making zoning decisions." Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho

353, 357-358 (2000); Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 2008 WL, 803001 (Idaho);
Evans v Teton County, 139 Idaho 71,76 (2003); Balser v. fiolenai Counly Bd of
Comm 'rs, 1 10 Idaho 37 (1 986); Friends ofFarrn to Market v. Valley County, 137 Idaho
192,200 (2002). The governing board of a county cannot deny a use that is specifically
permitted by a zoning ordinance on the ground that such use would conflict with a
generalized goal of' a comprehensive plan; a comprehensive plan reflects the desirable
goals and objectives, or desirable fhture situations for the land within a j ~ s d i c t i o nbut
, it
does not operate as a legally conlrolling zoning law. Sunders Orchard v. Gem County ex
rel, Bd. ofCounty Comm'rs, 137 Idaho 695,699 (2002) ("[tlhe governing board cannot,
however, deny a use that is specifically permitted by the zoning ordinance on the ground
that such use would conflict with the comprehensive plan").
Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353 (2000), is instructive here. In Urrutia,
the Supreme Court of Idaho held that the Blaine County Board of Commissioners'
decision to deny a developer's application "was improper in that the Board placed
inappropriate emphasis upon the subdivision's non-compliance with the Comprehensive
Plan." Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,356 (2000). Blaine County's ordinance,
\

like Kootenai County's ordinance, stated that the development application should
conform to the goals and policies of the comprehensive plan. The Urrutia court held
that:
It is to be expected that the land to be subdivided may not agree with all
provisions in the comprehensive plan, but a more specific analysis,
resulting in denial of a subdivision application based solely on noncompliance with the comprehensive plan elevates the plan to the level of
legally controlling zoning law. Such a result affords the Board unbounded
discretion in examining a subdivision application and allows the Board to
effectively re-zone land based on the general lan~uagein the
comprehensive wlan. As indicated above, the comprehensive plan is
intended merely as a guideline whose primary use is in guiding zoning
decisions.

Urruria v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,358-359 (2000) (emphasis added). This is
precisely the same legislative "unbounded discretion" with which the BOCC is acting in
the i n s m t case. The Idaho Supreme Court has squarely rejected a county commission's
authority to deny a developer's application based upon alleged non-compliance with the
general goals of the eomprehensivc plan.
Two years later, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Sanders Orchard v. Gem
County was even more specific:
The Subdivision Ordinance's requirement that the Board consider the
konformance of the subdivision with the Comprehensive Plan' does not
incorporate by reference all of the provisions of the Comprehensive Plan
into the Subdivision Ordinance ...The governing board cannot [I deny a use
that is specifically permitted by the zoning ordinance on the ground that
such use would conflict with the comprehensive plan.
Sanders Orchard v. Gem County ex rel. Bd. ofCounty Comm 'rs, 137 Idaho 695,699
(2002). KHD's first and second applications comply with the zoning ordinance. The
BOCC impermissibly denied the first and second PUD and subdivision applications on
the ground that they allegedly conflicted with the Comprehensive Plan.
The BOCC found that KHD's proposed development was not consistent with
Goals 4,7,9, 14, 17,23 and 24 of the Comprehensive Plan. Goal 4 is to "[plreserve,
protect, and enhance the water quality and quantity of lakes, streams, rivers and wetlands
in Kootenai County." Goal 7 is to "Cplrevent or limit development activity in hazardous
areas." Goal 9 is to "[d]evelop land use regulations that protect property rights, maintain
quality of life, provide adequate land for development, buffer non-compatible land uses,
and protect the environment." Goal 14 is to "Cplrovide for the efficient, safe, and costeffective movement of people and goods." Goal 17 is to "[elnsure efficient and effective
police, fire, and emergency services." Goal 23 is to "[d]evelop quality County parks,

greenbelts, and recreation facilities to meet the diverse needs of a growing population.*'
Goal 24 is to ""Elecure waterfront and near-shore areas for beneficial public uses and
enhance public enjoyment of a growing population."
The BOCC's decision on KHDYsapplication is precisely the situation that the
Umutia and Sanders Orchard decisions sought to avoid. If the BOCC were allowed to
approve or reject KHD's PUD or subdivision applications based upon alleged violations
of the goals of the Comprehensive Plan, the BOCC could consider public opposition
based on the general, vague goals contained in the Comprehensive Plan, exactly what has
occurred in this case. Meanwhile, landowners would be trapped in a situation where they
are of%red no guidance on the parameters to which their development application should
conform in order to be approved; instead, each application would be left to the legislative
whims of the BOCC depending on which way the political winds were blowing on that
particular day.
Respondents admit that "a land use application does not need to strictly comply
with a county's comprehensive plan." Brief of Respondents, at p. 11. But in an effort to
support the BOCC's use of the goals of the Comprehensive Plan as grounds to deny
KHD's applications, Respondents inappropriately cite to Evans v. Teton County, 139
Idaho 71 (2003), for the proposition that "the comprehensive plan cannot be ignored in
making a decision to approve or deny the application." Brief of Respondents, at p. 11.
However, Respondents left out the actual language of Evans which provides that "a board
of comissioners cannot ignore their comprehensive plan when adopting or amending
zoning ordinances." Evans at 76 (emphasis added). Unlike the present case, Evans was
a challenge to a legislative zoning change, not a quasi-judicial development application.
Evans itself contradicts Respondents' suggestion (Brief at p. 11) that the Evans decision

did not c o m e n t on a board's use of the comprehensive plan when making a decision on
whether a quasi-judicial application conforms to ordinances already in place. Evans
specifically states that "a comprehensive plan is not a legally conbolling zoning law." Id
When the BOCC is concerned with implementing the goals of the Comprehensive
Plan, the proper procedure is to work in its legislative capacity to amend the county's
zoning ordinances to incorporate the Comprehensive Plan goals into legally sound,
specific standards. Idaho law is clear that the BOCC e m o t use the general language of
the Comprehensive Plan as a tool to deny individual quasi-judicial applications that
otherwise comply with the current standards of zoning ordinances. The BOCC thus erred
when it did so embody the general goals of the Comprehensive Plan as the sole basis for
denying KHD's second PUD and subdivision applications, and the primary basis for
denial of the first Pm application.
D.

The Doctrine Of Eauitable Estop~elPrevents The BOCC From
Denying KHD's Application Based On Grounds The BOCC Failed To
Raise When Thev Denied KHD's Original Ap~lication

Without incorporating the goals of the Comprehensive Plan into the specific
standards of the County's zoning ordinance, the BOCC cannot introduce new standards
with respect to whether KHD's second application is in compliance with Comprehensive
Plan goals. Upon KHD's first application, the BOCCYsdecision stated that the
application cornplied with all goals except Nos. 7 and 14. The parties went through
mediation and entered into a post-mediation agreement setting forth the specific
requirements of the BOCC in order for the developmental application to be reviewed.
Even if the Court should find the post-mediation agreement is not enforceable as a
Development Agreement under Idaho law, it forms the basis for the principle of equitable

estoppel against introducing new alleged compliance deficiencies based on newly
asserted Comprehensive Plan goals.
In the post-mediation agreement, the BOCC and KID identified the specific
actions that KWD would take to obtain a permitlapproval of the PUD.' First, the parties
agreed that all proposed building sites would be in compliance with federal, state and
local laws and regulations, including those applicable to building on slopes. Second, the
parties agreed that any disturbance of wetlands would occur only as permitted pursuant to
federal, state and local regulations and permitting, including those of the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers. Third, KHD agreed to various actions to help mitigate the effects of
the development on Highway 97, including: (1) running construction traffic at non-peak
hours as determined by the Idaho Transportation Department ("IDT"), (2) constructing a
permanent overpasslunderpass across Highway 97 to be approved by IDT, and (3)
financially participate in studies of traffic mitigation on Highway 97.
Despite these requirements being met, the BOCC introduced five new goals of the
Comprehensive Plan which it alleged the second application was incompatible with. The
BOCC cannot raise alleged deficiencies on a piecemeal basis. The doctrine of equitable
estoppel prevents them from doing so. In a case identical to the present situation, where
the court remanded an application back to the administrative agency for a second review,
the agency was held to be estopped from raising new issues, objectives, and compatibility
deficiencies. See Floyd v. Klein, 765 N.E. 632, 641 (Ind. App. 2002) ("[all1 of the
asserted defects in a plat must be identified at one time, and a plan commission may not
raise asserted defects in a piecemeal fashion").

'

The Court noted during the February 22,2008 hearing that "[tlhere also was a second portion [of the postmediation agreement] which made reference to Idaho Code § 67-651 9(4)(c) that provided essentially that
the parties agree to and hereby identifj the actions that the Appellant, Kirk-Hughes Development, can take
to obtain permit approval of the PUD." Reporter's Transcript of Proceedings, February 22,2008, Case No.
CV-08-163.

To prevail on a claim of equitable estoppel, it must be shown that a party makes
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or construdive
knowledge of the truth; (2) that it is made with the intent that it be relied upon; and (3)
that the party asserting estoppel relies on it to the party's prejudice. Twin Fall$ Clinic di

IJosp. Bldg. Corp. v, Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,22, (1982); John K Brown Properties v.
Blaine County, 138 Idaho 171, 176 (2002). When the post-mediation agreement was
entered into, the BOCC did not disclose the fact that it had the intention of introducing
five new Comprehensive Plan goals which it would allege were applicable to the
applications and render them incompatible. The BOCC knew that W D would rely on
the post-mediation agreement as the definitive roadmap towards approval of KHDYs
application. KHD spent substantial amounts of time and expenditures over the next few
months working to shape its second PUD and first preliminary subdivision application so
that the BOCC's concerns would be adequately addressed. In fact, the County planning
staff recommended approval of the second applications based on compliance with all
applicable issues raised in the first hearing and the post-mediation agreement. (ROA,
Second Appeal, 2065-23 0 1.)
The principle of equitable estoppel is properly invoked here to prohibit the BOCC
from denying KHD's proposed use of its land based on five entirely new Comprehensive
Plan goals after KWD incurred substantial expense in reasonable and good faith reliance
on the mediation agreement, which the parties intended to be a roadmap toward project
approval. "[Ilf a plan commission fails to apprise a developer of asserted defects in a plat
following a hearing, the commission may be estopped from denying an application for
plat approval on the basis of those asserted defects following a subsequent hearing."
Floydv. Klein,765 N.E. 632,641 (Ind. App. 2002). It would be highly inequitable to

deprive KHD of the right to complete the development as proposed aRer incurring such
expenses. Courts of other states have applied estoppel to new or amended rewlations
where the applicw has made a substantial investment in good faith reliance on the
ordinmces in place at the time of application. Henry (4t Murphy, inc. v. Allenstown, 424
A. 2d 1132 (N.W. 1980); American National Bank v. City of Chicago, 3 1 1 N.E. 2d 325
(Ill. App. 1974).
Idaho law does as well. Thus, in situations where a landowner, in reliance on an
existing zoning regulation, makes substantial expenditures before the zoning regulation is
changed, the landowcr is protected from the local government's "ever-evolving"
position. See Boise City v. Blaser, 98 Idaho 789,79 1 (1977); City ofLewiston v.
Bergamo, 119 Idaho 22 1,225 (Idaho App., 1991); Chisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139
Idaho 131, 134-135 (2003); Canal/Norcrest/Columbus Action Committee v. City of Boise,
137 Idaho 377 (2002). As in the situation where a county board cannot prevent a

landowner from receiving approval for an otherwise valid application by changing zoning
law after the application is submitted, a board also cannot enter into a mediation
agreement spelling out the alleged deficiencies of an application only to deny the
application agdn after the alleged deficiencies have been resolved at great expense to the
landowner by inserting entirely new objections.
As demonstrated above, the BOCC is equitably estopped from denying KHD's
application on any basis other than those raised in the original denial of KHDYs
application or the mediation that resulted therefrom. We therefore turn to the alleged
deficiencies raised by incompatibility with Comprehensive Plan Goals 7 and 14 in the
BOCC's original denial as well as its principal cause of rejection that the use permitted

by the zoning ordinance is inappropriate and analyze them below, incorporating by
reference the detailed analyses from Appellant's Opening ~ r i e - f s . ~

1.

Alleged Non-Compliance With Goal No. 7

Goal No. 7 of the Comprehensive Plan is to "[plrevent or limit development
activity in hazardous areas." The BOCC stretched this goal to incorporate the prevention
of building of residences on slopes greater than fifteen percent (15%), in denying KHD 's
applications,
There is no provision in the county's zoning ordinance referencing a prohibition
on building on slopes greater than fifteen percent (1 5%). To the contrary, there is a direct
reference in the zoning ordinance authorizing construction on lands with slopes greater
than fifteen percent (1 5%), provided a conceptual engineering plan and geotechnical plan
from a licensed geological engineer is included with a PUD application when
construction is proposed in areas where the natural slope equals or exceeds fifteen
percent (15%). "When land disturbing activity is proposed in areas where the natural
slope equals or exceeds fifieen percent (1 5%), the director may require a conceptual
engineering plan as part of a PUD application.. .[and a geotechnical analysis for]
proposed building sites, roads, driveways or other development where the natural slope
equals or exceeds fifteen percent (15%). . ." K.C.C. 5 9-1 5-8.3 Slopes exceeding fifteen
percent (15%) give rise to a condition that the applicant must fulfill; it is not a basis for
denial. This totally negates the BOCCYsposition that they can reject an application
because it proposes development on slopes equal to or exceeding fifteen percent (15%)

KHD believes that it has conformed with cach goal of the Comprehensive Plan. Although conformance
with the goals of the Comprehensive Plan other than Nos. 7 and 14 will not be analyzed in this brief, they
are analyzed in great detail in Appellant's Opening Briefs.
As detailed in Appellant's Opening Brief, KEUD has in fact obtained a geotechnical report and approval.
No countervailing geotechnical evidence was submitted by the County.

under Goal No. 7 of the Comprehensive Plan to ""limit development activily in hazardous
areas."

The BOCC9sactions here ruc: violative of Idabo Code 67-6536, which requires
that "'approval or denial of m y application,. .shall be based upon standards and criteria
which shall be set forth in the comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate
ordinance or regulation of the city or county." I.C. 5 67-6536. The BOCC cannot decide
on an ad hoc basis that slopes greater than fifteen percent (I 5%) are hazardous and
therefore do not comply with the Comprehensive Plan for one applicant but not for a
second similar application (Gozzer ~ a n c h ) Indeed
.~
the Hearing Examiner determined
that construction'could legally occur on slopes greater than fifteen percent (1 5%). (ROA,
First Appeal, 1655.)
En fact, as recently as August 2004, the BOCC entertained and explicitly rejected
a proposed ordinance change that would limit construction on slopes greater than 35%.
Why would the BOCC decide that there was no reason to limit construction on slopes
greater than 35%, and then reject JCHD's application on the basis that construction on
slopes greater than 15% would conflict with Comprehensive Plan Goal No. 7 of "limiting
development activity in hazardous areas"? The BOCC does not have the discretion to
arbitrarily decide that building on relatively minor slopes on KHDYsland would be
hazardous when the zoning ordinance provides otherwise. Their reasons for doing so in
this case are pretextual.

The County incorrectly asserts that the Court should not take into account the BOCC's approval of an
application for a similar development, Gozzer Ranch, when determining whether the BOCC's actions were
arbitrary and capricious because "the projects involved different parcels, different plans, and different
proposals ..." Brief of Respondents, at p. 21. This is not the law in Idaho. Information concerning a local
government's prior approvals of similarly situated developers is relevant in an action appealing the local
government's denial of a developer's application. Workman Family Partnership v. City of Twin Falls, 104
Idaho 32 (1 982). It is also relevant in the equal protection argument set forth in point E2, infra.

Allerred Non-Compliance With Goal No. 14

2.

Goal No. 14 of the Comprehensive Plan is to ""[provide for the efficient, safe and
cost-effective rnovement of people and goods." KHD has responded to the BOCC9s
concerns regarding Goal No. 14 in several manners. KHD has agreed (via the postmediation agreement between the parties) to ensure that all construction traffic is run at
non-peak hours on State Highway 97, which is the primav focus of the BOCC's
concerns. In fact, the Idaho Department of Transportation ("ITD") determined that the
MC)project

was well within the capacity of Highway 97 and had no objection to I W D

moving to the next stage in the process. By statute (I.C. § 40-3 10 et seq.), the ITD is
given sole authority over all decisions concerning congestion, adequacy, and safety on
state highways.
Even though preempted by statute, the BOCC elevated itself over the expertise of
the ITD and relied on its own Board member, EImer Currie's amateur "traffic studies" to
reach the pretextual conclusion that KHDYsapplication does not comply with Goal No.
14. The BOCC's Order of Decision in i@denial of KHDYsfirst application makes clear
that the BOCC abandoned 1TDysdetermination in favor of its own ad hoc analysis:
The result ofthe constantly changing position of ITD was a significant
degradation of their credibility with the County on this PUD. The position
of ITD was not supported by the public testimony or the personal
experiences of the BOCC. As a body the BOCC has almost one-hundred
and fifty years of experience living in Kootenai County. The members
have, over the years, traveled Highway 97 for personal as well as
professional reason both for the County and in private employment. It has
been their personal experience that Highway 97 in its present state is not
conducive to this increased level of development.
Findings of Board of Commissioners of Kootenai County, Order of Decision, PUD 05405, page 7. Chairman Currie even related his own experiences in driving State Highway
97 even though he is neither qualified to make these judgments, nor is there any statute

giving the BOCG the authority to take these &dings into account. Doing so is a
violation of Idaho statutory law, providing that the approval or denial of an application
"shall be based upon standards and criteria which shaII be set forth in the comprehensive
plan, zoning ordinance or other appropriate ordinance or regulation of the city or county."

3.

BOCC Finding That The Location Of The Properh. Is Not Suitable
For the Uses Permitted B y The Zoning Ordinance

The BOCC exceeded its statutory authority when it determined that its principal
grounds for denial were that the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance for the property
were inappropriate and the zoning ordinance should be changed.
As the American Planning Association, "Crowing Smart Legislative Guidebook"
(2002), states in chapter 8, 38-83:
As used here, site plan review is limited to the examination of proposals
that are permitted as of right by-the zoning ordinance, but where there is _a
limited amount of discretion in evaluating how well the proposal fits the
characteristics of the site itself. Site plan review does not involve
detemination of whether the particular use is appropriate in a specific
location or area, since the zoning ordinance will have (or should have)
resolved that as matter of legislative policy.
American Planning Association, "Growing Smart Legislative Guidebook" (2002), 88-83
(emphasis added) (citing kbzinski v. Lawler, 41 8 A.2d 66 (Conn., 1979); D. Mandelker,
Land Use Law, 4th Ed. 56.68 at 281 ("[ilf a site plan complies with site plan review
requirements and if the proposed use is authorized by the zoning ordinance, the reviewing
agency may not disapprove the site plan because it finds the use objectionable"). Other
states have reached similar conclusions regarding the scope of plan approval with respect
to the use of the land. See Coscan Wushington, Inc. v. Maryland National Capital Park
and Planning Commission, 87 Md. App. 602, 590 A. 2d 1080 (Md. 1991); Holmes v.

Planning Board ojNew Castle, 78 App. Div. 2d, 433 N.Y.S 2d 587 (App. Div. 2d Dept.

The BOCC's denial of KHD's applications must be reversed because the denials
were in total violation of KWD's guarantee of due process. ""When acting upon a quasijudicial zoning matter the governing board is neither proponent nor an opponent of the
proposal at issue, but sits instead in the seat of the judge." Marcia 7: Turner, LLC v. City

of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846 (2007). "In this context, the Due
Process Clause would therefore apply to the zoning board in the same way that it applies
to judges." Id.
1.

Members Of The BOCC Are Not Authorized To Make Independent Site
Visits Nor To Advocate Denial Of The Application Based On Their Own
Personal Studies

It is an impermissible violation of due process rights for a member of the BOCC
to view the property and/or adjacent highway, conducting "studies" on his own, without
authority from the BOCC or notice to KHD, the BOCC and the public. Comer v. County

of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433,439 (1 997) (Board of County Commissioners, which was
considering an application, violated due process rights when they reviewed property in
question without notice and without giving parties or their representative opportunity to
be present); See also Nasierowski Bros. Inv. Co. v. City of Slerling Heights, 949 F . 2d 890
(6' Cir. 1991) and Harris v. County of Riverside, 904 F. 2d 497, 501-02 (9th Cir. 1990)

(both finding that the procedural due process rights of the owners were violated where
they were not given notice in a quasi-judicial zoning proceeding). In fact, the District
Court has recognized that notice is a due process issue in the litigation currently pending

reguding the nearby Powderhorn properly's application for a zoning cbmge. (KHD will
ask the court to take judicial notice of this court d i n g . )
The "personal studies" of the grades on Highway 517 by Comissioner Currie,
without the presence of an ITD, BOCC or M D representative were a gross breach of due
process. It was hrther aggravated because the "personal studies" were used to oppose
the application and were in fact adopted by the BOCC. (See Findings of Board of
Comissioners of Kootenai County, Order of Decision, PUD 054-05, page 7) (ROA,
First Appeal, 1965). Moreover, the question of adequacy of grades on a state highway
are within the sole authority of the ITD, which in fact advised the BOCC that the grades
were acceptable and that further details would be appropriate at later permitting. Thus,
the BOCC reliance on the "personal studies"opposing the project was ultra-vires the
authority of local government when acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. Interested parties
in a quasi-judicial land use approval proceeding are entitled to an opportunity to present
and rebut evidence to a tribunal which is impartial in the matter, i.e. having had no prehearing or ex parte contacts concerning the question at issue. Albuquerque Commons
Partnership v. City Council ofAlbuquerque, 2008 WL 203 1414 at 11 (N.M. 2008).
It is undisputed that the BOCC acts in a quasi-judicial and not legislative capacity
when it considers whether to approve or deny applications for subdivisions and PUDs.
"A decision by a zoning board applying general rules or specific policies to specific
individuals, interests, or situations, [is] quasi-judicial in nature and subiect to due Drocess
constraints." Chambers v. Kootenai County Bd. Of Comm 'rs, 125 Idaho 115, 118 (1 994)
(emphasis added); Cowan v. Bd. Of Comm 'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501 (2006);
Cooper v. Board of County Comm 'rs ofAda County; 101 Idaho 407,411 (1 980).

' I ' i ?

t i " " .

As stated recently by the New Mexico Supreme Court in Albuquerque Cornmom

Partnershrlp v. City ofCouncil oflfbuguerque, 2008 WL203 1414 at p. 38 (l?.M., 2008):
i

See 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr; R a u o p f s Law of Zoning and Planning,
§40:22 at 40-49 (2005) (noting that characterization as quasi-judicial can
result in the parties being entitled to greater procedural rights and enabling
reviewing courts to conduct a closer scrutiny of the merits of the decision).
Quasi-judicial zoning matters are not politics-as-usual as far as the
municipal governing body is concerned. In such proceedings, the council
does not sit as a mini-legislature, as it Eunctions in most matters, but
instead must act like a judicial body bound by "ethical standards
comparable to those that govern a court in performing the same function."
High Ridge Hinkle Joint Venture v. City ofAlbuquerque; 1 19 N.M. 29,40,
888 P. 2d 475,486 (Ct. App.1994).
Since the BOCC placed heavy reliance on the inadequacy of the grades of
Highway 97 based on ultra-vires and unethical studies by a board member, this must lead
to a vacation of the BOCC's determination.
2.

It Is A Violation Of Due Process And Eaual Protection For A OuasiJudicial Body To Be Swayed BY Public Sentiment And Political Pressure
To Deny The Applications Based On Ultra Vires Public Reauests To
Change The Zoning Of The Site.

The BOCC is not allowed to advocate approval or denial of the application.

"When acting upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter the governing board is neither a
proponent nor an opponent of the proposal at issue, but sits instead in the seat of a judge."

Marcia T. Turner, LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P. 3d 840, 846, (2007).
"In this context, the Due Process clause would therefore apply to the zoning board in the
same way that it applies to judges." Id.
The evidence reveals that the BOCC was swayed by the large numbers of the
public who attended the hearings and requested that the applications be denied on the
basis that the use was not compatible with the area, regardless of the zoning on the
property. The Intervenor's Brief makes clear that what the public really wanted was a
downzoning of the property: "Residents and environmental groups opposing

developments in rural areas have been frustrated and often thwarted with the great
latitude given by the Idaho appellate courts in affirming local g o v e m e n t approval of

." Brief of Intervenors, p. 2

developments
-\

(emphasis added). The Intervenor's preseniation to the Court asks whether KEID's
proposal is "in compliance with the Comprehensive Plan," rather than in compliance with
the zoning ordinances. (ROA, First Appeal, 2385.) The Intervenor cites "63 written
public coments" and "1 00 plus pages of public testimony" that allegedly illustrate that
"the proposed Chateau development was not compatible with the surrounding area."
Brief of Intervenors, p. 12. Indeed in its Findings, the BOCC specifically adopted that
position raised by the public opposition that KHD's project was inappropriate for the
location as the flundamental basis of its decision. See Findings of Board of
Commissioners of Kootenai County, Order of Decision, PUD 054-05, page 12 ("the
single most relevant question is whether this project is appropriate for the location")
(ROA, First Appeal, 197 1).
The New York Court of Appeals weighed in on a case where an applicant for a
conditional use permit authorized for a shopping center by the zoning ordinance was
denied the permit because the public wanted the property downzoned to residential. In
finding the actions of the city arbitrary, capricious and discriminatory, the Court voided
the city's actions and ordered the issuance of the permit. Udell v. I-iaas, 235 N.E.2d 897,
1968):
900 (N.Y.
[iln exercising their zoning powers the local authorities must [not] act
because of the whims of either an articulate minority or even majority of
the community . .. and . . . ensure that the public welfare is being served
and that zoning does not become nothing more than a Gallup Poll.
If this were a legislative decision by the BOCC, than listening to any objections by
members of the public would be appropriate. However, when the board is acting in a

quasi-judicial capacity, it is inappropriate to be swayed by public opinion on matters
outside the smdards of the ordinance. See Albuquerque Commons Partnership at p. 9
('YtqJuasi-judicial zoning matters are not politics-as-usual as far as the municipal
governing body is concerned. In such proceedings, the council does not sit as a minilegislature, as it functions in most masers, but instead must act like a judicial body bound
by ethical s t a n h d s comparable to those that govern a court.. .").
Indeed in City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,448
(1985), the Supreme Court found that the hostility of the public and neighborhood against

a special use permit for a mentally retarded facility, authorized by law in the zoning,
could not be treated as rational:

'

First, the Council was concerned with the negative attitude of the majority
of property owners located within 200 feet of Featherston facility, as well
as with the fears of elderly residents of the neighborhood. But mere
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly
cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are not permissible bases for treating a
home for the mentally retarded differently from apartment houses,
multiple dwellings, and the like. It is plain that the electorate as a whole,
whether by referendum or otherwise, could not order city action violative
of the Equal Protection Clause, Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly
of Colomdo, 377 U.S. 713,736-737,84 S.Ct. 1459, 1473-1474,12
L.Ed.2d 632 (1 964), and the City may not void the strictures of that Clause
by deferring to the wishes of or objections of some fraction of the body
politic. "Private biases maybe outside the reach of the law, but the law
cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect." Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429,433, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1882, (1984).

City ofcleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,448 (1 985)
(emphasis added).
In Scott v. Greenville County, '716 F. 2d 1409, 1419-20 (4' Cir. 1983) the
Court held:
Nonetheless it has been recognized that the zoning action which is tainted
with fundamental procedural irregularity.. . does amount to an actionable
denial of due process.. . For example in Cordeco Development Corp. v.
Yasquez 539 F.2d 256,260 (1" Cir. 1976), the First Circuit affirmed a

ruling that local officials had committed a constitutional violation by
singling out a permit applicant for adverse treatment due to "illegitimate
'political' or, at least, personal motives."
The quotation fiom Scott was quoted in Marks v. City ofchesapeake, 883 F.2d 308 (4th
Cir. 1989) which further held:
As a general matter, therefore, the public's '"negative attitudes", or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning
proceeding are not "permissible bases" for "local officials" land use
decisions. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432,448
(1 985).
Similarly, treating the KHD property differently from the Gozzer tract which was
almost identical to the KHD resort proposal also constituted a deprivation of equal
protection. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) ("our cases
have recognized successful equal protection claims brought by a 'class of one,' where the
plaintiff alleges that she has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly
situated and there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment").
In almost identical circumstances to the present case the Court held that the
demand for a larger easement than required of others was "irrational and arbitrary" and
that "the Village's demand was actually motivated by ill will resulting from the Olech's
filing of an unrelated successful lawsuit against their Village; and that the village acted
either with intent to deprive Olech of her rights or in reckless disregard of her rights."
Olech at 563.
In Cruz v. Town of Cicero, 275 F. 3d 579 (7th Cir. 2001), the district court had
denied the town's motion for summary judgment despite the fact that the town had
conceivable, rational reasons to deny the development permission requested. The town,
said the district court, had not offered suflicient proof. The case went to the jury, which
awarded the developer $402,000. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the jury verdict on the

basis that the jury cotild have found the town acted for totally illegitimate reasons. See
Paul D. Wilson, When Sending Flowers is Not Enough: Developments in Landowner
Civil Rights Lawsuits Against Municipal OEcials, 34 Urb.Law. 981, 985 (2002).
In the present case, the filing of the first appeal from the denial of the first
application set off the reckless and intentional behavior of the County in entering into a
post-mediation agreement to rehear the matter and then add a whole new category of
alleged conflicts with five additional comprehensive plan goals.
The Court should vitiate the BOCC's decision based upon its findings that the
zoning uses authorized by the property were inappropriate, fed by the public's massive
appearance in opposition to the project on that ground. Since the utilization of the
Comprehensive Plan goals was inappropriate on statutory due process and equal
protection grounds; and the principal finding that the use was inappropriate for the area
(despite its zoning for that use in that area) was void for due process reasons; and the
concerns about the highway safety were ultra vires and constitutionally preempted by
state statute; and the concerns about development above fifteen percent (1 5%) slopes
contradicted by the ordinance itself-the

Court should grant the second PUD and

subdivision applications as definitive relief and not remand for a third hearing on the
matter.
V.

RESERVATION OF FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS
Finally, in the event that the Court should uphold the BOCC's determination,

KHD requests that this court do so without prejudice to KHD's bringing a plenary action
asserting federal and state constitutional claims relating to equal protection, due process,
civil rights, and takings violations, without concern as to the res judicata or preclusive
effect of this Court's ruling, pursuant to England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical

Examiners, 375 U.S. 41 1 (1 964) (a party litigating in state court can reserve its right to
have a federal court rule on federal issues by notifying the state court of its intention to
return to federal court after termination of the state proceedings); Fields v. Sarasota
Manatee Airport Auth., 953 F. 2d 1299 (1 1th Cir. 1992); Peduto v. City of North

Wildwood, 8'78 F. 2d 725,729 n. 5 (3rd Cir. 1989).

KHD requests that this Court either (1) grant KED leave to file a complaint
asserting federal and state constitutional claims relating to equal protection, due process,
civil rights, and takings violations, or (2) issue its decision without prejudice so that such
claims can be brought without concerns as to the res judicata or preclusive effect of the
Court's ruling. The Court should further direct that those claims be consolidated with the
first and second appeals.

VI.

CONCLUSION
Because the BOCC acted outside of its permissible scope in denying KHD's PUD

applications, KHD respectfully requests this Court to: (1) remand the application to the
BOCG ordering the BOCC to approve KHD's PUD and preliminary subdivision
applications, based upon the Planning Staffs Report and Recommendation dated August
23,2007; (2) retain jurisdiction over this consolidated matter until such approval
becomes final and building permits are issued; (3) award KHD attorneys fee's and costs
pursuant to I.C. 5 12-1 17; or (4) at a minimum, remand the second application to the
BOCC in accordance with the decision of the Court and grant attorney's fees, reserving
jurisdiction over this consolidated matter.

In the event of denial of the first and second appeals, ICMB respecthlly requests
that this Court do so wilhout prejudice to the filing of a plenary action assefiing KHD's
slate and federal conftitutional claims.

DATED: May 28,2008
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COME NOW the Respondents, KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS, ELMER R. CURRIE, RICHARD A. PIAZZA, and W. TODD TONDEE,
by and through their attorney of record, Patrick M. Braden of the Kootenai County
Department of Legal Services, and hereby provide the following response to Appellant

RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S CONSOLIDATED SUPPLEMENTAL & REPLY BRIEF - 1
H \Plannlng\Chateau de Lore #2\Petltlon for Judlc~alRev~ew- CV-08-163\Response to Appellant's
Consolidated Supplemental and Reply Br~efdoc

7'

/-

:

1 q

Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC's Consolidated Supplemental & Reply Brief, filed with the
District Court on May 28, 2008 ("Consolidated Brief').
INTRODUCTION
The Consolidated Brief filed by the Appellant, Kirk-Hughes Development LLC
("KHD") contains reply argument regarding issues raised in KHD's Opening Brief, which
were responded to in the Brief of Respondents filed by Respondent Kootenai County ("the
County") on May 12, 2008. Accordingly, the arguments in this brief will be limited to the
issues newly raised in the Consolidated Brief, to specifically include the following: Section
IV(D) and subsections contained therein, concerning arguments related to estoppel,
Section IV(E), concerning allegations of deprivation of due process, and Section V,
concerning reservation of the right to bring federal constitutional claims in a separate
action
The County also reasserts its standing objection to any further consideration of the
petition for judicial review originally brought in Case No. CV-06-6587, contesting the
decision of the Kootenai County Board of Commissioners (the "Board") on KHD's first
application for conceptual planned unit development (PUD) approval of Chateau de Loire,
Case No. PUD-054-05. The reasons for this objection are set forth in the County's
Memorandum in Support of Objection to Reply Brief of Appellant and Motion to Strike, filed
on April 16, 2008, as supplemented by the arguments contained in this brief.
ARGUMENT
I.

Estoppel
KHD has asserted for the first time in this case that the County is estopped from

considering any standards other than those set forth as actions which could be taken to
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gain approval in a subsequent application in the Post-Mediation ~ g r e e m e n t ' . This is
merely a new spin on an old argument. In fact, KHD has failed to show that any of the
elements of estoppel apply to this case.
The elements of estoppel are as follows:
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth,
(2) the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the truth,
(3) the false representation or concealment was made with the intent that it
be relied upon and
(4) the person to whom the representation was made or from whom the facts
were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation or concealment to
his prejudice.
Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 ldaho 19, 22, 644 P.2d 341, 344
(1982).' Apparently the "material fact" at issue here was the fact that the subsequent
application contemplated in the Post-Mediation Agreement would be subject to the
standards contained in Kootenai County's zoning and subdivision ordinances, as well as
the specific actions identified as those which could be taken to gain approval. The County
never made a representation otherwise, and did not conceal that fact. Additionally, KHD
knew, or had to know the "truth" of the matter, as the standards contained in those
ordinances are readily available from the County and are also posted on the Internet.
KHD's subsequent application for both conceptual PUD and preliminary subdivision
approval for Chateau de Loire, Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07, showed that it
recognized what those standards were.

1

The Post-Mediation Agreement is contained in the Agency Record in Case No. CV-08-163 at pp. 2052-53.
The County has also stipulated that the Agency Record in Case No. CV-06-6587 may be augmented with the
Post-Mediation Agreement.
2

The second element was inexplicably omitted in John W , Brown Properties v. Blaine County, 138 ldaho 171,
176, 59 P.3d 976, 981 (2002), even though the ldaho Supreme Court cited to its prior decision in Twin Falls
Clinic. In any event, Brown did not purport to overrule Twin Falls Clinlc in this regard.
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KHD also had no right to rely on the misguided notion that the actions identified as
those which could be taken to gain approval, as set forth in the Post-Mediation Agreement,
would be Jthe
ITC

standards by which the new application would be measured. First of all,

that applicat~onwas for both PUD and subdivision approval - invoking standards which
were not applicable to the first application, which was for PUD approval only. Secondly, at
the time the Post-Mediation Agreement was signed, the County did not know what would
be proposed in the second application, and particularly if there were to be material changes
from the first (such as a request for preliminary subdivision approval, location of streets,
locat~onof lots, etc.) Therefore, the County had every right to scrutinize the second
application according to

of the applicable standards set forth in its land use ordinances,

and not simply on the basis of the actions identified as those which could be taken to gain
approval in the Post-Mediation Agreement. Because no false representation or omission
of a material fact was made which KHD had the right to rely upon, it follows that it could not
have relied on such representation or omission to its detriment.
The cases cited by KHD in the Consolidated Brief with respect to this issue, most of
which are from jurisdictions outside Idaho, are of little, if any, relevance to this case. In
Floyd County v. Klein, 765 N.E.2d 632 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), the Indiana Court of Appeals
did state that "if a plan commission fails to apprise a developer of asserted defects in a plat
following a hearing, the commission may be estopped from denying an application for plat
approval on the basis of those asserted defects following a subsequent hearing." Floyd,
765 N.E.2d at 641. However, this is inapplicable in this case for two reasons. First, this
quote contemplated a subsequent hearing on the same application, where the application
had been amended to address the defects identified by the plan commission at the initial
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hearing. Here, KHD submitted a different applicat~on. Secondly, the second application
was for preliminary subdivision approval, which was not requested the first time, as well as
for conceptual PUD approval, which was. Because the second application was subject to
standards not applicable in the first application, the principle of estoppel articulated in Floyd
cannot apply.

KHD has also cited six other cases allegedly in support of its position, four of which
were ldaho cases. Chisholm v. Tw~nFalls County, 139 ldaho 131, 75 P.3d 185 (2003);
Canal/Norcrest/Columbus Action Commitfee v. City of Boise, 137 ldaho 377,48 P.3d 1266
(2002); Boise City v. Blaser, 98 ldaho 789, 572 P.2d 892 (1977); City of Lewiston v.
Bergamo, 119 ldaho 221,804 P.2d 1352 (Ct. App. 1990); Henry and Murphy, Inc. v. Town
of Allenstown, 424 A.2d 1132 (N.H. 1980); American Nat'l Bank v. City o f Chicago; 31 1
N.E.2d 325 (111. App. Ct. 1974). None of these cases, however, considers or even
ment~onsthe word "estoppel." These cases actually addressed the issue of vested rights.
Bergamo and Blaser addressed this issue in the context of an annexation of
property by a city; specifically, whether a use permitted prior to annexation could continue
after the property was annexed, even though no city permit had been issued or the use
was prohibited under city regulations. Blaser, 98 ldaho at 790-91, 572 P.2d at 893-94
(effect of county permit on annexed property when permit was issued prior to annexation);
Bergamo, 119 ldaho at 222-25, 804 P.2d at 1353-56 (effect of annexation on use permitted
by county which was established prior to annexation). The other cases merely considered
when rights are considered "vested," a rather unremarkable point given the well-settled
nature of this rule in Idaho. See Chisholm, 139 ldaho at 134-35, 75 P.3d at 188-89 (noting
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that "lilt is well established that an applicant's rights are determined by the ordinance in
existence at the time of filing an application for the permit").
Here, KWD has not argued that the second application should have been vested in
prior ordinances, nor has it alleged any prejudice by virtue of the fact that the second
application was subject to the standards set forth in the county ordinances then in effect,
rather than those in effect at the time of the first application. Therefore, none of these
cases are relevant to the issues presented in this case.
Subsections IV(D)(l) and IV(D)(2) of the Consolidated Brief appear to constitute
reply argument to arguments made in the Brief of Respondents filed on May 12, 2008. To
the extent a response may be appropriate, it is sufficient to simply note that KHD again
asks this Court to impermissibly substitute its judgment for that of the Board. ldaho Code §
67-5279(1); Sanders Orchard v. Gem County, 137 ldaho 695,697-98, 52 P.3d 840, 842-43
(2002).
On the other hand, the arguments made in Subsections IV(D)(3) of the Consolidated
Brief are among those which have been raised for the first time. Here, KHD argues that
the Board exceeded its statutory authority in determining that the proposed Chateau de
Loire PUD and subdivision was not "compatible with existing homes, businesses,
neighborhoods, and with the natural characteristics of the area." K.C.C. §§ 9-15-9(C), 102-I(C)(l). As is true of KHD's estoppel argument, this argument is not supported by the
case law cited therein, none of which are ldaho cases.
In Kosinski v. Lawlor, 41 8 A.2d 66 (Conn. 1979), the Connecticut Supreme Court
affirmed a decision by the Superior Court to issue a writ of mandamus compelling the city
of Hamden to issue a certificate of site plan approval. Kosinski, 418 A.2d at 69-70. The
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b a s ~ sof t h ~ sdec~sionwas a find~ngby the Harnden Planning and Zoning Comm~ssionthat
the proposed site plan at issue complied with all of the applicable requirements of the
county's zoning regulations, a finding confirmed by the Superior Court. Id. at 67-68. The
Hamden Planning and Zoning Commission nevertheless denied the request because it
believed that the plan represented "a poor use of the site." Id. at 68.
Here, the Board found, on two occasions, that the proposed Chateau de Loire PUD
did

meet all of the requirements for PUDs under the Zoning Ordinance, and also found

that that the second application did not meet all of the requirements for major subdivisions
under the Subdivision Ordinance. Both ordinances specificallv require the Board to make a
finding that the proposal be "compatible with existing homes, businesses, neighborhoods,
and with the natural characteristics of the area." K.C.C. §§ 9-1 5-9(C), 10-2-1 (C)(l). If the
Board cannot make that finding, the Board cannot approve the proposal. Accordingly, this
is not a case like Kosinski, in which the decision maker denied an application on the basis
of a standard not set forth in the applicable zoning regulations. Cf. Kosinski, 418 A.2d at
67-68, 70.

Coscan Washington, Inc. v. Maryland Nat'l Capital Park and Planning Commission,
590 A.2d 1080 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), is equally unavailing. Coscan merely stands for
the proposition that a zoning authority may regulate the use of particular building materials
as a condition of approval of a Comprehensive Design Zone application, a process which is
roughly analogous to a PUD. Coscan, 590 A.2d at 1085-91. The fact that it tended to
regulate aesthetics was not fatal to the validity of this exercise of the police power by
Prince Georges County, as there were several other legitimate reasons for this regulation.

Id. at 1087-91.
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In Holmes v. Town of New Castle, 78 A.2d 1 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980), the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court found that a condition of approval of a site plan
was properly authorized under the Town of New Castle's zoning regulations, and that the
condition was not inherently confiscatory (i.e., not a taking). Holmes, 78 A.2d at 12-22,2429.

It invalidated the condition only because it found that the site plan itself was

~mpermissiblyvague, and remanded the case to the Town in order to give it an opportunity
to cure the defect via adoption of an implementation plan. Id. at 29-32.
By contrast, the ability to regulate aesthetics through zoning regulations has been
expressly recognized in Idaho. Lamar Corp. v. City of Twin Falls, 133 ldaho 36, 981 P.2d
1146 (1999). The Lamar Court specifically held that a municipality's appearance is a

substantial government interest, and that zoning ordinances may be enacted to preserve
aesthetics. Lamar, 133 ldaho at 41, 981 P.2d at 1 151. In that case, the Twin Falls City
Council denied a request for approval of erection of a billboard on the basis that "[tlhe sign
is not compatible with building heights of the existing neighborhood and imposes a foreign
and inharmonious element to the existing skyline," and that "the proposed sign is
inconsistent with the adopted Comprehensive Plan regarding gateway arterials." Id. at 39,
981 P.2d at 1149. The ldaho Supreme Court affirmed this decision over arguments that
the decision was arbitrary and capricious, was not supported by substantial evidence, and
was a prior restraint on constitutionally protected commercial speech. Id. at 40-43, 981
P.2d at 1150-53.
Here, ldaho case law has specifically recognized that zoning authorities may
regulate aesthetics, and that compatibility with a community is a legitimate criterion for
approval of a land use application. Thus, the non-Idaho cases cited by KHD have little
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relevance to this case, and to the extent they may be relevant, in fact lend support for the
Board's decision. Accordingly, KHD's argument that the Board was estopped from
considering any aspect of the second Chateau proposal other than those set forth as
actions which could be taken to gain approval in the Post-Mediation Agreement must fail.

Constitutional Claims

11.

KHD has also, for the first time, set forth specific arguments regarding its allegations
that it was denied due process as a result of the Board's actions in the two Chateau de
Loire applications. In so doing, KHD has also tacked on a claim that it was denied equal
protection because these applications were denied, while the earlier Gozzer Ranch
application had been approved. Neither of these claims, however, is sufficient to warrant
vacation of the Board's only decision properly before this Court, the decision on the second
Chateau de Loire application. They also would not warrant vacation of the Board's
decision on the first Chateau de Loire application, if the Court were inclined to rule on its
merits.
A.

Due Process

In the context of land use decisions, due process requires, at a minimum, that
affected persons be afforded notice, the opportunity to present and rebut evidence, specific
written findings of fact and conclusions, and a transcribable record of the proceedings.
Gay v. Bonneville County, 103 ldaho 626, 651 P.2d 560 (Ct. App. 1982). In quasi-judicial
matters such as this case, it also requires that the decision maker be a fair, impartial
tribunal. Marcia 7: Turner LLC v. City o f Twin Falls, 144 ldaho 203, 209, 159 P.3d 840,
846 (2007).
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Here, KHD makes two arguments as to why it was allegedly denied due process by
the Board. Flrst, it argues that the flrst application was denied on the basis of unauthorized
"personal studies" of State Highway 97 in the vicinity of the proposed Chateau de Loire
development The County firmly believes that the first Issue is moot by virtue of the PostM e d ~ a t ~ Agreement
on
and the subsequent applicat~onsubmrtted by KHD. See Goodman v.

Lothrop, 143 ldaho 622, 625, I 5 1 P.3d 818, 821 (2007); Wilson v. Bogert, 81 ldaho 535,
542, 347 P.2d 341, 345 (1959). Nevertheless, even if the Court were to consider the
merits of the first appeal, it should not find that KHD was denied due process on that basis.
KHD cites Comer v. Twin Falls County, 130 ldaho 433,942 P.2d 557 (1997), for the
proposition that a site visit made without notice constitutes a denial of due process.

Comer, 130 ldaho at 439, 942 P.2d 557, 563. However, Comer must be read in llght of the
ldaho Supreme Court's later decision in Evans v. Cassia County, 137 ldaho 428, 50 P.3d
443 (2002). In that case, after discussing Comer and Chambers v. Kootenai County, 125
ldaho 115, 867 P.2d 989 (1994), the Court made the following observation:
While Comer and Chambers are still good law in this state, the spirit of their
holdings is not implicated in this case. The record does not indicate that any
factual disputes would be resolved by sending this case back to the Board
for a decision to be made without the benefit of a viewing, or based upon a
viewing at which interested parties are present. The Board was not acting
upon a cold appellate record to make its decision, as was the case in Comer;
rather, it was the original deciding body. There was substantial evidence
presented at the hearing upon which the Board could have based its
decision, wholly independently from the visit to the property. In our review of
the proceedings, we are to "consider the proceedings as a whole and to
evaluate the adequacy of procedures and resultant decisions in light of
practical considerations with an emphasis on fundamental fairness and the
essentials of reasoned decision-making." I.C. § 67-6535. W e find that
whatever knowledge the Board may have gained from visiting the property
was not necessary to form the basis of its decision, as the hearing yielded
substantially the same evidence as could have been garnered during the
visit. Also, interested persons were provided a fair opportunity to present
and rebut evidence at the hearing. Consequently, the appellants cannot
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H \Plannlng\Chateau de Lore #2\Petltlon for Judlclal Revlew - CV-08-163\Response to Appellant's
Consolidated Supplemental and Reply Brlef doc

7

'

,-

3:,

. . '

show that a substantial right of theirs has been prejudiced by the Board's
v~sitto the site.

Evans, 137 Idaho at 433, 50 P.3d at 448.
Here, Commissioner Currie did not state that he had visited the site; he merely
stated that he had driven the portion of Highway 97 in the vicinity of Beauty Bay Hill, near
the portion bisecting the Chateau property. It was common knowledge throughout the
proceedings that all five commissioners who participated in the hearings and decisions on
the two Chateau applications had driven Highway 97 on numerous occasions for reasons
wholly unrelated to this case, and were well familiar with the condition of the highway.
Thus, Commissioner Currie's drive along a state highway during the course of proceedings
should not be construed as a "site visit" triggering the requirements of Comer. Even if the
Court were to so construe this drive, however, the factors present in Evans were also
present here.
The Board was the original deciding body and was not limited to a cold appellate
record. KHD and other interested persons were provided a fair opportunity to present and
rebut evidence with respect to Highway 97 at the hearings on that application, and there
was substantial evidence presented at the hearing on that issue by KHD and opponents
alike upon which the Board could have based its decision, wholly independently from
Commissioner Currie's drive, which yielded substantially the same evidence as could have
been garnered during his drive. Additionally, the Board conducted a properly noticed site
visit after the public hearing on the second application, including a drive on Highway 97
through this area on the way to the site, where interested parties were present.
Because the facts surrounding this case are nearly identical to those in Evans and
sufficiently dissimilar to those in Comer, the Court should find that no substantial right of
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KHD was prejudiced by Commissioner Currie's drive on Highway 97 in the vicinity of the
proposed Chateau development. Even if the Court were to find that Commissioner Currie's
vote should be invalidated on that basis, the decision of the Board should still stand, as the
vote to deny that application was unanimous.
KHD also makes the rather novel argument that the Board should not have based
either decision on "public sentiment and political pressure," and that to do so also
constitutes a denial of due process. It is true that the ldaho Supreme Court has held that a
governing board acting in a quasi-judicial capacity sits "in the'seat of a judge." Turner, 144
ldaho at 209, 159 P.3d at 846. However, the Turner Court then went on to describe the
concept of impartiality as follows:
[Impartiality] means "the lack of bias for or against either party to the
proceeding. Impartiality in this sense assures equal application of the law.
That is, it guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will apply the
law to him in the same way he applies it to any other party." In the context of
due process, it does not mean "lack of preconception in favor of or against a
particular legal view. This sort of impartiality would be concerned, not with
guaranteeing litigants equal application of the law, but rather with
guaranteeing them an equal chance to persuade the court on the legal points
in their case." It also does not mean having "no preconceptions on legal
issues, but [being] willing to consider views that oppose his preconceptions,
and remain[ing] open to persuasion, when the issues arise in a pending
case." Impartiality under the Due Process Clause does not guarantee each
litigant a chance of changing the judge's preconceived view of the law.

Id. This is the very purpose of holding public hearings on land use applications, whether
they be for zone changes, subdivisions, PUDs, conditional use permits, variances, etc. - it
allows the applicant, other affected parties, and the general public an opportunity to
persuade the hearing body that an application should be approved or denied
KHD, however, cites to Udell v. Haas, 235 N.E.2d 897 (N.Y. 1968), for the
proposition that it was improper to deny a conditional use permit for a shopping center on
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the basis that the public wanted the property rezoned to residential. This is a misstatement
of both the holding of UdeNand the facts surrounding it. The Court of Appeals of New York
in fact vacated an ordinance changing the zone from business to residential after the
owner of one of the affected parcels had submitted a preliminary sketch of a proposed
business development. Udell, 235 N.E.2d at 900-01. The primary reason for the reversal
was actually because the zone change was not compatible with the Village of Lake
Success' comprehensive plan. It is instructive to read the quote from UdeN cited in the
Consolidated Brief in its entirety:
This fundamental conception of zoning has been present from its inception.
The almost universal statutory requirement that zoning conform to a 'wellconsidered plan' or 'comprehensive plan' is a reflection of that view. The
thought behind the requirement is that consideration must be given to the
needs of the community as a whole. In exercising their zoning powers, the
local authorities must act for the benefit of the community as a whole
following a calm and deliberate consideration of the alternatives, and not
because of the whims of either an articulate minority or even majority of the
community. Thus, the mandate of the Village Law (s 177) is not a mere
technicality which serves only as an obstacle course for public officials to
overcome in carrying out their duties. Rather, the comprehensive plan is the
essence ofzoning. Without it, there can be no rational allocation of land use.
It is the insurance that the public welfare is being served and that zoning
does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll.
Id. at 900-01 (citations omitted). By comparison, ldaho courts have recognized that when a
governing board considers a subdivision application, the board must "look at all facets of
the comprehensive plan and assure that the land fits within all of the various considerations
set forth in the plan," and that the board's findings of fact and conclusions of law should
"demonstrate that the goals of the comprehensive plan were considered, but were simply
used in conjunction with the zoning ordinances, the subdivision ordinance and any other
applicable ordinances," in making a decision on the application. Urrutia v. Blaine County,
134 ldaho 353, 358-59, 2 P.3d 738, 743-44 (2000).
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That is what the Board did In this case. It performed a comprehensive plan analysis,
but rel~edon the substantive requirements of the Zoning Ordinance and Subdivision
Ordinance, including the requirement that the proposal must be found to be compatible
with the Comprehensive Plan, in making its decision, This decision was amply supported
with substantial, tangible evidence in the record, and not the merely emotional, irrational,
fear-based outcry that concerned the courts in the other cases cited by KHD in this section
of the Consolidated Brief. Instead, to the extent negative attitudes or fear may have been
expressed by opponents to the Chateau project, they were substantiated by evidence of
the presence of factors which

are properly cognizable

in a proceeding on a land use

application. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 438 (1985).
The fact that this evidence came as a result of the public comment process, rather
than from the application materials or from a public agency, does not make it any less
worthy of the Board's consideration. Otherwise, why have a public comment process? In
that event, the Board's only task would be to rubber-stamp every land use application it
receives. The Local Land Use Planning Act, Idaho Code 5 67-6501 et seq. (LLUPA), and
the County's land use ordinances do not provide for automatic approval of land use
applications, however. The Board, in its quasi-judicial capacity, must be afforded the
discretion to approve, conditionally approve, or deny these applications, after considering
the factors outlined in the applicable County ordinances, in order to further the goals of
LLUPA, the Comprehensive Plan, and County land use ordinances. This is, in fact, what
the Board did here, and it is not a violation of due process to do so.
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KWD has also argued, for the first time, that the that the Board's decision on its
applications constitutes a denial of equal protection, by virtue of the fact that the Board
previously had approved a somewhat similar development, Gozzer Ranch.

In its

Consolidated Brief, KHD bases this allegation on the so-called "class of one" doctrine. See
Village of Willowbrook

v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000). An equal protection claim based on

a "class of one" is one in which the plaintiff alleges that (1) he or she has been intentionally
treated difierently from others similarly situated and (2) that there is no rational basis for
the difference in treatment. Olech, 528 U.S. at 564. This claim is grounded in the purpose
of the equal protection clause, which is "to secure every person within the State's
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by express
terms of a statute or by its improper execution through duly constituted agents." Id.
The other cases cited by KHD in this section, however, are not supportive of this
argument. Cruz v Town of Cicem, 275 F.3d 579 (7thc i r 2001), was a case involving a
suburb of Chicago in which the zoning administrator engaged in some "Chicago-style
politicking" to the detriment of the plaintiff, who had sent the zoning administrator flowers
instead of the expected financial contribution to her political campaigns. Cruz, 275 F.3d at
583-86, 588.

The plaintiff was then subjected to requirements for condominium

developments which were not required of anyone else. Id. at 583-86. Thus, the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals rightly found that he was denied equal protection under the "class
of one" theory. Id. at 587-89.
Cleburne involved the denial of a special use permit for a group home for the
developmentally disabled. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435-39. After consideration of whether a
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standard of heightened scrutiny was appropriate, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the
proper level of scrutiny was a "rational bas~s"test. Id. at 439-37. The Court did go on to
find that the negative attitudes and fears expressed by the public with respect to the people
who would live In the facility were not, by themselves, sufficient to justify the denial of a
permit for the facility. Id. at 447-50.

Scott v. Greenville County, 716 F.2d 1409 (4'hC i r 1983). involved a governing
body's instruction to the zoning administrator not to issue a building permit for a proposed
apartment complex, notwithstanding a provision of Greenville County's zoning ordinance
which specifically prohibited such conduct. Scott, 716 F.2d at 1412-13. The county council
had begun the process of changing the zoning of the property on which the proposed
apartment complex was located

after learning

of the proposal. Id. The actions of the

county council were found to have been rooted, at least in part, on racial bias, in that even
though the developer himself was not a member of a protected minority, he had indicated a
willingness to allow persons who were, namely African Americans, to reside there. Id. at
1416-21. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rightly found that he was denied
equal protection (and due process) on the basis of racial discrimination. Id.

Cordeco Dev Corp. v. Vasquez, 539 F.2d 256 ( l S tCir. 1976), was a case somewhat
similar to Cruz to the extent that a decision against an applicant for a sand extraction
permit, and a subsequent issuance of a permit which had the effect of allowing very little
sand extraction, was found to have been tainted by undue political influence from a
powerful family who owned neighboring properties and had received unrestricted permits
for sand extraction. Cordeco, 539 F.2d at 258-60. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that he was denied equal protection under the "class of one" theory. Id. at 260.
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Marks v City of Chesapeake, 883 F.2d 308 (4"' Clr 1989) involved the denial of a
conditional use permit for the operation of a palm~stryand fortune telling buslness In the
City of Chesapeake. The Marks Court cited Ckeburne and Cordeco for the proposition that
purposeful discr~rninationagainst a particular individual based on illegitimate political or
personal motives, or on negative attitudes or stereotypic fears not substantiated by factors
properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, violates the Equal Protection Clause even
where no recognized class-based or invidious discrimination was ~nvolved. Marks, 883

F.2d at 31 1 . However, it actually affirmed the decision of the District Court in favor of the
plaintiff based on trial testimony that indicated that the City Council was "impermissibly
tainted by 'irrational neighborhood pressure' manifestly founded in religious prejudice." Id.
at 31 1-12.
Here, KHD has failed to show that any of the factors which led to the decisions cited
above are present in this case. Admittedly, the Gozzer Ranch and Chateau proposals
were, in some ways, similar. Both are golf course developments with luxury homes
designed primarily for wealthy, part-time residents, with spectacular views of Lake Coeur
d'Alene and the surrounding mountains. However, KHD has pointed to no evidence in the
record, other than the fact that Gozzer Ranch was approved and Chateau was denied
twice, showing that the Board intentionally treated KHD differently from Discovery Land
Co., the developer of Gozzer Ranch.
In addition, even if the Court were to find disparate treatment between KHD and
Discovery, there was a rational basis for such treatment. The Chateau proposal proposed
substantial commercial facilities, more so in the first proposal than in the second, which
could lead to a greater increase in traffic than mere residential development. There were
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also unresolved issues unique to the Chateau property which were unique to that property,
as discussed in detail in the previously filed Brief of Respondents, at pp. 12-20. In
addition, the approval of Gozzer Ranch led to the revelation of several problems with largescale rural development on the east side of Lake Coeur d'Alene which were not readily
apparent prior to its approval. See also Brief of Respondents at pp. 21-22.
For the reasons stated above and in the previously filed Brief of Respondents,
KHD's due process and equal protection claims must fail. Therefore, the decision of the
Board in Case Nos. PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07 should be affirmed. The decision of the
Board in Case No. PUD-054-05 should be found to be moot, or alternatively, should be
affirmed.

III.

Reservation of Federal Constitutional Claims
Finally, KHD has indicated that it is reserving its right to bring claims in federal court

for alleged violations of constitutional rights arising from the decisions at issue in this
petition for judicial review in the event of a decision adverse to KHD in this Court. While
the County respects the right of KHD to do so, it must be pointed out that under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, Article IV, § 1 of the United States Constitution, and under 28
U.S.C. 9 1738, federal courts are generally required to give the same preclusive effect to
state court decisions as would other state courts. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-105
(1980) (extending res judicata doctrine to claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
The doctrine of federal court "abstention" was first announced in Railroad Comm'n
of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Abstention occurs when "the federal courts,
exercising a wise discretion, restrain their authority because of scrupulous regard for the
rightful independence of the state governments and for the smooth working of the federal
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judlc~ary."Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501 (quotations omitted). An England reservation occurs
when a party "inform[s] the state courts that .. he intends, should the state courts hold
agalnst hlm on the questlon of state law, to return to the Distr~ctCourt for disposition of his
federal contentions." England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S 41 1,

42 1 (1964).
The exception set forth in England does not apply to this ease because KHD was
not forced into state court by a federal court exercising abstention. Indeed, it voluntarily
ralsed const~tutionalclaims, including allegations of due process violations and regulatory
taklngs. The Consolldated Brief even raised, for the first time, altegations of equal
protection violations.

This is not consistent wlth a reservation of these claims for

subsequent litigation in federal court in the event of an adverse decision in the courts of
this state. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 7 5 , 83-85 (1 984).
Thus, it is the County's position that

claims raised in this Court should be decided

on thelr merits, and that the Court's decislon should be given res judicafa effect in any
subsequent proceeding. Ultimately, however, this may be an issue that a federal court will
need to decide. Therefore, this Court should decline to rule that its decision in this case
has no prejudicial or res judicafa effect in any subsequent state or federal proceeding.

CONCLUSION

KHD has failed to show that any of the elements of estoppel apply to the Board's
application of the terms of the Post-Mediation Agreement to its consideration of the second
Chateau proposal. KHD has also failed to show that any of the conditions which courts
have recognized as legitimately giving rise to a deprivation of due process or equal
protection are present in this case. The Court should also decline to rule that its decision
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In this case would not have any prejudicial or res judicata effect in any subsequent federal
proceeding. Therefore, based on the above discussion and the discussion contained in the
previously filed Brief of Respondents, the decision of the Board in Case Nos. PUD-057-07
and S-878P-07 should be AFFIRMED, and the decision of the Board in Case No. PUD054-05 should be found to be MOOT. Alternatively, both decisions should be AFFIRMED.
DATED this

3

day of June, 2008.
Kootenai County Department
of Legal Services

Patrick M. Braden
Attorney for Respondents

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 5 1 day of June, 2008, I caused to be served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing via facsimile, addressed to the following:
Kristen R. Thompson
THOMPSON LAW FIRM
55 S.W. Fifth Avenue, Suite 150
Meridian, ID 83642

Geraldine Kirk-Hughes
KIRK-HUGHES & ASSOCIATES
2551 S. Fort Apache Road, Suite 103
Las Vegas, NV 891 17

Fax: (208) 888-7296

Fax: (702) 233-8661

Robert H. Freilich
MILLER BARONDESS, LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars, Suite 1000
Los Angeles, CA 90067

Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box "A"
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816

Fax: (310) 552-8400

Fax: (208) 765-51 17
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R-4 THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST SUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI* COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IN THE MATTER OF TEE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-WGmS DEVELOPNENT, LLC
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
CHATEAU DE LOIRE,

)
)
)

)

Appellant,

Case No. CV-06-6587

1
1

1

VS.
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; S.J. "GUS"
JOfXNSON; ELMER R. CURRIE; KATIE
BRODIE,

1
)

1

Respondents.

1
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPNENT, LLC
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
CHATEAU DE LOIRE,

)
)

KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,

1

Appellant,

)

)

1
VS.
)

KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS; ELMER
R. CURRIE; RICHARD A. PIAZZA; AND
W. TODD TONDEE,

)

Respondents,

1
and
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH, a non-profit unincorporated
Association; NORBERT and BEVERLY
TWILLMANN, husband and wife;
SUSAN MELKA; BILL and SILVIA
LAMPARD, husband and wife; DAVD and
BARBARA WARDS WORTH, husband and
wife; and HEATHER BOWLBY,
Intervenors.

ORDER OF THE COURT - Page I

1
)
)

)

1

Case No. CV-08-163

ORDER OF THE COURT

IT IS HEREBY OmERED, That the parties shall comply with the Court's schedule as follows:

I-

That the Appellant shall file a supplemental brief by May 28, 2008 addressing the issues as raised
and consolidated in the two (2) applications for permits of a planned unit development (PUD) and a
planned unit development and subdivision permit pending before this court and scheduled to be
heard on June 4,2008 at 1 :30 P.M.

2-

That the Gounv and Interveners have until close of business, 5:00 P.M., on June 3, 2008 to file
response briefs to the Appellant's supplemental briefing.

_

3

That the Appellant, as discussed at the status conference of May 22, 2008, reserves the right to file
additional claims relative to violation of civil rights, due process, takings, and other claims which
may arise from the decisions for which judicial review has been sought in this action.

4. That the parties agree to meet for discussions and mediation of claims in the County Law Library on
June 4, 2008 at 9:30 A.M. in a good faith attempt to resolve the issues pending before the court prior
to the 1 130 P.M. hearing as scheduled.

SF
DATED this

day of June 2008.

JUDGE JOHN P. LUSTER
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEWBY CERTIFY that on the -day of June 2008,I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, and addressed to each of the following:
Robert H. Freilich
Miller Barondess, LLP
1 999 Avenue of the Stars, Ste 1000
Los Angeles, CA 90067
Fax: 3 10-552-8400

.

Kristen R. Thompson
Thompson Law Firm
55 SW Fifth Ave., Ste. 150
Meridian, ID 83642
Fax: 208-888-7296

ly

Patrick M. Braden
Kootenai County
Dept. of Legal Services
PO Box 9000
45 1 N. Government Way
Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16
Fax: 208-446-1 62 1
Scott W. Reed
Attorney at Law
PO Box A
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816
Fax: 208-765-5 1 17
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U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Wand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile Transmission

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile Transmission

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Overnight Delivery
Facsimile Transmission

/

Hand Delivefy
,
i
Overnight Delivery
1

:
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(Facsimil7~ransmission

IN THE DISTNCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTNCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF' KOOTENAI

Ud THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
CHATEAU DE LOIRE
KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Appellant,
vs.

KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; ELMER R. CURRIE;
FUCHARD A. PIAZZA; and
W. TODD TONDEE.

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

CASE NO. CV-08-00163
(Consolidated with Case
NO. CV-06-06587)

MEMORANDUM
OPINION AND
ORDER IN RE: APPEAL
OF DECISION BY
KOOTENAI COUNTY
BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS

Respondents,
and
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH,
A non-profit unincorporated Association;
NORBERT and BEVERLY TWILLMAW,
husband and wife, SUSAN MELKA; BILL and
SYLVIA LAMPARD, husband and wife; DAVID
and BARBARA WARDS WORTH, husband and
wife; and HEATHER BOWLBY,
Intervenors

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER IN RE:APPEAL: 1

Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development, LLG, appeals from a decision
of the Kootenai County Board of County Commissioners denying an
application for a planned unit development.
Kristen R. Thompson, THOMPSON LAW FIRM, Robert H.
Freilich, MILLER BARNDESS, LLP, and Geraldine Kirk-Hughes,
K I N HUGHES & ASSOCIATES, attorneys for Appellant.
Patrick M. Braden, KOOTENAI COUNTY DEPARTMENT 017
LEGAL SERVICES, attorney for Respondents.
Scott W. Reed, attorney for Intervenors/Respondents.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004 and 2005, Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC ("KHD"), purchased a total
of five hundred seventy-eight (578) acres on the east side of Lake Coeur d'Alene in
Kootenai County, Idaho. The intent was to develop a resort community called Chateau
de Loire. The site is located on both sides of State Highway 97. The property was
located within the Restricted Residential and Rural zones.'
On April 12, 2005, KHD filed an application2 with Kootenai County ("Couhty")
requesting approval of a planned unit development ("PUD").

The Kootenai County

Board of Comissioners ("BOCC") denied KHD's application on August 24, 2006.
KHD appealed from the denial of its application ("First Appeal") in Kootenai County
Case No. CV-06-06587
While the First Appeal was pending, KHD filed a Motion for Mediation. On
December 21, 2006, an Order Granting Motion for Mediation was entered. The parties

'

Approxirnately 393 acres were zoned Rural and approxilnately 184 acres were zoned Restricted
Residential. The lninimuln lot size in the Rural zone is five (5) acres. The minimum lot size in the
Restricted Residential is 8,250 square feet. See ICoote~$niGoutto) Co(le S;S; 9-113-3 (tit(/ 9-8-3.
* See Application in PUD-054-05. This application requested preliminary approval of a PUD with a
proposed subdivision within the PUD.

1
I
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mediated on Jmuary 19, 7007, and entered into a Post-Mediation Agreenient
("Agreement") on the same day. As a result of the Agreement, the parties stipulated to a
stay of the First Appeal.
On March 14. 2007, KKD filed another application.3 In addition, KHD filed a
Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement in Kootenai County Case No. CV-06-06587 on
April 24, 2007. Basically, KHD contended that, if it met the conditions set fort11 in the
Agreement, it was entitled to the requested permits.
The BOCC voted to deny the second application and, on December 20, 2 0 0 7 , the
~ January 9, 2 0 0 8 , KHD filed an Appeal of the denial by
BOCC entered its ~ e c i s i o n . On
the BOCG of its second application in Kootenai County Case No. C V - 0 8 - 0 0 1 6 3
("Second Appeal").
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, an Order was entered consolidating the
First Appeal in Kootenai County Case No. CV-06-06587 and the Second Appeal in
Kootenai County Case No. C V - 0 8 - 0 0 1 8 3 .

Following a hearing, KHD's Motion to

Enforce Mediation Agreement was denied.5

See Applications in PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07. The second application included a request for a PUD,
which was assigned Case No. PUD-057-07, and a request for a subdivision, which was assigned Case No.
S-878P-07, within the PUD. The second application was a modified application. The proposed gated
colnlnunity would have consisted of no more than 500 units on the 578 acres of property. The residential
colnponent of the developlnent consisted of single family dwellings, condominiums, and villas. The
developlnent also included a nulnber of amenities, including a golf course, a spa, an athleticirecreational
center with camp style activities for children, tennis courts, fishing ponds, walking, hiking and biking trails,
a helipad for emergency services, a colnlnunity shuttle service, an amphitheatre, a comlnunity dock, and
various retail activities. The project would occur in three (3) phases over a period of ten (10) years.
4
The second application was initially scheduled for Public Hearing before Hearing Examiner Lisa Key.
The Hearing Examiner recommended denial of the application. The BOCC also held a Public Hearing on
the application. On December 4, 2007, the BOCC conducted a site visit; the site visit included viewing the
site for the proposed wastewater treatment facility, existing roads to the waterfront, location of village
clusters with respect to adjacent properties, and the locations of the other alnenities requested in the PUD.
This site visit is not challenged by KHD.
5
The Order Denying Appellant's Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement (as amended) contained certain
rulings. The Post-Mediation Agreement executed by KHD and Kootenai County was enforceable as a
contract and was clear and unambiguous. However, the Agreement did not contain any guarantees or
assurances that Kootenai County would approve the application to be submitted by KHD and Itkilro Cotle $
,
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Neighbors for Responsible Growth and certain individuals ("Neigl-tbors") filed a
Motion to Intervene. That Motion was granted. The Neigl~borshave intervened only in
the Second Appeal.
Afier a number of motions and objectionshere filed and entered by the parties, a
comprehensive hearing was held. At the hearing, both the First Appeal and Second
Appeal were addressed. The records have been prepared and the parties have provided
briefing on the issues. The matter has now been submitted to this Court for a decision.

7

I1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Local Land Use Planning Act, which is found in Irlalzo Code S; 67-6501, et

seq., governs matters involving land use. According to Irlalzo Cork S; 67-6519, judicial
review of planning and zoning decisions made by a board of county commissioners under
the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) is to be made in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act.

The Idaho

Administrative Procedures Act (IAPA) is found in Irlalzo Cork S; 67-5201 et seq.
The scope of judicial review of administrative decisions is as follows:

67-6519(4)(c) cannot be construed to require Kootenai County to approve an application upon a finding
that KHD had colnplied with the conditions set forth in the Agreement. Therefore, the Agreement would
not be enforced as requested by KHD. Otherwise stated, the Agreement was enforceable, but not as KI-ID
wanted it to be enforced.
"he motions and objections included: (1) MOTION REQUESTING RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
(Denying Appellant's Motion to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement) AND, IN THE ALTEllrjATIVE,
CERTIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION by Appellant; (2) OBJECTION TO REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT AND MOTION TO STRIKE by Respondent Kootenai County; (3) MOTION FOR
APPEAL OF COMMISSIONERS' DECISION ON PUD APPLICATION 054-05 by Appellant: (4)
OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR APPEAL OF COMMISSIONERS' DECISION ON
PUD APPLICATION 054-05 by Respondent Kootenai County.
7
The hearing was conducted on June 4,2008. At the hearing the parties advised the court that they were
continuing to negotiate a possible resolution. They preceeded to oral argument, however, asked the court to
defer ruling pending those efforts. On June 25. 2008 the court was advlsed by correspondence that efforts
to settle were unsuccessful. Accordingly the matter was taken under advisement at that time.
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( I j The court shall not substitute its judgment fbr that of'the agcncy as
to the weight of the evidence on questio~isof' fact.
...
(3) M e n the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or
by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm
the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or
in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection . . . (3) of this section,
agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced.

IrIalzo Code S; 67-5279. Thus, the review of a land use decision under this section is a
two tiered process: (1) the party attacking the board's actions must illustrate that the
board erred in a manner specified under subsection (3), and (2) that a substantial right of
that party was prejudiced. A court reviewing the decision of a board pursuant to Irlalzo

Code S; 67-6279 may reverse or remand for further proceedings only if substantial rights
of the appellant have been prejudiced. Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of Fremont

County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006); Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho

LLUPA requires counties to submit written decisions in all planning and zoning
matters. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are included in such decisions. IrIaho

Code S; 67-6535(b). Judicial review of an order is limited to the record. IrIalzo Code S;
67-5277; Balser v. Koote~zaiCounty, 110 Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 (1 986). The board's
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filldings of* fkct are to be upheld if they are supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole. Sanrlers Orclzard v. Gem County, 137 Idaho 695, 52 P.3d 840 (2002).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance.
Substantial and competent evidence may be contradicted. It does not necessarily lead to
a certain conclusion. It only needs to be "of such sufficient quantity and probative value
that reasonable minds could reach the same conclusion as the fact finder." Cowan v.

Board of Commissioners of Fremotzt County, 143 Idaho at 5 1 7 , 148 P.3d 1263.
The court must defer to the board's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. The factual findings are not clearly erroneous so long as they are supported
by substantial, competent, although conflicting, evidence.

A strong presumption of

validity exists for the actions taken by zoning boards, which includes the application and
interpretation of their own zoning ordinances. Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of

Fremont County, supra; Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 71, 73 P.3d 84 (2003);
Payette River Property Owners Association v. Board of County Commissioners of
Vallej~County, 132 Idaho 55 1, 976 P.2d 477 (1 999); Sanders Orclzarrl v. Gem County,
supra. The party challenging a decision made by a board bears the burden of proving
that the ordinance was applied improperly. Angstman v. City of Boise, supra.
This Court is constrained to adhere to the standards set forth above in reaching its
determinations in this case.

111
THE FIRST APPEAL
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In the First Appeal, Appellant KWD seelcs judicial review of a decision entered by
Respondent HOCC denying an application submitted in PUD-054-05.' When the PostMediation Agreement was entered into by the parties, the First Appeal was stayed
pending a filing of a new or second application. Appellant KE-ID filed a Second Appeal
following the denial of the second application. After the two appeals were consolidated,
Appellant filed a Motion for Appeal of Commissioners' Decision on PUD Application

054-05. Respondent objected and contended that the Post-Mediation Agreement between
the parties superseded and extinguished any claims raised in the appeal of the first
application for the Chateau de Loire project.
Thereafier, KHD submitted its Collsolidated Supplemental and Reply Brief,
which basically incorporated the First Appeal into the Second Appeal.

Respondent

submitted a Response and referenced its earlier briefing. Arguments relating to both
Appeals were addressed in these memorandums. Accordingly, to the extent that there are
issues related or common to both cases, those issues will be addressed in the next section
dealing with the Second
In this consolidated case, there were two applications which gave rise to two
Appeals. No determination is made here as to whether the Post-Mediation Agreement
and the filing of the second application superseded and extinguished any claims raised in
the First Appeal because such is not necessary in order to reach a decision in this case.
The issues raised by KHD in the First Appeal will not be addressed at length in
this section. Rather, the specific issues raised in the Second Appeal will be addressed in

8

Appellant submitted a Brief and Respondent also submitted a Brief on the issues raised in the First
Appeal
9
IntervenorsIRespondents filed a Brief in the Second Appeal. They were not a p a n o f the First Appeal.

q
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the nest section and, where KHD now argues that issues relating to tlie First Appeal
should be considered, they will be included there.
Alternatively. with regard to the First Appeal, the Decision of the BOCC and the
record on the First Appeal have been reviewed. See Findings of Fact, Comprehensive
Plan Analysis, Conclusions of Law and Order of Decision dated August 34, 2006. On
Appeal, KHD raised three issues. See Notice of Appeal filed on September 1,2006. The
standards for judicial review set forth in statutory and case law require that KHD must
illustrate that the BOCC erred in a manner specified in Irlcalzo Code 8 67-5279(3) and that
a substantial right of KHD was prejudiced. Even if KHD could illustrate that the BOCC
had erred, the substantial rights of KHD have not been prejudiced. Any error that might
have existed was in effect cured when the parties entered into the Post-Mediation
Agreement, which identified certain concerns of the BOCC and essentially acknowledged
their validity and which resulted in a second application that was subsequently filed by

KT3D.'O Thus, the challenge of Appellant KHD to the Decision of the BOCC with regard
to the First Appeal fails and must be denied.

IV
THE SECOND APPEAL
Following a second application, the BOCC entered Findings of Fact, Applicable
Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Decision dated December 20, 2007.
Thereafter, KI-ID filed a Second Appeal. Appellant listed six (6) issues for appeal. See
Notice of Appeal in Kootenai County Case No. CV-08-00163, p. 2. Pursuant to Irlnlzo

I(1aizo Code 5 67-5279(3) provides that, if an agency's action is not affirmed, it must be set aside and
remanded for further proceedings. Viewing the matter most favorably to K H D and practically speaking,
the second application acted as a remand - it was another opportunity for ICHD to obtain approval for the
Chateau d e Loire prqject.
10
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Cocle $ 67-5279, the denial of the applicatioris by the BOGC must be affirmed unless
W D can illustrate that the BOCC erred in a manner specified under subsection (3) of the
statute." In this case, KHD appeals on grounds that the decision of the BOCC was: (1)
in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the stat~~tory
authority of the agency; (2) made upon unlavvful procedure; (3) not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (4) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.

A.

Were the Findings of Fact, Analysis, and ~onclusionsof Law Supported by
Substantial evidence in the Record as a Whole?
Under Idaho case law, the BOCC's findings of fact are to be upheld if they are

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Pursuant to Irlnlio Code $675279(1), this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the BOCC as to the weight

to be given the evidence on questions of fact.
In the second application, KHD requested approval of a PUD and also approval of
a subdivision. The requirements for proposed PUDs are set forth in Chapter 15 of the
Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance, which is found in Title 9 of the Kooteilai County
Code. The requirements for proposed major subdivisions are set forth in the Kooteilai
County Subdivision Ordinance, which is found in Title 10 of the Kootenai County Code.
Certain findings must be made before a hearing examiner can recommend approval of a
PUD application and before the BOCC can approve a PUD application. Those iiildiiigs
are found in K.C.C. 8 Y-15-Y(C). Also, certain findings must be made before a hearing
examiner can recommend approval of a major s~~bdivision
application and before the

" Even if ICHD can illustrate that tlle BOCC erred in a manner specified under subsection (3) of the statute,
KHD must also show that its substantial rights have been prejudiced; otherwise, the actions of the BOCC
must be affirmed.
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BOGG can approve the subdivision application. Those findings are found in K.C.C. S; 10-

The BOCC reached a decision that it could not make all of the required findings
for a number of reasons. A review of the Decision reveals that it consisted of the
fbllowing major sections:
I
I1
I11

IV
V
VI

Course of Proceedings
Findings of Fact
Applicable Legal Standards
Comprehensive Plan Analysis
Board Analysis and Con~lusionsof Law
Order of Decision

The Applicant does not challenge the first section dealing with the Course of
Proceedings. In the second section, thirty-four (34) Findings of Fact were set forth. The
Findings of Fact were supported by references to various exhibits in the record. The third
section set forth the Applicable Legal Standards, including references to the ordinances
governing PUDs and subdivisions and to the Comprehensive Plan. In section four, the
goals of the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan were set forth and analyzed. Finally,
in the fifth section, the BOCC reached its conclusions. The BOCC concluded, among
other things, that the proposed development was not compatible with certain goals,
policies, and the future land map of the Comprehensive Plan. The BOCC also concluded
that the application and design did not meet PUD requirements and other requirements
In addition, the BOCC concluded that the proposed development was not compatible
with the surrounding area, including natural characteristics and features such as wetlands
and steep slopes as well as neighborhoods. Furthermore, the BOCC concluded that the
transportation infrastructure and emergency services were not "feasible, available and
adequate."

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER IIV RE: APPEAL: 10

The question here is not whether KEID presented evidence in support of its second
application; the question is whether there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the Decision of the BOCG that KHD failed to meet all of the applicable

requirements. W i l e KHI) may not agree with the findings and conclusions reached by
the BOGC, the record contains evidence to support the BOCC's co~lcernsregarding water
service, disturbance of wetlands. runoff and erosion from steep slopes, transportation on
Highway 97 and the Beauty Bay Will, continued availability of adequate emergency
services, compatibility of the density in the PUD project with the surrounding
neighborhood, and other matters.
The record in this case was voluminous. Conflicting evidence was presented on
many of the issues. The evidence came from a variety of sources, including staff,
experts, interested persons, and residents, as well as from maps, photographs, letters, and
reports. The BOCC weighed the evidence and reached a decision. Under the applicable
law, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the BOCC as to the weight to be
given the evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion. Applying the relevant legal standards, the Findings
of Fact, Analysis, and Conclusions of Law reached by the BOCC in this case were
supported by substantial evidence in the record.

B.

Did the BOCC arrive at their Decision in a manner that was arbitrarv,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion?

KHD contends that the Decision of the BOCC was arbitrary, capricious, and an
abuse of discretion. The contentioil appears to be based on two arguments.
The first argument is that it was arbitrary and capricious for this Board to find that
the secoild applicatioii failed to meet certain goals of the Comprehensive Plan when a
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prior Board found that the first application met those goals.

In denying the first

applicatioil for PUD, the BOGG found that the applicant failed to meet Goals 7 and 14.
In denying the second application for a PUI) and subdivision, the BOCC found that the
applicant failed to meet Goals 4, 7, 9, 14, 17, 23 and 34 of the Comprehensive Plan. On
the second application, KEID was seeking approval not only of the PUD, but also of the
subdivision. Therefore, the BOCC could reach different determinations on the two
applications. Furthermore, in this case, the membership of the BOCC changed between
the time that the first application was denied and the time that the second application was
denied. In reaching a decision, the BOCC considered the evidence presented at the
hearing on the second application.'2 Thus, it is possible for one Board, acting in its
quasi-judicial capacity, to find that a Comprehensive Plan goal was met while another
Board could find that it was not.I3 As determined in Subsection IV(A) above, the
Decision of the BOCC on the second application was supported by substantial, although
conflicting, evidence in the record. The Decision was not arbitrary and capricious or an
abuse of discretion.
The second argument is that an application for a similar development was
approved while KHD's application was denied. A prior BOCC approved an application
for a project known as "Gozzer Ranch." Although the Gozzer Ranch project was similar
in certain ways and in a somewhat similar location, the Chateau de Loire project involved
a different property with different plans. Also, there were no other developments on that
side of Lake Coeur d'Alene at the time that Gozzer Ranch was considered. However, by
the time that KHD made the application for the Chateau de Loire project, Gozzer Ranch

''ICHD participated fully in the second hearing.
l 3 This is analogous to a case in which a new trial is granted. Where one judge might render certain rulings
at the first trial, another judge might make different findings upon retrial based on the evidence presented.
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had been approved and other applications were being considered. Finally, based on past
experiences, the impact of large scale developments in Kootenai County is now more
closely scrutinized by the BOCG and by the public in general than earlier developments
to malie certain that applications meet all of the applicable requirements. Every planning
decision is fact specific. The granting of one application cannot be the precedent to
requiring the granting of a similar application." Even though a previous application for
Gozzer Ranch had been approved, it was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion for the BOCC to deny KHD's application for the Chateau de Loire project
when the Decision was based upon substantial evidence in the record.
In conclusion, the BOCC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and it did not
abuse its discretion in denying M D ' s second application.

C.

Was the BOCC's Decision in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions?

Authority for the adoption of ordinances relating to subdivisions is found in Irlnlzo

Code

8

667-6523. Authority for the adoption of ordinances relating to planned unit

developments as part of or separate from the zoning ordinance is found in Irlalzo Code 8
67-6515. Both statutes contain the following statement: "Denial of a subdivision
Cplanned unit development] permit or approval of a subdivision [planned unit
development] permit with conditions unacceptable to the landowner may be subject to the
regulatory taking analysis provided for by section 67-8003, Idaho Code, consistent with
the requirements established thereby." Irlnlzo Code

8 67-8003 sets forth the

procedure

for agencies to evaluate whether proposed actions may result in a taking of private
property without due process of law. However, Chapter 80 of Title 67 of the Idaho Code
-

14

If that was the rule, there would be no need for subsequent applications for other propert~es.
A

i
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does not expand or reduce the scope of private property protections provided by the
federal and state constitutions. I~talzoCode $ 6 7-8001.

In its Opening Brief, M D raised an issue regarding failure to complj~with Idalto
Code $ 67-6535fc;).

The statute provides as follows: ""Every final decision rendered

concerning a site-specific land use request shall provide or be accompanied by notice to
the applicant regarding the applicant" right to request a regulatory taking analysis
pursuant to section 67-8003, Idaho Code.'"D

did not receive such a notice, This

failure to provide notice does not serve as a basis to ether reverse or remand the decision
of the BOCC. As previously noted the scope of judicial review provides that the agency's
actions shall be affismed unless the court finds that the decision was in violation of
statutory provisions or made upon unlawful procedure. The notice of the regulatory
taking analysis is a post decision requirement. It is not a statutory or procedural defect
upon which the agency action is based.

Furthermore, KHD has requested such an

analysis by letter dated April 7, 2008." The status of an analysis is unknown. To the
extent that Kootenai County may have failed to comply with Irlulzo Code

8

67-8003

following KHD's request, an adequate remedy is set forth under that statute.

IGID alleges that the denial of its PUD and subdivision applications by the BOCC
constituted a taking of private property by Kootenai County without just compensation.
Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

$5 13 and 14 of

the Idaho Constitution protect private property from being taken by a governmental entity
for public use without just compensation.

15

Although it was not a part of the record below and has not been fol-mally filed, a copy of this letter was
received and is attached to the Court File.
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The United States Supreme Court has stated that a "taking" requiring just

compensation under the Fifth Amendment occurs "when the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good, that is, to leave his property economically idle." Lucas v. Sosctlz Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Gt, 2886,

__ ,

120 L.Ed.2d 798, - (1 992)

(emphasis in original). The Idaho Supreme Court followed Lucas in interpreting Article
I,

5

14 of the Idaho Constitution. In Moon v. Nortlz Irlalzo Farmers Association, 140

Idaho 536.542, 96 P.3d 637, 643 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that when there
had been no claim of "a permanent deprivation of all economically beneficial uses of
their land . . . . under the Idaho Constitution, which does not allow less than a total
deprivation of use or denial of access, and under Lucas, there is no taking in violation of
the state or federal constitution.'"
In the instant case, KHD has failed to show that the denial of its application
amounts to a permanent deprivation of all economically beneficial uses of that property.
The record shows that, prior to KHD's purchase of the property, it was used for
agricultural purposes. Part of the property is forested. Additionally, KHD can develop
the property with any use permitted in each of its respective zones.
The denial of KHD's second application did not constitute a "regulatory talcing"
requiring just compensation under either the United States Constitution or the Idaho
Constitution.
KHD claims that the Decision of the BOCC constituted a denial of equal
protection by treating the KHD property differently from the Gozzer Ranch property.
KHD bases its claim on the "class of one" doctrine. The purpose of the equal protection
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clause of the Fourleenth Amendment to the United States Cotlstitution is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination. An
equal protection claim based on a "class of one7'isone in which the plaintiff alleges that

(1) the plaintiff has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated,
and (2) there is no rational basis for the di.fference in treatment. Village of WiIlowbrook

v. Ofech, 538 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). In this case, the
evidence does not reveal that the BOCC "intentionally" treated KHD's application
different from the Gozzer Ranch application. Furthermore, rational bases exist for any
difference that might exist in the treatment of the Chateau de Loire development as
compared with the Gozzer Ranch development.'"t

cannot be determined that KHD's

equal protection rights were violated.

D.

Did the BOCC act in excess of its statutory authority?
KHD argues that the BOCC exceeded its statutory authority when it determined

that its principal grounds for denial were that the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance
for the property were inappropriate and the zoning ordinance should be changed. First,
the record does not reflect that the BOCC gave as its principal grounds for denial that the
uses permitted by the zoning ordinance for the property were inappropriate. Second the
record does not reflect that the BOCC found that the uses permitted by the zoning
ordinance for the property were inappropriate. The subject property is zoned Rural and
Restricted Residential. The BOCC and the Intervenors acltnowledged that permits could
be granted for the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance. However, the BOCC found
that the project as proposed by KWD did not meet certain requirements of the zoning

16

A similar issue was addressed in more depth in Subsection IV(B) above.
consistent with the outcome there.
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ordinance. Finally, the record does not reflect that the BOCC reached a determination
that the zoning ordinance should be changed. The BOCC did not exceed its statutory
authority when it denied permits to KHD for the Chateau de Loire based upon the
standards set forth in its existing ordinances.

I.

M1;lsthe Decision i n , the HO('C' m;~deupon unliiv\lful procedure'?

W D alleges that the BOCC's violated its due process rights when the BOCC
denied its applications. M e n acting upon a quasi-judicial land use matter, a zoning
board cannot be a proponent or an opponent of the proposed project. Instead, the board
sits in the seat of a judge. Therefore, the Due Process Clause applies to the board in the
same way that it applies to judges. Marcia T. Turner, L L C v. City of Twin Falls, 144
Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840 (2007).17 See also Cowan

V.

Board of Commissioneus of

Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006).
KHD claims that the BOCC violated KHD's due process rights when it relied
upon an unsupported and unrelated political outcry, ex parte communications,
unauthorized site visits, and personal studies by members of the BOCC. In particular,
KHD complains about the following: (1) Members of the BOCC making independent site
visits or advocating denial of the application based on their own personal studies; and (2)
Public pressure for a denial of the applications.
First, KHD challenges the actions of the BOCC on grounds that members made
independent site visits and advocated denial of the application based on their own
personal studies. In Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433, 942 P.2d 557

17

The Turrier court explained the concept of "impartiality" in detail in the opinion. See Turner, 144 Idaho
at 209, 159 P.3d at 846 (impartiality means lack of bias and ensures equal application of the law, but it does
not mean a lack of preconception on legal issues - only that the judge is willing to consider views that
oppose his preconceptions and remain open to persuasion.)
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(1W7), the ldaho Supreme Court held that a board of county coinmissioners violated tlie

due process rights of certain persons protesting a permit for a dairy when the board
viewed the subject property without notice and without giving parties or their
representatives an opportunity to be present. The instant case is distinguishable from

Comer. Here, KHD objects to comments made by Commissioner Currie as to his
personal obseniations about Highxray 97 prior to the Decision of the BOCC on the first
application. The record does not show that Commissioner Currie conducted a "site visit"
which is entitled to due process.

Highway 97 is a major roadway within Kootenai

County; it is one that is traveled regularly by many folks and one with which many
people in Kootenai County are familiar to some degree.

The record reveals that

Commissioner Currie only stated that he had driven Highway 97.

KHD had an

opportunity to present evidence regarding Highway 97 and other interested persons
testified regarding the condition of Highway 97. Prior to a determination on the second
application, the entire BOCC conducted a properly noticed site visit.18
The BOCC voted unanimously to deny the second application.

Even if

Commissioner Currie's vote was not considered, the votes of Commissioners Piazza and
Tondee would still act to deny the second application.
Second, KHD challenges the actions of the BOCC on grounds that it was a
violation of due process and equal protection for a quasi-judicial body to be swayed by
public sentiment and political pressure to deny the applications based on ultra vires
public requests to change the zoning of the site. The public did not request a change in
the zoning of the subject property. The public did, however, object to the proposed
development as presented by KHD during hearings in front of the BOCC. The BOCC
IS

This "site visit" is not disputed or challenged.
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was charged with weighing the evidence that was presented by menlbers of the public.
including those who approved and disapproved of the proposal, and evidence that was
presented by members of KFID's development team. While the testimony of the public
may have been persuasive, the record reflects that the BOCC also considered other
evidence presented at the hearing on the second application. The record does not reflect
that the BOCC was unduly influenced. The findings and conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Under Idnlzo Code $ 67-5279(1), this
Court cannot cannot substitute its judgment for that of the BOCC as to the weight of the
evidence.
The conclusion here is that the BOCC did not make its decision upon unlawful
procedure on either of the two grounds raised by KI-ID that have been addressed in this
section.

F.

Were the substantial r i ~ h t sof the Appellant KHD preiudiced bv the action of
the BOCC?
A court reviewing a land use decision by a local board must affirm the action

unless the party challenging the action can show that a substantial right of that party was
prejudiced. Idaizo Code $ 67-5279(4); Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 9 17
P.2d 409 (Ct.App. 1996).
In Appellant's Opening Brief, KHD argues that the BOCC violated its substantial
rights and due process of law by a wronghl taking of its private property. That issue has
been addressed in Subsection C above. The result here is the same.
KHD also contends that the BOCC failed to set forth reasonable conditions that it
could take to have its Applications accepted. A review of the Decision entered by the
BOCC on the second application indicates that the BOCC set forth seven (7) items that
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might be incorporated into any subsecluent application. However, the Decision also
contained the following statement: "Implementation of the above actions is NOT a

guarantee of future approval." The items were matters about which the BOCC were
concerned with regard to any approval for the development of the subject property under
a PUD or subdivision application.

As ruled earlier in this case, such items are

conditional; approval of future applications is based upon the record at that time.
It cannot be found that KHD's substantial rights were prejudiced by the action of
the BOGC. First, W D has not shown that the BOCC ened in a manner specified under
Idaho Code S; 67-5279(3). Furthermore, the denial of this particular application by the
BOCG does not deprive KHD of any lawful use of its property existing prior to the filing
of its application. Because it was applying for a PUD, KHD was seeking a change in the
way its existing land uses would be treated. After the denial, KHD was left with the
same status, condition, and uses available for its land as existed before KHD applied for
the PUD. ICED'S property can still be put to any use permitted under the applicable laws,
regulations, and ordinances. Finally, KHD can make another application if it so desires.

G.

Is KHD entitled to an award of attorney fees?
In its Notice of Appeal for the Second Appeal, Appellant KHD claims that

Respondents are liable to it for all attorneys' fees and costs. Matzo Code

8

12-117

governs the award of attorney fees in civil actions to which a public entity is a party. The
statute provides for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party or a party prevailing in
part. However, attorney fees may be awarded only if the court finds that the party against
whom the judgment or partial judgment is rendered "acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law . . . ." Even if a reviewing court later finds that the case involved an erroneous

q
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interpretation of a statute or ordinance, an award of attorney fees is unwarranted if the
public entity "acted in a way that fairly and reasonably addressed the issue." Payette
River Proper@ Owners Ass'n v, Valley COIAN@,
132 Idaho 551, 558, 976 P.2d 477, 484

(1999).
In this case, KWD was not a prevailing party. Even if KHD was a prevailing
party. it cannot be found that the Respondents acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. In this case, the BOCC held lengthy hearings and an extensive record was compiled.
The parties engaged in mediation and more than one application was submitted by KHD.
The Respondents have acted in a way that fairly and reasonably addressed the issues. In
conclusion, KHD is not entitled to an award of attorney fees against Respondents.

H.

Did the BOCC act inanpropriately in other wavs?
Appellant KHD has raised other issues regarding the actions of the BOCC. Those

issues will be addressed below.
1.

Decision of BOCC as a Quasi-Judicial Act

A board acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when it considers whether to approve or
deny applications for PUDs and subdivisions. Quasi-judicial activity is differentiated
from legislative activity. Legislative actions by a board produce a rule or policy which
has application to an open class. Quasi-judicial activity, on the other hand, impacts
specific individuals, interests, or situations. Legislative actions carnot be attacked by a
petition for judicial review as can quasi-judicial actions. Marcia T. Turner v. City of
Twin Fnlls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840 (2007).
W?len a board acts upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter, the board cannot be either
a proponent or an opponent of the proposal. The board sits in the seat of a judge.
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Therefore, the Due Process Clause applies to a zoning board in the same waj that it
applies to judges. Id.
In this case, Appellant KHD argues that the BOCC acted in a legislative rnanner
rather than a quasi-judicial manner when it denied the applications. According to KHD,
the BOCC had previously made the zoning decision in its legislative capacity and was
left only with the quasi-judicial task of approving applications of landowners whose
applications were in conformity with the zoning ordinance. KHD's argument is based
upon the zoning classification. W D contends that the BOCC had no discretion to deny
applications based on considerations other than the zoning ordinance classification and,
since this property was zoned as Restricted Residential and Rural, the applications had to
be approved. However, the BOCC was reviewing the specific proposal for the Chateau
de Loire as a PUD and a s~bdivision.'~The requirements of the Kootenai County
Ordinances pertaining to those kinds of proposals applied as well as the underlying
zoning classification.
Both parties agree that the BOCC had to act in a quasi-judicial capacity when it
considered the applications. Here, the BOCC acted in that capacity when it reviewed the
applications based upon the requirements for PUDs and subdivisions set forth in the
applicable Kootenai County Ordinances.

2.

Denial based on non-conformance with the Comprehensive Plan

KHD claims that the BOCC relied principally upon the non-compliance of the
applications with the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan and that doing so was legal
error. Comprehensive plans do not themselves operate as legally controlling zoning law.
l9 The proposal included more than lots and land divisions; it included a golf course, c o n d o ~ n i n i u ~areas,
n
and other amenities. Neither the Respondents nos the Intervenors deny that Appellants can act in accord
with the zoning classifications, i.e., so many units per acre, and that has not been a disputed issue.
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They serve to guide and advise the governing bodies responsible for malcing zoning
decisions. A board cannot rely solely on non-compliance with the comprehensive plan in
denying an application. To do so would elevate the comprehensive plan to the level of
legally controlling zoning law. However, the goals of the comprehensive plan can be
considered and used in conjunction with applicable ordinances in evaluating a proposed
development. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,2 P.3d 738 (2000).
The instant case can be distinguished from those cases where boards relied only
on the comprehensive plan goals in denying an application. Here the BOCC set forth the
applicable legal standards upon which it relied in Section 111 of the Decision dated
December 20,2007. Those standards included not only the Comprehensive Plan but also
the Subdivision Ordinance, the Zoning Ordinance, and other applicable ordinances and
statutes. Although Section IV of the Decision was devoted to a Comprehensive Plan
Analysis, Section V contained the Board Analysis and Conclusions of Law. M i l e the
items set forth in Section V addressed the Comprehensive Plan, they also addressed other
ordinances and other issues required before the PUD application could be approved.
In sum, the BOCC did not rely solely on the Comprehensive Plan in denying
M D ' s request for permits for a PUD and subdivision for its proposed development.
Instead, the BOCC relied upon the proper legal standards, considering the
Comprehensive Plan but also applying standards set forth in the Kootenai County
Ordinances. The BOCC did not use the general language of the Comprehensive Plan as
the sole basis for denying KHD's second application for a PUD and a subdivision.

3.

Equitable Estoppel
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%[hen denying KI-ID's first application, the BOCC relied upon KHD's failure to
comply with Goals 7 and 14 of the Comprehensive Plan. Thereafter, the parties entered
into a Post-Mediation Agreement setting forth certain actions that KHD could take to
obtain approval of the proposed PUD. En the Decision denying the second application,
the BOCC cited Goals 4, 7, 9, 14, 17, 23 and 24 of the Comprehensive Plan. KWD now
claims that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars the BOCC from introducing new
alleged compliance deficiencies based on newly asserted Comprehensive Plan Goals in
its denial of the second application and claims that it had met-all requirements set forth in
the Post-Mediation ~ ~ r e e m e n t . * '
The elements of estoppel are as follows:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual
or constructive knowledge of the truth;
the party asserting estoppel did not know or could not discover the
truth;
the false representation or concealment was made with the intent
that it be relied upon; and
the person to whom the representation was made or from whom
the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation
or concealment to his prejudice.

Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 34 1 (1982j.
In this case, the BOCC did not falsely represent that it would approve KHD's
application if U I D met the Goals 7 and 14 without considering any other Goals of the
Comprehensive Plan and the BOCC did not falsely represent that, if KHD met the
conditions set forth in the Post-Mediation Agreement, the Chateau de Loire project would
be approved. Furthermore, the BOCC did not conceal the material fact that KHD would
be required to meet the standards set forth in the applicable Kootenai County Ordinances
before any permits would be issued. KMD filed a second application, which differed
20

This argument is similar to the argument made in Section IV(B), ir!frri.
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from the first application and which sought permits for a PUD and a subdivision. That
second application was subject to hearings and &Further decisions by the BOCC.
Therefore, KHD cannot meet the first element of equitable estoppel.
In addition, the second element requires that the party asserting estoppel did not
know or could not discover the truth. In this case, the filing of the second application and
the evidence KHD presented at the hearings show that KHD recognized that there were
standards it would have to meet. Even if it did not know, KHD could have discovered
the information because the ordinances and requirements are readily available from the
County and are also posted on the Internet. Thus, KHD cannot meet the second element
of equitable estoppel.21
KHD cited to a number of cases. See, e.g., Clzisholm v. Twin Falls County, 139
Idaho 131, 75 P.3d 185 (2003). However, those cases can be distinguished. It is well
settled that a board cannot enforce a change in an existing zoning regulation affecting the
property afier a landowner has made an application and has made substantial
expenditures; an applicant's rights are determined by the zoning ordinance in existence at
the time of the filing of an application for a permit and a newly amended zoning
ordinance cannot be retroactively applied. In this case, KHD's right to a permit was
determined by the ordinances in existence at the time that its application was filed. The
BOCC did not amend its ordinances to affect KHD's application. The Decision on the
first application and/or the Post-Mediation Agreement cannot be considered as
amendments of the Kootenai County ordinances by the BOCC.

''The second element is not included among the elernents in Jolirt HI. Brorvrz Properties

tJ. Blriirie Coirrtty,
138 Idaho 17 1, 59 P.3d 976 (2002). In BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.), p. 571, five elements are
listed with the first element listed in Trvi12 Frills Clinic & Hosp. Blrlg. Corp. and Jolin W. Brorvrz
Properties being separated into two elements; the second element is included as an element of equitable
estoppel in this source.
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In summary, the elements of equitable estopppcl have not been met under the
facts in this case. The Idaho case law does not support a claim that equitable estoppel
should he applied here.22

4.

Reservation of Federal Constitutional Claims

In this case, the Decision of the BOCC is being affirmed. KHD has indicated that
it is reserving its right to bring claims in federal court for alleged violations of
constitutional rights arising from the determinations made by the BOCC at issue in this
case if a decision adverse to KHD is entered here. KHD has the right to bring such an
action if it decides to do so. KHD also requests that the decision in this case be entered
without prejudice so that such claims can be brought without concern as to res judicata or
preclusive effect of this Court's rulings.
This Court is bound by Idalzo Code 8 67-5279(3). According to the statute, the
agency action can be affirmed; if it is not, it must be set aside, in whole or in part, and
remanded for further proceedings. In accord with the statute, the action of the BOCC is
affirmed.

CONCLUSION
It is concluded that the action of the Respondent BOCC must be affirmed because
it cannot be found that the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the BOCC
denying the applications of Appellant KHD were in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions, in excess of its statutory authority, made upon unlawful procedure,
not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, or were not arbitrary,
Even if equitable estoppel was applied to Iimit consideration only to Goals 7 and 14 of the
Comprehensive Plan, substantial evidence existed to support the findings of the BOCC o n those Goals. See
Subsection IV(A) above.

22
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tile applicant regarding the applicant's right to request a regulatory taking analysis
pursuant to section 67-8003, Idaho Code." KWD did not receive such a notice. However,

KHD has requested such an analysis by letter dated April 7, 2008.14 The status of an
analysis is u h o w n . To the extent that Kootenai County may have failed to comply with
Icinho Code S; 67-8003 following KHD's request, an adequate remedy is set forth there.

KHB alleges that the denial of its PUD and subdivision applications by the BOCC
constitttted a taking of private property by Kootenai County without just compensation.
Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, $513 and 14 of
the Ida110 Constitution protect private property from being taken by a governmental entity
for public use without just compensation.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that a "taking" requiring just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment occurs "when the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good. that is, to leave his property economically idle." Lucas v. Soutiz Carolina Coastal
Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886, -,

120 L.Ed.2d 798, - (1 992)

(emphasis in original). The Idaho Supreme Court followed Lucas in interpreting Article
I, fj 14 of the Idaho Constitution. In Moon v. Nortiz I h i z o Farmers Association, 140
Idaho 536, 542, 96 P.3d 637, 643 (20041, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that when there
had been no claim of "a permanent deprivation of all economically beneficial uses of
their land .

.

. . under the Idaho Constitution, which does not allow less than a total

deprivation of use or denial of access, and under Lucas, there is no taking in violation of
the state or federal constitution."

I4

Alt11oug11 it was not a part of the record below and has not been formally filed, a copy of this letter was
received and is attached to the Court File.
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In the instant case. KHD has failed to show that the denial of its application
alllo~itltsto a perrnailent deprivation of all economically beneficial uses of that property.
The record shows that, prior to KHD's purchase of the property, it was used for
agricultural purposes. Part of the property is forested. Additionally, KHL) can develop
the property with any use permitted in each of its respective zones.
The denial of KHD's second application did not constitute a "regulatory taking"
requiring just compensation under either the United States Constitution or the Idaho
Constitution.
KHD claims that the Decision of the BOCC constituted a denial of equal
protectioil by treating the KHD property differently from the Gozzer Ranch property.
KHD bases its claim on the "class of one" doctrine. The purpose of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination. An
equal protection claim based on a "class of one" is one in which the plaintiff alleges that
(1) the plaintiff has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated,
and (2) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Village of Willowbrook
v. Olerlz, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). In this case, the

evidence does not reveal that the BOCC "intentionally" treated ICEID'S application
different from the Gozzer Ranch application. Furthermore, rational bases exist for any
difference that inight exist in the treatment of the Chateau de Loire development as
compared with the Gozzer Ranch development."

It cannot be determined that KHD's

equal protection rights were violated.

15

A similar issue was addressed in inore depth in Subsection IV(B) above. The conclusion here is
consistent with the outcoine there.
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D.
ICI-ID argues that the BOCC exceeded its statutory authority when it determined
that its principal grounds for denial were that the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance
for the property were inappropriate and the zoning ordinance should be changed. First,
the record does not reflect that the BOCC gave as its principal grou~dsfor denial that the
uses permitted by the zoning ordinance for the property were inappropriate. Second the
record does not reflect that the BOCC found that the uses permitted by the zoning
ordinance for the property were inappropriate. The subject property is zoned Rural and
Restricted Residential. The BOCC and the Intervenors acknowledged that permits could
be granted for the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance. However, the BOCC found
that the project as proposed by KHD did not meet certain requirements of the zoning
ordinance. Finally, the record does not reflect that the BOCC reached a determination
that the zoning ordinance should be changed. The BOCC did not exceed its statutory
a~ttlioritywhen it denied permits to KHD for the Chateau de Loire based upon the
standards set forth in its existing ordinances.

E.

Was the Decision by the BOCC made upon unlawful procedure?
KHD alleges that the BOCC's violated its due process rights when the BOCC

denied its applications. When acting upon a quasi-judicial land use matter, a zoning
board cannot be a proponent or an opponent of the proposed project. Instead, the board
sits in the seat of a judge. Therefore, the Due Process Clause applies to the board in the
same way that it applies to judges. Marcia T: Turner, LLC v. City of Twin f i l l s , 144
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Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840 (2007).16 See also C o m n v. Board of Cornmissioners OJ

Fre~zonrCounty, 143 Idaho 501, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006).
KHD claims that the BOCC violated KHD's due process rights when it relied
upon an unsupported and unrelated political outcry, ex park communications,
unauthorized site visits, and personal studies by members of the BOCC. In particular,
KHD cornplains about the following: ( I ) Members of the BOCC making independent site
visits or advocating denial of the application based on their own personal studies; and (2)
Public pressure for a denial of the applications.
First, KHD challenges the actions of the BOCC on grounds that members made
independent site visits and advocated denial of the application based on their own
personal studies. In Corner v. County of Twin fills, 130 Idaho 433, 942 P.2d 557
(19971, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a board of county commissioners violated the
due process rights of certain persons protesting a permit for a dairy when the board
viewed the subject property without notice and without giving parties or their
representatives an opportunity to be present. The instant case is distinguishable from

Conzer. Here, KHD objects to comments made by Commissioner Currie as to his
personal observations about Highway 97 prior to the Decision of the BOCC on the first
application. The record does not show that Commissioner Currie conducted a "site visit"
which is entitled to due process.

Highway 97 is a major roadway within Kootenai

County; it is one that is traveled regularly by many follts and one with which many
people in Kootenai County are familiar to some degree.

The record reveals that

'"he
Turrzer court explained the concept of "impartiality" in detail in the opinion. See Turrzer, 144 Idaho
at 209, 159 P.3d at 846 (impartiality means lack of bias and ensures equal application of the law, but it does
not inean a lack of preconception on legal issues - only that the judge is willing to consider views that
oppose his preconceptions and remain open to persuasion.)
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Go~~lmissioner
Curric only stated that be had drive11 Highway 97.

KHD had an

opporturiity to present evidence regarding Highway 97 and other interested persons
testified regarding the condition of Highway 97. Prior to a determination on the second
application, the entire BOCC conducted a properly noticed site visit.I7
The BOCC voted unanimously to deny the second application.

Even if

Cornniissioner Currie's vote was not considered, the votes of Comissioners Piazza and
Tondce would still act to deny the second application.
Second, KHD challenges the actions of the BOCC on grounds that it was a
violation of due process and equal protection for a quasi-judicial body to be swayed by
public sentiment and political pressure to deny the applications based on ultra vires
public requests to change the zoning of the site. The public did not request a change in
the zoning of the subject property. The public did, however, object to the proposed
development as presented by KHD during hearings in front of the BOCC. The BOCC
was charged with weighing the evidence that was presented by members of the public,
including those who approved and disapproved of the proposal, and evidence that was
presented by members of KHD's development team. While the testimony of the public
may have been persuasive, the record reflects that the BOCC also considered other
evidence presented at the hearing on the second application. The record does not reflect
that the BOCC was unduly influenced. The findings and conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Under I h k o Corle

8

67-5279(1), this

Court cannot cannot substitute its judgnlellt for that of the BOCC as to the weight of the
evidence.

17

This "site visit" is not disputed

01.

challenged.
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The conclusio~ihere is that the BOCC did not make its decision upon unlawful
procedure on either of the two grounds raised by KHD that have been addressed in this
section.

F.

Were the substantial rights of the Appellant ICHD preiudiced by the action of
the BOCC?
A court reviewing a land use decision by a local board must affirm the action

unless the party challenging the action can show that a substantial right of that party was
prejudiced. filalzo Code 8 67-5279(4); Angsfman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 91 7

In Appellant's Opening Brief, KHD argues that the BOCC violated its substantial
rights and due process of law by a wrongful taking of its private property. That issue has
been addressed in Subsectioil C above. The result here is the same.
KHD also contends that the BOCC failed to set forth reasonable conditions that it
could take to have its Applications accepted. A review of the Decision entered by the
BOCC

011 the

second application indicates that the BOCC set forth seven (7) items that

might be incoiporated into any subsequent application. However, the Decision also
contained the following statement: "Implementation of the above actions is NOT a
guarantee of future approval." The items were matters about which the BOCC were

concerned with regard to ally approval for the development of the subject property under
a PUD or subdivision application.

As ruled earlier in this case, such items are

conditional; approval of future applications is based upon the record at that time.
It cannot be found that KHD's substantial rights were prejudiced by the action of
the BOCC. First, KHD has not shown that the BOCC erred in a manner specified under
Iilalzo Code 8 67-5279(3). Furthermore, the denial of this particular application by the
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BOCC does not deprive KHD of any lawful use of its property existing prior to the filing
of its applicatioil. Because it was applying for a PUD, KHD was seeking a change in the
way its existing land uses would be treated. After the denial, KHD was left with the

same status. condition, and uses available for its land as existed before KHD applied for
the PUD. KHD's property can still be put to any use permitted under the applicable laws,
regulations, and ordinances. Finally, KHD can make another application if it so desires.

C.

Is ICHD entitled to an award of attorney fees?

In its Notice of Appeal for the Second Appeal, Appellant KHD claims that

Respoildents are liable to it for all attorneys' fees and costs. I h h o Code $ 12-117
governs the award of attorney fees in civil actions to which a public entity is a party. The
statute provides for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party or a party prevailing in
part. However, attorney fees may be awarded only if the court finds that the party against
whom the judgment or partial judgment is rendered "acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law . . . ." Even if a reviewing court later finds that the case involved an erroneous
interpretation of a statute or ordinance, an award of attorney fees is unwarranted if the
public entity "acted in a way that fairly and reasonably addressed the issue." Pnyette
River Property Owizers Ass'n v. Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 558, 976 P.2d 477, 484

(1 999).
In this case, KHD was not a prevailing party. Even if KHD was a prevailing
party, it cannot be found that the Respondents acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. In this case, the BOCC held lengthy hearings and an extensive record was compiled.
The parties engaged in mediation and more than one application was submitted by KI-ID.
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Thc Respondents have acted in a way that fairly and reasonably addressed the issues. In
conclusion, KHD is not entitled to an award of attorney fees against Respondents.

W.

Did the BOCC act inappropriatelv in other ways?
Appellant KWD has raised other issues regarding the actions of the BOCC. Those

issues will be addressed below.

1.

Decision of BOCC as a Quasi-Judicial Act

A board acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when it considers whether to approve or
deny applications for PUDs and subdivisions. Quasi-judicial activity is differentiated
from legislative activity. Legislative actions by a board produce a rule or policy which
has application to an open class. Quasi-judicial activity, on the other hand, impacts
specific individuals, interests, or situations. Legislative actions cannot be attacked by a
petition for judicial review as can quasi-judicial actions. Marcia T. Turner v. City of
Twin Fnlls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840 (2007).
When a board acts upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter, the board cannot be either
a proponent or an opponent of the proposal. The board sits in the seat of a judge.
Therefore, the Due Process Clause applies to a zoning board in the same way that it
applies to judges. Id.
In this case, Appellant KHD argues that the BOCC acted in a legislative manner
rather than a quasi-judicial manner when it denied the applications. According to KHD,
the BOCC had previously made the zoning decision in its legislative capacity and was
left only with the quasi-judicial task of approving applications of landowners whose
applications were in conformity with the zoning ordinance. KHD's argument is based
upon the zoning classification. KHD contends that the BOCC had no discretion to deny
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applications based on considerations other than the zoning ordinance classification and,
since this properly was zoned as Restricted Residential and Rural, the applications had to
be approved. However, the BOGC was reviewing the specific proposaI for the Chateau

de Loirc as a PUD and a subdivision.18 The requirements of the Kootenai County
Ordinances pe~ainingto those kinds of proposals applied as well as the underlying
zoning classification.
Both parties agree that the BOCC had to act in a quasi-judicial capacity when it
considered the applications. Were, the BOCC acted in that capacity when it reviewed the
applications based upon the requirements for PUDs and subdivisions set forth in the
applicable Kootenai County Ordinances.
2.

Denial based on non-conformance with the Comprehensive Plan

KEID claims that the BOCC relied principally upon the non-compliance of the
applications with the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan and that doing so was legal
error. Comprehensive plans do not themselves operate as legally controlling zoning law.
They serve to guide and advise the governing bodies responsible for making zoning
decisions. A board cannot rely solely on non-compliance with the comprehensive plan in
denying an application. To do so would elevate the comprehensive plan to the level of
legally controlling zoning law. However, the goals of the comprehensive plan can be
considered and used in conjunction with applicable ordinances in evaluating a proposed
development. Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,2 P.3d 738 (2000).
The instant case call be distinguished from those cases where boards relied only
on the comprehensive plan goals in denying an application. Here the BOCC set forth the
IS

The proposal illcluded more than lots and land divisions; it included a golf course, condominium areas,
and other amenities. Neither the Respondents nor the Intervenors deny that Appellants can act in accord
with the zoning classifications, i.e., so many units per acre, and that has not been a disputed issue.
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applicable legal standards upon which it relied in Section I11 of the Decision dated
December 20, 2007. Those standards included not only the Comprehensive Plan but also
the Srtbdivision Ordinance, the Zoning Ordinance, and other applicable ordinances and
statutes. Although Section IV of the Decision was devoted to a Comprehensive Plan
Analysis, Section V contained the Board Analysis and Conclusions of Law. W i l e the
items set forth in Section V addressed the Comprehensive Plan, they also addressed other
ordina~lcesand other issues required before the PUD application could be approved.
In sum, the BOCC did not rely solely on the Comprehensive Plan in denying
ICHD's request for permits for a PUD and subdivision for its proposed development.
Instead, the BOCC relied upon the proper legal standards, considering the
Comprehensive Plan but also applying standards set forth in the Kootenai County
Ordinances. The BOCC did not use the general language of the Comprehensive Plan as
the sole basis for denying KHD's second application for a PUD and a subdivision.

3.

Equitable Estoppel

When denying KHD's first application, the BOCC relied upon KHD's failure to
comply with Goals 7 and 14 of the Comprehensive Plan. Thereafter, the parties entered
into a Post-Mediation Agreement setting forth certain actions that KHD could take to
obtain approval of the proposed PUD. In the Decision denying the second application,
the BOCC cited Goals 4, 7, 9, 14, 17, 23 and 24 of the Comprehensive Plan. KHD now
claims that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars the BOCC from introducing new
alleged compliance deficieilcies based on newly asserted Comprehensive Plan Goals in
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the Post-Mediation Agreement. I9
The elemeilts of estoppel are as follows:

(1)

(2)
(3)

(4)

a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual
or constructive knowledge of the truth;
the party asserling estoppel did not know or could not discover the
truth;
the false representation or concealment was made with the intent
that it be relied upon; and
the person to whom the representation was made or from whom
the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation
or concealment to his prejudice.

Twii?fills Clinic & Hospital BIdg Corp. v. &mill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P .2d 34 1 (1 982).
In this case, the BOCC did not falsely represent that it would approve KHD's
application if KHD met the Goals 7 and 14 without considering any other Goals of the
Comprehensive Plan and the BOCC did not falsely represent that, if KHD met the
conditions set forth in the Post-Mediation Agreement, the Chateau de Loire project would
be approved. Furthermore, the BOCG did not conceal the material fact that KHD would
be required to meet the standards set forth in the applicable Kootenai County Ordinances
before any permits would be issued. KHD filed a second application, which differed
from the first application and which sought permits for a PUD and a subdivision. That
second application was subject to hearings and further decisions by the BOCC.
Therefore, KHD cannot meet the first element of equitable estoppel.
In addition, the second element requires that the party asserting estoppel did not
know or could not discover the truth. In this case, the filing of the second application and
the evidence KFID presented at the hearings show that KHD recognized that there were
standards it would have to. meet. Even if it did not know, KHD could have discovered

''This argument is similar to the argument made in Section IV(B), i r e .
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the information because the ordinances and requirements are readily available from the
County and are also posted on the Internet. Thus, KHD cannot meet the second element
of equitable estoppel.20
KHD cited to a number of cases. See, e.g., Clzislzolm v, Twin Falls County, 139
Idaho 131, 75 P.3d 185 (2003). However, those cases can be distinguished. It is well
settled that a board cannot enforce a change in an existing zoning regulation affecting the
property after a landowner has made an application and has made substantial
expenditures: an applicant's rights are determined by the zoning ordinance in existence at
the time of the filing of an application for a permit and a newly amended zoning
ordinance cannot be retroactively applied. In this case, KHD's right to a permit was
determined by the ordinances in existence at the time that its application was filed. The
BOCC did not amend its ordinances to affect KHD's application. The Decision on the
first application andfor the Post-Mediation Agreement cannot be considered as
ameildnients of the Kootenai County ordinances by the BOCC.
In summary, the elements of equitable estopppel have not been met under the
facts in this case. The Idaho case law does not support a claim that equitable estoppel
should be applied l ~ e r e . ~ '
4.

Reservation of Federal Constitutional Claims

In this case, the Decision of the BOCC is being affirmed. KHD has indicated that
it is reserving its right to bring claims in federal court for alleged violations of
20

The second element is not included among the elements in John W. Brorvrr Properties 11. Blairtc County,
138 Ida110 17 I, 59 P.3d 976 (2002). In BLACIC'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.), p. 57 1, five elements are
listed with the first element listed in nvir? Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bfflg. Corp. and Joirrz W. Brotvrr
Properties being separated into two elements; the second element is included as an element of equitable
estoppel in this source.
Eve11 if equitable estoppel was applied to limit consideration only to Goals 7 and 14 of the
Comprehensive Plan, substantial evidence existed to support the findings of the BOCC on those Goals. See
Subsection IV(A) above.

''
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constitutional rights arising from the determinations made by the BOGC at issue in this
case if a decision adverse to KHD is entered here. KHD has the right to bring such an
action if it decides to do so. KHD also requests that the decision in this case be entered
without prejudice so that such claims can be brought without concern as to res judicata or
preclusive effect of this Court's rulings.
This Court is bound by Idalto Code § 67-5279(3). According to the statute, the
agency action can be affirmed; if it is not, it must be set aside, in whole or in part, and
reinunded for f ~ ~ r t hproceedings.
er
In accord with the statute, the action of the BOCC is
affirmed.

VI
CONCLUSION
It is concluded that the action of the Respondent BOCC must be affirmed because
it cannot be found that the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the BOCC
denying the applications of Appellant KHD were in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions, in excess of its statutory authority, made upon unlawful procedure,
not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, or were not arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion as required under Idalzo Code # 67-5279(3). Even if
the action of the BOCC had fallen within one of the categories listed in Idalto Code § 675279(3), the action of the BOCC must still be affirmed because the substantial rights of
ICHD have not been prejudiced.

Other issues raised by KHD have been considered

herein, but they do not alter the outcome.
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VII

ORDER
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is hereby ORDERED that the actions of the
Respondent Board of County Commissioners in this case be and they hereby are affirmed
as set forth herein.
DATED this

day of August, 2008.

John Patrick Luster
District Judge
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capricious, or an abuse of discretion as required under Xrlnho Code $67-5279(3). Even if
the action of the BOCC had fallen within one of the caegories listed in Icinho Code I$ 67-

5279(3), the action of the BOCC must still be affirmed because the substantial rights of
M D have not been prejudiced.

Other issues raised by KHD have been considered

herein, but they do not alter the outcome.

VII
ORDER
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is hereby O R D E E D that the actions of the
Respondent Board of County Commissioners in this case be and they hereby are affirmed
as set hrth herein.
DATED this

1 ~i *"day of August, 2008.

!s-3r/79&.
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District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KOOTENAI
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION
OF KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC
FOR PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT
CHATEAU DE LOIRE

)

CASE NO, CV-08-00163
(Consolidated with Case
NO. CV-06-06587)

KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
Appellant,

1

vs.

KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS; ELMER R. CURRIE;
RICHARD A. PIAZZA; and
W. TODD TONDEE.
Respondents,
and
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH,
A non-profit unincorporated Association;
NORBERT and BEVERLY TWILLMANN,
husband and wife, SUSAN MELKA; BILL and
SYLVIA LAMPARD, husband and wife; DAVID
and BARBARA WARDSWORTH, husband and
wife; and HEATHER BOWLBY,
Intervenors.

)

1
1
1
1

AMENDED
MEMORANDUM
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Appellant Kirk-Hughes Development. LLC, appeals from a decision
of the Kootenai Gounty Board of County Commissioners denying an
application for a planned unit development.
Kristen R. Thompson, THOMPSON LAW F I W , Robert H.
Freilich, MILLER BARNDESS, LLP, and Geraldine Kirk-Hughes,
KIRK HUGHES & ASSOCIATES, attorneys for Appellant.
Patrick M. Braden, KOOTENAI COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
LEGAL SERVICES, attorney for Respondents.
Scon: W. Reed, attorney for IntervenorslRespondents.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2004 and 2005, Kirk-Hughes Development, LLC ("KHD"). purchased a total
of five hundred seventy-eight (578) acres on the east side of Lake Coeur d'Alene in
Kootenai County, Idaho. The intent was to develop a resort community called Chateau
de Loire. The site is located on both sides of State Highway 97. The property was
located within the Restricted Residential and Rural zones.'
On April 12, 2005, KHD filed an application2 with Kootenai County ("County")
requesting approval of a planned unit development ("PUD").

The Kootenai Gounty

Board of Commissioners ("BOCC") denied KHD's application on August 24, 2006.
M D appealed from the denial of its application ("First Appeal") in Kootenai County
Case No. CV-06-06587.
While the First Appeal was pending, KHD filed a Motion for Mediation. On
December 21, 2006, an Order Granting Motion for Mediation was entered. The parties

1

Approximately 393 acres were zoned Rural and approximately 184 acres were zoned Restricted
Residential. The minimum lot size in the Rural zone is five (5) acres. The minimum lot size in the
Restricted Residential is 8J50 square feet. See Iioote~tcriCorrrzl~jCoeic §$ 9-13-3 ei~zcl9-8-3.
See Application in PUD-054-05. This application requested preliminary approval of a PUD with a
proposed subdivision within the PUD.

'

1-
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mediated on Jmuary 19, 7 0 0 7 , and entered into a Post-Mediation Agreement
("Agreen~ent"}on the same day. As a result of the Agreement, the parties stipulated to a
stay of tlie First Appeal.
On March 14, 2007, KHD filed another application.3 In addition, KHD filed a
Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreernent in Kootenai County Case No. CV-06-06587 on
April 24, 2 0 0 7 . Basically, W D contended that, if it met the conditions set forth in the
Agreement, it was entitled to the requested permits.
The BOCC voted to deny the second application and, on December 20, 2007, the
BOCC entered its ~ecision.' On January 9 , 2 0 0 8 , KHD filed an Appeal of the denial by
the BOCC of its second application in Kootenai County Case No. C V - 0 8 - 0 0 1 6 3
("Second Appeal").
Pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, an Order was entered consolidating the
First Appeal in Kootenai County Case No. CV-06-06587 and the Second Appeal in
Kootenai County Case No. C V - 0 8 - 0 0 1 8 3 .

Following a hearing, KHD's Motion to

Enforce Mediation Agreement was denied.5
3

See Applications in PUD-057-07 and S-878P-07. The second application included a request for a PUD,
which was assigned Case No. PUD-057-07, and a request for a subdivision, which was assigned Case No,
S-878P-07, within the PUD. The second application was a modified application. The proposed gated
community would have consisted of no more than 500 units on the 578 acres of property. The residential
component of the development consisted of single family dwellings, condominiums, and villas. The
development also included a number of amenities, including a golf course, a spa, an athletic/recreationaI
center with camp style activities for children, tennis courts, fishing ponds, walking, hiking and bilcing trails,
a helipad for emergency services, a community shuttle service, an amphitheatre, a community dock, and
various retail activities. The project would occur in three (3) phases over a period of ten (10) years.
The second application was initially scheduled for Public Hearing before Hearing Examiner Lisa ICey.
The Hearing Examiner recommended denial of the application. The BOCC also held a Public Hearing on
the application. On December 4, 2007, the BOCC conducted a site visit; the site visit included viewing the
site for the proposed wastewater treatment facility, existing roads to the waterfront, location of village
clusters with respect to adjacent properties, and the locations of the other amenities requested in the PUD.
This site visit is not challenged by KHD.
"he Order Denying Appellant's Motion to Enforce Mediation Agreement (as amended) contained certain
rulings. The Post-Mediation Agreement executed by ICHD and Icootenai County was enforceable as a
contract and was clear and unambiguous. However, the Agreement did not contain any guarantees or
assurances that Kootenai County would approve the application to be submitted by KHD and I(l(~izoCode 8
4 , - . - -
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Neighbors for Responsible Growth and certain individuals ("bJeighbors") filed a
Motion to Intervene. That Motion was granted. The Neighbors have intervened only in
the Second Appeal.
After a number of motions and objections6 were filed and entered by the parties, a

1
f

!

comprehensive hearing was held. At the hearing, both the First Appeal and Second
Appeal were addressed. The records have been prepared and the parties have provided
briefing on the issues. The matter has now been submitted to this Court for a decision.

7

I1
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Local Land Use Planning Act, which is found in Idaho Code $ 67-6501, et
seq., governs matters involving land use. According to Idalzo Code $ 67-6519, judicial
review of planning and zoning decisions made by a board of county commissioners under
the Local Land Use Planning Act (LLUPA) is to be made in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the Idaho Administrative Procedures Act.

The Idaho

Administrative Procedures Act (IAPA) is found in Idaho Code $67-5201 et seq,
The scope of judicial review of administrative decisions is as follows:

67-6519(4)(c) cannot be construed to require Kootenai County to approve an application upon a finding
that KHD had complied with the conditions set forth in the Agreement. Therefore, the Agreement would
not be enforced as requested by KHD. Otherwise stated, the Agreement was enforceable, but not as KHD
wanted it to be enforced.
The motions and objections included: (1) MOTION REQUESTING RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER
(Denying Appellant's Motion to Enforce Post-Mediation Agreement) AND, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
CERTIFICATION OF THE COURT'S DECISION by Appellant; (2) OBJECTION TO REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANT AND MOTION TO STRIKE by Respondent Kootenai County; (3) MOTION FOR
APPEAL OF COMMISSIONERS' DECISION ON PUD APPLICATION 054-05 by Appellant; (4)
OPPOSITION TO APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR APPEAL OF COMMISSIONERS' DECISION ON
PUD APPLICATION 054-05 by Respondent Kootenai County.
7
The hearing was conducted on June 4,2008, At the hearing the parties advised the court that they were
continuing to negotiate a possibl'e resolution. They preceeded to oral argument, however, asked the court to
defer ruling pending those efforts. On June 25,2008 the court was advised by correspondence that efforts
to settle were unsuccessful. Accordingly the matter was taken under advisement at that time.

"

? r
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(1) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as
to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact.

...
(3) When the agency was required by the provisions of this chapter or
by other provisions of law to issue an order, the court shall affirm
the agency action unless the court finds that the agency's findings,
inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency;
(c) made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole; or
(e) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside, in whole or
in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary.
(4) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection . . . (3) of this section,
agency action shall be affirmed unless substantial rights of the
appellant have been prejudiced.
Idalto Code § 67-5279. Thus, the review of a land use decision under this section is a
two tiered process: (1) the party attacking the board's actions must illustrate that the
board ened in a manner specified under subsection (3): and (2) that a substantial right of
that party was prejudiced. A court reviewing the decision of a board pursuant to Idaho
Code § 67-6279 may reverse or remand for further proceedings only if substantial rights
of the appellant have been prejudiced. Cowan v. Board of Conznzissioners of h n z o n t
County, 143 Idaho 50 1, 148 P.3d 1247 (2006); Angstnzan v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho

LLUPA requires counties to submit written decisions in all planning and zoning
matters. Findings of fact and co~~clusions
of law are included in such decisions. Idalto
Code § 67-6535(b). Judicial review of an order is limited to the record. Idalto Code §
67-5277; Balser v. Kooteizai Coccitty, 110 Idaho 37, 714 P.2d 6 (1986). The board's
r-

6
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findings of fact are to be tipheld if they are supported by sribslantial evidence in the
record as a whole. Sarzders Orclzar~lt?. Genz County, 137 Idaho 695, 52 P.3d 840 (2002).
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance.
Substantial and competent evidence may be contradicted. It does not necessarily lead to

a certain conclusion. It only needs to be "of such sufficient quantity and probative value
that reasonable minds could reach the same coilcl~isionas the fact finder." Cowan v.

Bonrdof Commissioners ofFrenzont County, 143 Idaho at 517, 148 P.3d 1263.
The court must defer to the board's findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. The factual findings are not clearly erroneous so long as they are supported
by substantial, competent, although conflicting, evidence. A strong presumption of
validity exists for the actions taken by zoning boards, which includes the application and
interpretation of their own zoning ordinances. Cowan v. Board of Conzmissioners of

fiemont Courtty, supra; Evans v. Teton County, 139 Idaho 7 1, 73 P.3d 84 (2003);
Payette Kivrr Property Owners Association v. Board of County Comnzissioners of
Valiej~County, 132 Idaho 55 1, 976 P.2d 477 (1 999); Sanders Orcltard v. Gent County,
supra. The party challenging a decision made by a board bears the burden of proving
that the ordinance was applied improperly. Angstnzan v. City of Boise, supra.
This Court is constrained to adhere to the standards set forth above in reaching its
determinations in this case.
111

THE FIRST APPEAL
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In the First Appeal, Appellant

KHD seeks judicial review of a decision entered by

Respondent BOCC denying an application submitted in PUD-054-05.'

When the Post-

Mediation Agreement was entered into by the parties, the First Appeal was stayed
pending a filing of a new or second application. Appellant KHD filed a Second Appeal
following the denial of the second application. After the two appeals were consolidated,
Appellant filed a Motion for Appeal of Commissioners' Decision on PUD Application
054-05. Respondent objected and contended that the Post-Mediation Agreement between
the parties superseded and extinguished any claims raised in the appeal of the first
application for the Chateau de Loire project.
Thereafter, KHD submitted its Consolidated Supplemental and Reply Brief,
which basically incorporated the First Appeal into the Second Appeal.

Respondent

submitted a Response and referenced its earlier briefing. Arguments relating to both
Appeals were addressed in these memorandums. Accordingly, to the extent that there are
issues related or common to both cases, those issues will be addressed in the next section
dealing with the Second

peal.'

In this consolidated case, there were two applications which gave rise to two
Appeals. No determination is made here as to whether the Post-Mediation Agreement
and the filing of the second application superseded and extinguished any claims raised in
the First Appeal because such is not necessary in order to reach a decision in this case.
The issues raised by KHD in the First Appeal will not be addressed at length in
this section. Rather, the specific issues raised in the Second Appeal will be addressed in

8

Appellant submitted a Brief and Respondent also submitted a Brief on the issues raised in the First
Appeal.
9
Intervenors/Respondents filed a Brief in the Second Appeal. They were not a part of the First Appeal.
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the next section and, where

KHD now argues that issues relating to the First Appeal

should be considered, they will be included there.
Alternatively, with regard to the First Appeal, the Decision of the BOCC and the
record on the First Appeal have been reviewed. See Findings of Fact, Comprehensive
Plan Analysis, Conclusions of Law and Order of Decision dated August 24, 2006. On
Appeal, W D raised three issues. See Notice of Appeal filed on September 1, 2006. The
standards for judicial review set forth in statutory and case law require that KHD niust
illustrate that the BOCC erred in a manner specified in Idaho Code § 67-5279(3) and that
a substantial right of KHD was prejudiced. Even if KHD could illustrate that the BOCC
had erred, the substantial rights of KHD have not been prejudiced. Any error that might
have existed was in effect cured when the parties entered into the Post-Mediation
Agreement, which identified certain concerns of the BOCC and essentially acknowledged
their validity and which resulted in a second application that was subsequently filed by

KHD" Thus, the challenge of Appellant KHD to the Decision of the BOCC with regard
to the First Appeal fails and must be denied.

IV

THE SECOND APPEAL
Following a second application, the BOCC entered Findings of Fact, Applicable
Legal Standards, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Decision dated December 20, 2007.
Thereafter, KHD filed a Second Appeal. Appellant listed six (6) issues for appeal. See
Notice of Appeal in Kootenai County Case No. CV-08-00163, p. 2. Pursuant to Idaho

l (I

Z(/(tho Code # 67-5279(3) provides that, if an agency's action is not affim~ed.it must be set aside and
remanded for further proceedings. Viewing the matter most favorably to ICHD and practicall>~spealting,
the second application acted as a remand - it was another opportunity for KHD to obtain approval for the
Chateau de Loire project.

q
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8 67-5279, the denial of the applications by the BOCC must be affirmed unless

KFID can illustrate that the BOCC erred in a manner specified under subsection (3) of the
statute." In this case, KHD appeals on grounds that the decision of the BOCC was: (1)
in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (2) in excess of the statutory
authority of the agency; (2) made upon unlawful procedure; (3) not supported by
substantial evidence on the record as a whole; or (4) arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of
discretion.

A.

Were the Findin~sof Fact, Analysis, and ConcIusions of Law Supported bv
Substantial evidence in the Record as a Whole?

Under Idaho case law, the BOCC's findings of fact are to be upheld if they are
supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Pursuant to Idaho Code 8 675279(1), this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the BOCC as to the weight
to be given the evidence on questions of fact.
In the second application, KHD requested approval of a PUD and also approval of
a subdivision. The requirements for proposed PUDs are set forth in Chapter 15 of the
Kootenai County Zoning Ordinance, which is found in Title 9 of the Kootenai County
Code. The requirements for proposed major subdivisions are set forth in the Kootenai
County Subdivision Ordinance, which is found in Title 10 of the Kootenai County Code.
Certain findings must be made before a hearing examiner can recommend approval of a
PUD application and before the BOCC can approve a PUD application. Those findings
are found in K.C.C. $ 9-15-9(C). Also, certain findings must be made before a hearing
examiner can recommend approval of a major subdivision application and before the

" Even if KHD can illustrate that the BOCC essed in a manner specified under subsection (3) of the statute,
KHD must also show that its substantial rights have been prejudiced; otherwise, the actions of the BOCC
must be affirmed.

q r
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'The BOCC reached a decision that it could not make all of the required findings
for a number of reasons. A review of the Decision reveals that it consisted of the
following rnajor sections:

7
11
I11
IV
V
VI

Course of Proceedings
Findings of Fact
Applicable Legal Standards
Comprehensive Plan Analysis
Board Analysis and Conclusions of Law
Order of Decision

The Applicant does not challenge the first section dealing with the Course of
Proceedings. In the second section, thirty-four (34) Findings of Fact were set forth. The
Findings of Fact were supported by references to various exhibits in the record. The third
section set forth the Applicable Legal Standards, including references to the ordinances
governing PUDs and subdivisions and to the Comprehensive Plan. In section four, the
goals of the Kootenai County Conlprehensive Plan were set forth and analyzed. Finally,

in the fifth section, the BOCC reached its conclusions. The BOCC concluded, among
other things, that the proposed development was not compatible with certain goals,
policies, and the future land map of the Comprehensive Plan. The BOCC also concluded
that the application and design did not meet PUD requirements and other requirements.
In addition, the BOCC concluded that the proposed development was not compatible
with the surrounding area, including natural characteristics and features such as wetlands
and steep slopes as well as neighborhoods. Furthermore, the BOCC concluded that the
transportation infrastructure and emergency services were not "feasible, available and
adequate."
q <
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The question here is not whether KHD presented evidence in support o f its second
application; the question is whether there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the Decision of the BOCC that KHD failed to meet all of the applicable
requirements. While KND may not agree with the findings and conclusions reached by
the BOCC, the record contains evidence to support the BOCC's concerns regarding water
service, disturbance of wetlands, runoff and erosion from steep slopes, transportation on
Highway 97 and the Beauty Bay Hill, continued availability of adequate emergency
services, compatibility of the density in the PUD projtct with the sunounding
neighborhood, and other matters.
The record in this case was voluminous. Conflicting evidence was presented on
many of the issues. The evidence came from a variety of sources, including staff,
experts, interested persons, and residents, as well as from maps, photographs, letters, and
reports. The BOCC weighed the evidence and reached a decision. Under the applicable
law, this Court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the BOCC as to the weight to be
given the evidence. Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion. Applying the relevant legal standards, the Findings
of Fact, Analysis, and Conclusions of Law reached by the BOCC in this case were
supported by substantial evidence in the record.

B.

Did the BOCC arrive at their Decision in a manner that was arbitrary,
capricious, or an abuse of discretion?

KHD contends that the Decision of the BOCC was arbitrary, capricious, and an
abuse of discretion. The contention appears to be based on two arguments.
The first argument is that it was arbitrary and capricious for this Board to find that
the second application failed to meet certain goals of the Comprehensive Plan when a
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prior Board .Found that the first application met those goals.

In denying the first

application for PUD, the BOCC found that the applicant failed to meet Goals 7 and 14.
In denying the seco~ldapplication for a PUD and subdivision, the BOCC found that the
applicant failed to meet Goals 4, 7, 9, 14, 17, 23 and 24 of the Comprehensive Plan. On
the second application, IWD was seeking approval not only of the PUD, but also of the
subdivision. Therefore, the BOCC could reach different determinations on the two
applications. Furlhemore, in this case, the membership of the BOCC changed between
the time that the first application was denied and the time that the second application was
denied. In reaching a decision, the BOCC considered the evidence presented at the
hearing on the second application.12 Thus, it is possible for one Board, acting in its
quasi-judicial capacity, to find that a Comprehensive Plan goal was met while another
Board could find that it was not.13 AS determined in Subsection IV(A) above, the
Decision of the BOCC on the second application was supported by substantial, although
conflicting, evidence in the record. The Decision was not arbitrary and capricious or an
abuse of discretion.
The second argument is that an application for a similar development was
approved while KHD's application was denied. A prior BOCC approved an application
for a project lcnown as "Gozzer Ranch." Although the Gozzer Ranch project was similar
in certain ways and in a somewhat similar location, the Chateau de Loire project involved
a different property with different plans. Also, there were no other developments on that
side of Lake Coeur d7Alene at the time that Gozzer Ranch was considered. However, by
the time that KHD made the application for the Chateau de Loire project, Gozzer Rancli
KHD participated fully in the second hearing.
This is analogous to a case in which a new trial is granted. Where one judge might render certain rulings
at the first trial, another judge might make different findings upon retrial based on the evidence presented.
l2
13
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had been approved and other applications were being considered. Finally, based on past
experiences, the impact of large scale developments in Kootenai Co~tntyis now more
closely scrutinized by the BOGC and by the public in general than earlier developments
to make certain that applications meet all of the applicable requirements. Every planning
decision is fact specific. The granting of one application cannot be the precedent to
requiring the granting of a similar application." Even though a previous application for
Gozzer Ranch had been approved, it was not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of
discretion for the BOCC to deny KHD's application for the Chateau de Loire project
when the Decision was based upon substantial evidence in the record.
In conclusion, the BOCC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously and it did not
abuse its discretion in denying KHD's second application.

C.

Was the BOCC's Decision in violation of constitutional or statutory
provisions?

Authority for the adoption of ordinances relating to subdivisions is found in Idalto
Code § 67-6513. Authority for the adoption of ordinances relating to planned unit

developments as part of or separate from the zoning ordinance is found in Idalto Code §
67-6515.

Both statutes contain the following statement: "Denial of a subdivision

[planned unit development] permit or approval of a subdivision Iplanned unit
development] permit with conditions unacceptable to the landowner may be subject to the
regulatory taking analysis provided for by section 67-8003, Idaho Code, consistent with
the requirements established thereby." I h l t o Code § 67-8003 sets forth the procedure
for agencies to evaluate whether proposed actions may result in a taking of private
property without due process of law. However, Chapter 80 of Title 67 of the Idaho Code
14

If that was the rule, there would be no need for subsequent applications for other properties

?
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does not expand or reduce the scope of private property protections provided by the
federal and state constitutiol~s.Zdalzo Code $678001.
In its Opening Brief, KITD raised an issue regarding failure to comply with fdalzu

Code $ 67-6535(c). The statute provides as follows: "Every final decision rendered
concerning a site-specific land use request shall provide or be accompanied by notice to
the applicant regarding the applicant's right to request a regulatory taking analysis
pursuant to section 67-8003, ldaho Code." KHD did not receive such a notice. This
failure to provide notice does not serve as a basis to either reverse or remand the decision
of the BOCC. As previously noted the scope of judicial review provides that the agency's
actions shall be affirmed unless the court finds that the decision was in violation of
statutory provisions or made upon unlavvful procedure. The notice of the regulatory
taking analysis is a post decision requirement. It is not a statutory or procedural defect
upon which the agency action is based.

Furthermore, KHD has requested such an

analysis by letter dated April 7, 2008." The status of an analysis is unknown. To the
extent that Kootenai County may have failed to comply with Idaho Code

8

67-8003

following KHD's request, an adequate remedy is set forth under that statute.
KHD alleges that the denial of its PUD and subdivision applications by the BOCC
constituted a taking of private property by Kootenai County without just compensation.
Both the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, $5 13 and 14 of
the Idaho Constitution protect private property from being taken by a gover~lrnentalentity
for public use without just compensation.

15

Although it was not a part of the record below and has not been fonnally filed, a copy of this letter was
received and is attached to the Court File.
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The United States Supreme Court has stated that a "taking" reqcriring just
compensation under the Fifth Amendment occurs "wlien the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common
good, that is, to leave his property economically idle." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal

Courzcil, 505 U.S. 1003, 1019, 112 S.Ct. 2886, -,

120 L.Ed.2d 798,

(1 992)

(emphasis in original). The Idaho Supreme Court followed Lucas in interpreting Article

I, § 14 of the Idaho Constitution. In Moon v. Nortlz Zdnho Farmers Association, 140
Idaho 536,542,96 P.3d 637,643 (2004), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that when there
had been no claim of "a permanent deprivation of all economically beneficial uses of
their land . . . . under the Idaho Constitution, which does not allow less than a total
deprivation of use or denial of access, and under Lucas, there is no taking in violation of
the state or federal constitution."
In the instant case, KHD has failed to show that the denial of its application
amounts to a permanent deprivation of all economically beneficial uses of that property.
The record shows that, prior to KHD's purchase of the property, it was used for
agricultural purposes. Part of the property is forested. Additionally, KHD can develop
the property with any use permitted in each of its respective zones.
The denial of KHD's second application did not constitute a "regulatory taking"
requiring just compensation under either the United States Constitution or the Idaho
Constitution.
KE1D claims that the Decision of the BOCC constituted a denial of equal
protection by treating the KHD property differently from the Gozzer Ranch property.
KHD bases its claim on the "class of one" doctrine. The purpose of the equal protection
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution is to secure every
person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination. An
equal protection claim based on a "class of one" is one in which the plaintiff alleges that
(1) the plaintiff has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated,
and (2) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment. Villnge of Wiillo~~hrook
v. Oleclz, 528 U.S. 562, 120 S.Ct. 1073, 145 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2000). In this case, the

evidence does not reveal that the BOCC "inttenlioi~ally" treated KHD's application
different from the Gozzer Ranch application. Furthermore, rational bases exist for any
difference that might exist in the treatment of the Chateau de Loire development as
compared with the Gozzer Ranch development.16 It cannot be determined that KHD's
equal protection rights were violated.

D.

Did the BOCC act in excess of its statutory authority?

KHD argues that the BOCC exceeded its statutory authority when it determined
that its principal grounds for denial were that the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance
for the property were inappropriate and the zoning ordinance should be changed. First,
the record does not reflect that the BOCC gave as its principal gvounds for denial that the
uses permitted by the zoning ordinance for the property were inappropriate. Second the
record does not reflect that the BOCC found that the uses permitted by the zoning
ordinance for the property were inappropriate. The subject property is zoned Rural and
Restricted Residential. The BOCC and the Intervenors acknowledged that permits could
be granted for the uses permitted by the zoning ordinance. However, the BOCC found
that the project as proposed by KHD did not meet certain requirements of the zoning

16

A similar issue was addressed in more depth in Subsection IV(B) above. The conclusion here is
consistent with the outcome there.
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ordinance. Finally, the record does not reflect that the BOCC reached a determination
that the zoning ordinance should be changed. The BOCC did not exceed its statutory
authority when it denied permits to KHD for the Chateau de Loire based upon the
standards set forth in its existing ordinances.

E.

Was the Decision by the BOCC made upan unialvful procedure?
KHD alleges that the BOCC's violated its due process rights when the BOCC

denied its applications. M e n acting upon a quasi-judicial land use matter, a zoning
board cannot be a proponent or an opponent of the proposed project. Instead, the board
sits in the seat of a judge. Therefore, the Due Process Clause applies to the board in the
same way that it applies to judges. Marcia T. Turner, L L C v. City of Twin Falls, 144
Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840 (2007).17 See also Cowan v. Board of Commissioners of
Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501,148 P.3d 1247 (2006).
KWD claims that the BOCC violated KHD's due process rights when it relied
upon an unsupported and unrelated political outcry, ex parte communications,
unauthorized site visits, and personal studies by members of the BOCC. In particular,
KHD complains about the following: (1) Members of the BOCC making independent site
visits or advocating denial of the application based on their own personal studies; and (2)
Public pressure for a denial of the applications.
First, KHD challenges the actions of the BOCC on grounds that members made
independent site visits and advocated denial of the application based on their own
personal studies. In Comer v. County of Twin Falls, 130 Idaho 433, 942 P.2d 557

l 7 The Turrzer court explained the concept of "impartiality" in detail in the opinio~z.See Turtzcr, 144 ldaho
at 209, 159 P.3d at 846 (impartiality means lack of bias and ensures equal application of the law, but it does
not mean a lack of preconception on legal issues - only that the judge is willing to consider views that
oppose his preconceptions and remain open to persuasion.)
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(1997), the Idaho Supreme Court held that a board of county con~missionersviolated the
due process rights of certain persons protesting a permit for a dairy when the board

d
#i

viewed the subject property without notice and without giving parties or their
representatives an opportunity to be present. The instant case is distinguishable from

Comer. Here, KHD objects to comments made by Commissioner Currie as to his
personal observations about Highway 97 prior to the Decision of the BOCC on the first
application. The record does not show that Commissioner Currie conducted a "site visit"
which is entitled to due process. Highway 97 is a major roadway within Kootenai
County; it is one that is traveled regularly by many folks and one with which many
people in Kootenai County are familiar to some degree.

The record reveals that

Commissioner Currie only stated that he had driven Highway 97.

KHD had an

opportunity to present evidence regarding Highway 97 and other interested persons
testified regarding the condition of Highway 97. Prior to a determination on the second
application, the entire BOCC conducted a properly noticed site visit.I8
The BOCC voted unanimously to deny the second application.

Even if

Commissioner Cunie's vote was not considered, the votes of Commissioners Piazza and
Tondee would still act to deny the second application.
Second, KHD challenges the actions of the BOCC on grounds that it was a
violation of due process and equal protection for a quasi-judicial body to be swayed by
public sentiment and political pressure to deny the applications based on ultra vires
public requests to change the zoning of the site. The public did not request a change in
the zoning of the subject property. The public did, however, object to the proposed
development as presented by KHD during hearings in front of the BOCC. The BOCC

'' This "site visit" is not disputed or challenged.
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including those who approved and disapproved of the proposal, and evidence that was
presented by members of KHD's development team. While the testimony of the public

may have been persuasive, the record reflects that the BOCC also considered other
evidence presented at the hearing on the second application. The record does not reflect
that the BOCC was unduly influenced. The findings and conclusions were supported by
substantial evidence in the record as a whole. Under lntako Code § 67-5279(1), this
Court cannot cannot substitute its judgment for that of the BOCC as to the weight of the
evidence.
The conclusion here is that the BOCC did not make its decision upon unlawful
procedure on either of the two grounds raised by KHD that have been addressed in this
section.

F.

Were the substantial rights of the Appellant KHD preiudiced by the action of
the BOCC?

A court reviewing a land use decision by a local board must affirm the action
unless the party challenging the action can show that a substantial right of that party was
prejudiced. Idnlto Code 8 67-5279(4); Angstman v. City of Boise, 128 Idaho 575, 91 7
P.2d 409 (Ct.App. 1996).
In Appellant's Opening Brief, KHD argues that the BOCC violated its substantial
rights and due process of law by a wrongful taking of its private property. That issue has
been addressed in Subsection C above. The result here is the same.
KHD also contends that the BOCC failed to set forth reasonable conditions that it
could take to have its Applications accepted. A review of the Decision entered by the
BOCC on the second application indicates that the BOCC set forth seven (7) items that
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might be incorporated into any subsequent application. However, the Decision also
contained the following statement: "Implementation of the above actions is NOT a

guarantee of future approval." The items were matters about which the BOCC were
concerned with regard to any approval for the development of the subject property under
a PUT> or subdivision application.

As ruled earlier in this case, such items are

conditional; approval of future applications is based upon the record at- that time.

It cannot be found that KHD's substantial rights were prejudiced by the action of
the BOCC. First, KHD has not shown that the BOCC erred in a manner specified under
Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). Furthermore, the denial of this particular application by the
BOCC does not deprive KHD of any 1awfi.d use of its property existing prior to the filing
of its application. Because it was applying for a PUD, KHD was seeking a change in the
way its existing land uses would be treated. After the denial, KHD was left with the
same status, condition, and uses available for its land as existed before KHD applied for
the PUD. W D ' s property can still be put to any use permitted under the applicable laws,
regulations, and ordinances. Finally, KHD can make another application if it so desires.

G.

Is KHD entitled to an award of attorney fees?
In its Notice of Appeal for the Second Appeal, Appellant KHD claims that

Respondents are liable to it for all attorneys' fees and costs. Ictnlzo Code § 12-117
governs the award of attorney fees in civil actions to which a public entity is a party. The
statute provides for an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party or a party prevailing in
part. However, attorney fees may be awarded only if the court finds that the party against
whom the judgment or partial judgment is rendered "acted without a reasonable basis in
fact or law. . . ." Even if a reviewing court later finds that the case involved an erroneous
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inteqretation of a statute or ordinance, an award of attorney fees is unwarrat~tcdif the
public entity "acted in a way that fairly and reasonably addressed the issue." Payette

River Propero) Owners Ass'n v. Valley County, 132 Idaho 551, 558, 976 P.2d 477, 484

(1 999).
In this case, KHD was not a prevailing party. Even if KHD was a prevailing
party, it cannot be found that the Respondents acted without a reasonable basis in fact or
law. In this case, the BOCC held lengthy hearings and an extensive record was compiled.
The parties engaged in mediation and more than one application was submitted by KHD.
The Respondents have acted in a way that fairly and reasonably addressed the issues. In
conclusion, KHD is not entitled to an award of attorney fees against Respondents.

H.

Did the BOCC act inappropriately in other ways?
Appellant KHD has raised other issues regarding the actions of the BOCC. Those

issues will be addressed below.

1.

Decision of BOCC as a Quasi-Judicial Act

A board acts in a quasi-judicial capacity when it considers whether to approve or
deny applications for PUDs and subdivisions. Quasi-judicial activity is differentiated
from legislative activity. Legislative actions by a board produce a rule or policy which
has application to an open class. Quasi-judicial activity, on the other hand, impacts
specific individuals, interests, or situations. Legislative actions cannot be attacked by a
petition for judicial review as can quasi-judicial actions. Marcia T. Turner v. City of

Twin Falls, 144 Idaho 203, 159 P.3d 840 (2007).
When a board acts upon a quasi-judicial zoning matter, the board cannot be either
a proponent or an opponent of the proposal. The board sits in the seat of a judge.
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Therefore, the Due Process Clause applies to a zoning board in the same way that it
applies to judges. Id.
In this case, Appellant KHD argues that the BOCC acted in a legislative manner
rather than a quasi-judicial manner when it denied the applications. According to KHD,
the BOCC had previously made the zoning decision in its legislative capacity and was
left only with the quasi-judicial task of approving applications of landowners whose
applications were in conformity with the zoning ordinance. KHD's argument is based
upon the zoning classification. KHD contends that the BOCC had no discretion to deny
applications based on considerations other than the zoning ordinance classification and,
since this property was zoned as Restricted Residential and Rural, the applications had to
be approved. However, the BOCC was reviewing the specific proposal for the Chateau
de Loire as a PUD and a subdivi~ion.'~The requirements of the Kootenai County
Ordinances pertaining to those kinds of proposals applied as well as the underlying
zoning classification.
Both parties agree that the BOCC had to act in a quasi-judicial capacity when it
considered the applications. Here, the BOCC acted in that capacity when it reviewed the
applications based upon the requirements for PUDs and subdivisions set forth in the
applicable Kootenai County Ordinances.

2.

Denial based on non-conformance with the Comprehensive Plan

KHD claims that the BOCC relied principally upon the non-compliance of the
applications with the Kootenai County Comprehensive Plan and that doing so was legal
error. Comprehensive plans do not themselves operate as legally controlling zoning law.
19

The proposal included more than lots and land divisions; it included a golf course, condominium areas,
and other amenities. Neither the Respondents nor the Intervenors deny that Appellants can act in accord
with the zoning classifications, i.e., so many units per acre, and that has not been a disputed issue.
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They serve to guide and advise the governing bodies responsible for malcing zoning
decisions. A board cannot rely solely on non-compliance with the comprehensive plan in
denying an application. To do so would elevate the comprehensive plan to the level of
legally controlling zoning law. However, the goals of the comprehensive plan can be
considered and used in conjunction with applicable ordinances in evaluating a proposed
development. Urrutin v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353,2 P.3d 738 (2000).
The instant case can be distinguished from those cases where boards relied only
on the comprehensive plan goals in denying an application. Here the BOCC set forth the
applicable legal standards upon which it relied in Section 111 of the Decision dated
December 20,2007. Those standards included not only the Comprehensive Plan but also
the Subdivision Ordinance, the Zoning Ordinance, and other applicable ordinances and
statutes. Although Section IV of the Decision was devoted to a Comprehensive Plan
Analysis, Section V contained the Board Analysis and Conclusions of Law. While the
items set forth in Section V addressed the Comprehensive Plan, they also addressed other
ordinances and other issues required before the PUD application could be approved.
In sum, the BOCC did not rely solely on the Comprehensive Plan in denying
KHD's request for permits for a PUD and subdivision for its proposed development.
Instead, the BOCC relied upon the proper legal standards, considering the
Comprehensive Plan but also applying standards set forth in the Kootenai County
Ordinances. The BOCC did not use the general language of the Comprehensive Plan as
the sole basis for denying KHD's second application for a PUD and a subdivision.

3.

Equitable Estoppel
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When denying KHD? first application, the BOCC relied upon KFID's failure to
comply with Goals 7 and 14 of the Comprehensive Plan. Thereafter, the parties entered
into a Post-Mediation Agreement setting forth certain actions that KHD could take to
obtain approval of the proposed PUD. In the Decision denying the second application,
the BOCC cited Goals 4, 7, 9, 14, 17, 23 and 24 of the Comprehensive Plan. KHD now
claims that the doctrine of equitable estoppel bars the BOCC from introducing new
alleged compliance deficiencies based on newly asserted Comprehensive Plan Goals in
its deniai of the second application and claims that it had met all requirements set forth in
the Post-Mediation ~ ~ r e e m e n t . ~ '
The elements of estoppel are as follows:
(1)

(2)
(3)
(4)

a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actual
or constructive knowledge of the truth;
the party asserting estoppel did not lmow or could not discover the
truth;
the false representation or concealment was made with the intent
that it be relied upon; and
the person to whom the representation was made or from whom
the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon the representation
or concealment to his prejudice.

Twin Falls Clinic & Hospital Bldg Corp. v. EianziIl, 1 03 Idaho 1 9, 644 P.2d 34 1 (1 982).
In this case, the BOCC did not falsely represent that it would approve KHD's
application if KHD met the Goals 7 and 14 without considering any other Goals of the
Comprehensive Plan and the BOCC did not falsely represent that, if =ID

met the

conditions set forth in the Post-Mediation Agreement, the Chateau de Loire project would
be approved. Ful-tliermore, the BOCC did not conceal the material fact that KHD would
be required to meet the standards set forth in the applicable Kootenai County Ordinances
before any permits would be issued. KHD filed a second application, which differed
20

This argument is similar to the argument made in Section IV(B), i r e .
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from the first application and which sought permits for a PUD and a subdivision. That
second application was subject to hearings and furtller decisions by the BOCC.
Therefore, KHD cannot meet the first element of equitable estoppel.
In addition, the second element requires that the party asserting estoppel did not
know or could not discover the truth. In this case, the filing of the second application and

the evidence W D presented at the hearings show that KHD recognized that there were
standards it would have to meet. Even if it did not know, KHD could have discovered
the information because the ordinances and requirements are readily available from the
County and are also posted on the Internet. Thus, KHD cannot meet the second element
of equitable estoppel.2'
KHD cited to a number of cases. See, e.g., Chisizolm v. Twin Falls County, 139
Idaho 131, 75 P.3d 185 (2003). However, those cases can be distinguished. It is well
settled that a board cannot enforce a change in an existing zoning regulation affecting the
property after a landowner has made an application and has made substantial
expenditures; an applicant's rights are determined by the zoning ordinance in existence at
the time of the filing of an application for a permit and a newly amended zoning
ordinance cannot be retroactively applied. In this case, KHD's right to a permit was
determined by the ordinances in existence at the time that its application was filed. The
BOCC did not amend its ordinances to affect KHD's application. The Decision on the
first application and/or the Post-Mediation Agreement cannot be considered as
amendme~itsof the Kootenai County ordinances by tlie BOCC.
The second element is not included among the elements in Jolrrt
Bro~vr?Properties v. Blnirte Connly,
138 Idaho 171,59 P.3d 976 (2002). In BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed.), p. 571, five elements are
listed with the first element listed in Twin Fitlls Clirtic & Hosp. Blilg. Corp. and Jolrrt N< Brown
Properties being separated into two elements; the second element is included as an element of equitable
estoppel in this source.
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In summary, the elements of equitable estopppel have not been met under the
facts in this case. The Idaho case law does not suppod a claim that equitable estoppel
should be applied herez2

4.

Reservation of Federal Constitutional Claims

In this case, the Decision of the BOCC is being affirmed. KHD has indicated that
it is reservitlg its right to bring claims in federal court for alleged violations of
constitutionaf rights arising from the determinations made by the BOCC at issue in this
case if a decision adverse to KHD is entered here. KHD has the right to bring such an
action if it decides to do so. KHD also requests that the decision in this case be entered
without prejudice so that such claims can be brought without concern as to res judicata or
preclusive effect of this Court's rulings.
This Court is bound by Idaho Code § 67-5279(3). According to the statute, the
agency action can be affirmed; if it is not, it must be set aside, in whole or in part, and
remanded for further proceedings. In accord with the statute, the action of the BOCC is
affirmed.

CONCLUSION
It is concluded that the action of the Respondent BOCC must be affirmed because
it cannot be found that the findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions of the BOCC
denying the applications of Appellant KHD were in violation of constitutional or
statutory provisions, in excess of its statutory authority, made upon unlawfiil procedure,
not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole, or were not arbitrary,
Even if equitable estoppel was applied to limit consideration only to Goals 7 and 14 of the
Comp~ehensivePlan, substantial evidence existed to support the findings of the BOCC on those Goals. See
Subsection IV(A) above.
22
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capricious, or an abuse of discretion as required under IcfnIzo Code 8 67-5279(3). Even if
the action of the BOCC had fallen within one of the categories listed in Idaho Code 8 675 2 7 9 0 , the action of the BOGC must still be affirmed because the substantial rights of
W D have not been prejudiced. Other issues raised by KHD have been considered
herein, but they do not alter the outcome.

VII

ORDER
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is hereby ORDEFED that the actions of the
Respondent Board of County Commissioners in this case be and they hereby are affirmed
as set forth herein.
DATED this

IY

.iL
day of August, 2008.

\?i?jPc

John Patrick Luster
District Judge
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Coeur d' Alene, ID 838 16

78 SW Fifth Ave. Ste 150
Meridian, ID 83632
Attornev for Intervet~ors/Respondents
Scott W. Reed
PO Box A
Coeur d'Alene, ID 838 14

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, 1 have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of said Court at
,2009.
Kootenai, Ida110 this 8 day of
DANIEL J. ENGLISI-I
Clerk of the District Coi~lt
By:

ICal::ryi~ Pb4. F f c ~ ' 3 ~ g j l ~ t y

IN

T H E S U Q ~COURT
C , ~ ~FOR THE STATE O F IDAHO

KIRK-HUGHES DEVELOPMENT, LLC
PetitionerIAppellant
Supreme Court Case 35730
Kootenai Co. Case CV08- 163
KOOTENAI COUNTY BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS;
ELMER R. CURRIE; RICHARD A.
PIAZZA and TODD TONDEE
Respondents
And
NEIGHBORS FOR RESPONSIBLE
GROWTH; NORBERT and BEVERLY
TWILLMAN; SUSAN MELKA;
BILL and SILVIA LAMPARD; DAVID
and BARBARA WARDSWORTH and
HEATHER BOWLBY
I ntervenorsIRespondents

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, Daniel J. English, Clerk of District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, In
and for the County of Kootenal, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record in the above
ent~tiedcause was compiled and bound under my direction as, and is a true. full and correct Record of the
pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the ldaho Appellate Rules.
I certify that the attorneys for the appellant and respondent were notified that the Clerk's Record
and Reporter's Transcript were complete and ready to be picked up, 01 if the attorney is out of'town, the
copies were mailed by U.S. mail; postage prepald, on the

2day of

abfiby

,2009.

I do further certify that the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript will be duly lodged with the
Clerk of the Supreme Court.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of sald Court at Kootenai,
Idaho this

day of

,2009.

DANIEL J. ENGLISH

a

Cler of Dlstl-~ctCOLIIT

By:

;"zt::cdn %#, ~ ' C C Q ~

Deputy Clerk

